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INTRODUCTION
This essay examines the burgeoning development of international
criminal law, focusing on the rise in prosecutions far from the locus
of the original crimes, particularly through the exercise of universal
jurisdiction. It surveys contemporary practice and argues that while
generally this exercise is a positive development, disparities in
practice, as well as the risk that practice may have negative effects
elsewhere generate reason for concern.' Part II argues for a practice
that is more consistent across jurisdictions and for caution in the
application of universal jurisdiction.2 It examines the virtues and
vices of executing justice at a distance in comparison to executing
justice locally. Part III argues for attentiveness to the local needs of
societies where mass atrocities or gross human rights violations may
occur and where distant justice is utilized.3 Next, this essay considers
one alternative to externalized justice-the mixed tribunal.' In such
cases, prosecutions take place in the location where the crimes
occurred, include international judges and often include
internationally determined rules and procedures. This approach,
however, also brings with it certain risks and limitations. Part VI of
this essay concludes with some reflections on the great strides, but
1. See infra Part I (examining the uneven developments in the application of
universal jurisdiction).
2. See infra Part II (arguing that inconsistent applications of universal
jurisdiction undermines the legitimacy of the doctrine).
3. See infra Part III (examining the potential ramifications for transitional
societies, and asking whether there are unintended adverse effects of the usage of
universal jurisdiction). See generally Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in
International Criminal Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 452 (1999) (looking at general
prospects for and developments in international criminal accountability); Chandra
Lehka Sriram, Universal Jurisdiction: Problems and Prospects of Externalizing
Justice, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 47-70 (2001) (discussing the problems of
distant justice and universal jurisdiction); Ruth Wedgewood et al., International
Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic Courts, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 120 (2001)
(providing an overview of the extensive debate over the appropriate role of
international versus domestic courts); Accountability for War Crimes: Progress
and Prospects: Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 106th Cong. (1999) (examining the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia and efforts to hold suspected Yugoslav war criminals
accountable in U.S. courts), available at http://www.house.gov/csce (last visited
Oct. 12, 2003).
4. See infra Part IV.A (examining the tribunal in East Timor).
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also limitations, in the development of international criminal
accountability.
A. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND DOMESTIC CRIMES
"Under the principle of universal jurisdiction a state is entitled or
even required to bring proceedings with respect to certain serious
crimes, irrespective of the location of the crime, and irrespective of
the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim."5 This principle only
applies to a limited number of crimes.6 These crimes include war
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture. This
principle also includes slavery and, for historical reasons, piracy.7
The prosecutions against Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in Spain and
Ariel Sharon in Belgium are two of the most famous examples of the
use of universal jurisdiction to punish a defendant for crimes
committed far from the nation and court seeking to try him or her.8
5. International Law Association, Committee on International Human Rights
Law and Practice, Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in
Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses, 2 (2000) [hereinafter Final Report],
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Human%20Rights%2OLaw/HumanRig.pdf
(last visited Oct. 28, 2003). See generally Universal Jurisdiction Information
Network, What is Universal Jurisdiction? (providing an overview of universal
jurisdiction versus other types of jurisdiction), at
http://www.universaljurisdiction.info/index/72646,74575 (last visited Oct. 13,
2003).
6. See PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION 28 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES]
(stating that universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the
nature of the crime).
7. See id. at 29 (listing the serious crimes under international law and
asserting that national judicial organs may apply universal jurisdiction to such
crimes, even if national legislation does not provide for it).
8. See Chandra Lekha Sriram, Exercising Universal Jurisdiction:
Contemporary Disparate Practice, 6 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 49 (2002) (giving a broad
survey of recent cases asserting universal jurisdiction, and noting the variance in
its application); see also Belgium Bars Sharon War Crimes Trial, BBC NEWS, June
26, 2002 (reporting a Belgium court's ruling that the case against Ariel Sharon
could not be brought because he was not in Belgium), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/2066808.stm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003);
Belgian Court Ruling Throws Doubt on Sharon Trial, HAARETZ.COM, Apr. 16,
2002 (discussing how a Belgium court found that no prosecution can be brought
against a person in abstentia), at
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B. A DELICATE BALANCE: UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
The exercise of universal jurisdiction may constitute a significant
challenge to national sovereignty, and may constitute a limitation on
the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs Of states.9
Jurisdiction has historically been tied closely to territorial
sovereignty, with quite limited exceptions for extraterritorial
application.10  With the exception of universal jurisdiction,
extraterritorial application of jurisdiction has tended to require a
nexus with the state seeking to try a case. There are four other
commonly cited bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction: 1) territorial,
basing jurisdiction upon the place where the offense was committed
or had its effects; 2) national, based upon the nationality of the
offender; 3) protective, based upon injury to the national interest; 4)
and passive personality, based upon the nationality of the victim."
Limitations upon extraterritorial jurisdiction derive from respect for
sovereignty, and they are made in large part to avoid jurisdictional
conflicts and to ensure consistency and predictability. While it is
important not to interfere unduly in the internal affairs of states in
times of transition, this essay suggests that the exercise of universal
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=152850&contrassl
D=l&sul (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
9. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII.").
10. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its
Place in International Law, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND
THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stephen
Macedo ed., forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 39, 39-63) (articulating the
relationship between sovereignty and the jurisdictional powers to prescribe,
adjudicate, and enforce).
11. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899-903 (D.D.C. 1988)
(describing the five traditional bases of jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes).
See generally Thomas M. Franck & Michael J. Glennon, FOREIGN RELATIONS &
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND SIMULATIONS 212-15 (2d ed.
1993) (discussing cases dealing with jurisdictional issues in the United States).
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jurisdiction may be particularly unsettling for transitional regimes. 2
This essay examines the burgeoning practice of universal
jurisdiction, as well as the broader phenomenon of "globalizing"
justice, and the ramifications of this developing practice. 3 After
surveying contemporary practice of universal jurisdiction, Part II
turns to the disparate practice, discerning three trends in developing
jurisprudence: 1) pure universal jurisdiction, 2) universal jurisdiction
"plus", and 3) non-use.1 4 This essay argues that the disparities in
practice should raise serious concerns as to the legitimacy and
perceived legitimacy of such globalized justice." Part III then
examines a further consideration that globalized justice may fail to
achieve many of its putative goals because it takes place far from the
locus of the crime and is thus "externalized. ' 16 It examines the
possibility, then, that certain alternative forms of globalized justice
may rectify some of the problems. For example, mixed tribunals in a
country, or other methods whereby internationalized justice takes
place, may be viable alternatives.
The next section examines contemporary practice with regard to a
wide array of countries, conflicts, and abuses, through cases filed in a
smaller number of countries. While the attempt, now foreclosed by
revisions to the Belgian legislation, to prosecute current Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon in Belgium is perhaps one of the most
12. See Nehal Bhuta, Justice Without Borders? Prosecuting General Pinochet,
23 MELB. U. L. REv. 499 (1999) (noting that a "frequently reiterated reason for
opposing the extradition, and one adverted to by Lord Lloyd in the first Appellate
Committee decision, is that prosecuting General Pinochet threatens to destabilize
Chile's successful transition from military rule to civilian government"), available
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/joumals/MULR/1999/20.html?query=%7e (last visited Oct. 14,
2003).
13. This essay will focus on only one method through which cases may be
heard in domestic courts for faraway crimes. I do not examine the Alien Tort
Claims Act, the Torture Victims Protection Act, or other legal tools in European
countries.
14. See infra Part II (identifying and examining three distinct approaches to the
use or non-use of the principle of universal jurisdiction).
15. See infra Part III (arguing that the needs of transitional societies are
complex and may militate for or against punishment).
16. See id. (examining the needs of victims and noting the benefits of truth
commissions).
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newsworthy cases of the exercise of universal jurisdiction, it is far
from the only one. 7 Universal jurisdiction, a part of customary
international law, is included in some national legislation,
international conventions, and judicial decisions. States, such as
Belgium and Spain, are increasingly exercising universal jurisdiction
to address crimes in places as far away as Chile and the Democratic
Republic of Congo ("DRC").
1 8
Part I examines several recent cases involving universal
jurisdiction and demonstrates the wide variance in national
approaches.' 9 Courts often refer to several alternative bases for
jurisdiction under international law, claiming competence based on
passive personality-the nationality of the victims of crimes.20 States
17. See Richard Bernstein, Belgium Rethinks Its Prosecutorial Zeal, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at A8 (reporting that a group of Lebanese Palestinians filed
a suit against Ariel Sharon in Belgium on charges of war crimes and due to Israel's
inability to prevent mass killings in Israeli-occupied Lebanon in 1982); see also
Marlise Simons, Sharon Faces Belgian Trial After Term Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
12, 2003, at A12 (reporting a Belgium court's ruling that Brussels could try Ariel
Sharon for war crimes under the national law, but not as long as he enjoyed the
immunity of his office as Prime Minister). See generally Press Release, Human
Rights Watch, Belgium: Anti-Atrocity Law Limited but Case Against Ex-Chad
Dictator Can Move Forward (Apr. 5, 2003) (reporting that in February 2003, the
Belgian Supreme Court upheld the Belgian law which permits victims to file
complaints in Belgium for abuses committed abroad, but held that sitting state
officials, like Ariel Sharon, had immunity from Belgian courts), available at
http://hrw.org/press/2003/040belgium040503.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
18. See Sriram, supra note 8, at 57-67 (providing a survey of cases applying
the principle of universal jurisdiction including proceedings against Argentine
junta members in Spain and proceedings against the Democratic Republic of the
Congo's Minister of Foreign Affairs in Belgium).
19. See infra Part I (examining cases in countries including Belgium, France,
and the United Kingdom).
20. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 901-03 (D.D.C. 1988)
(analyzing whether the passive personality principle offered the court a potential
basis for jurisdiction in a case of hostage-taking and aircraft piracy); see also
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 5, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture] ("Each State Party shall take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses referred
to in article 4 in the following cases: (a) When the offenses are committed in any
territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State; (c) When the victim is a
national of that State if that State considers it appropriate.").
308 [19:301
REVOLUTIONS INA CCOUNTABILITY
often also utilize a web of domestic legislation used to incorporate
international criminal law of a customary or treaty-based nature in
order to fulfill their obligations under relevant treaties and to enact
effective domestic legislation.21 Such legislation often makes
reference not only to universal jurisdiction, but also, or rather, to
passive personality.22 This usage of universality as well as alternative
bases of jurisdiction appears to be increasingly common, and is
described by some as universality plus.
23
National judges have taken radically different approaches to the
exercise of universal jurisdiction. The Spanish court explicitly
invoked universal jurisdiction, domestic legislation implementing
international treaties and norms, and passive personality jurisdiction
due to the existence of Spanish victims. 24 By contrast, the Belgian
magistrate addressing the Pinochet case found jurisdiction based on
customary international legal obligations and universal jurisdiction. 5
Clearly, practice is developing unevenly.
21. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 5, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter
Genocide Convention] ("The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance
with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the
provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective
penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in
Article III.").
22. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2003) (criminalizing the use of a weapon of
mass destruction against U.S. citizens and property in the United States and
abroad); id. § 2441 (criminalizing war crimes when committed against nationals of
United States).
23. See Diane F. Orentlicher, The Future of Universal Jurisdiction in the New
Architecture of Transnational Justice, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL
COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 10 (manuscript at 214, 216) (asserting that states' preference for
universality plus may have "significant implications for the development of a
broad consensus in support of principles governing the exercise of universal
jurisdiction").
24. See Sriram, supra note 8, at 52 (describing the proceedings in Spain and
noting that the complaint alleged Spain had jurisdiction "through a combination of
domestic and international law, to address crimes of genocide, torture, and
terrorism").
25. See id. at 55 (describing the proceedings against Pinochet in Spain and
noting that "[t]he investigating magistrate found that the prohibition of crimes
against humanity was part of customary international law andjus cogens and, thus,
2003] 309
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Pure universal jurisdiction is the boldest and least common
approach, which is best exemplified by the Belgian legislation and
jurisprudence. In a few cases, domestic judges have pursued
criminals for crimes established in international conventions, or that
form part ofjus cogens.26 These judges did not feel the need to rely
upon additional domestic legislation, although in the case of
Belgium, at least, such legislation is available. These recent instances
of pure universal jurisdiction are striking but still rare and it remains
unclear whether they are anomalies or represent a trend in practice.
These cases represent the boldest use of universal jurisdiction; in
other cases judges have been more tentative and have relied on
statutes providing for more traditional forms of extraterritorial
jurisdiction along with universal jurisdiction.
Judges in national courts have usually been more comfortable
combining what is to them a novel basis for jurisdiction with more
familiar bases like those linked to a state's territory or interests.
Legislation providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction over those
accused of serious crimes under international law may become more
expansive, and perhaps more consistent, as nations seek to conform
to their obligations as signatories to the International Criminal Court
("ICC") Statute; Belgium and Canada are among the nations that
have already made such revisions. In these types of cases, judges
part of the Belgian legal order even prior to the applicability of international
conventions.").
26. See id. at 56 (noting that in proceedings against Pinochet in Belgium, the
court did not principally rely on international conventions or domestic
implementing legislation). The court stated: "For these reasons we find, as a matter
of customary international law, or even more strongly as a matter of jus cogens,
universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity exists, authorizing national
judicial authorities to prosecute and punish perpetrators in all circumstances." Id.
27. See Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of
International Norms: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 159 (1993) (discussing the general wariness in the application of international
law and custom by domestic judges), available at
http://www.ejil.org/joumal/Vol4/No2/art2.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2003). See
generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 512-13 (4th
ed. 1990) (definingjus cogens as customary principles of international law that are
so overriding that states cannot set them aside "by treaty or acquiescence but only
by the formulation of a subsequent customary rule of contrary effect").
28. See A. Hays Butler, The Growing Support for Universal Jurisdiction in
National Legislation, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE
[19:301
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utilize universal jurisdiction plus. They may seek to assert
jurisdiction in accord with specific provisions of domestic legislation
that provide explicitly for extraterritorial application of criminal
legislation, or with domestic legislation incorporating provisions of
treaties that provide for such jurisdiction, or with domestic criminal
legislation. In some of these cases, judges simultaneously maintain
that jurisdiction could be based additionally or solely on universal
jurisdiction.
Finally, the more common practice is of non-use or non-
application of universal jurisdiction. Some courts have considered
the possibility that universal jurisdiction might provide them with
competence to enforce international law, but then balk at that
possibility and ultimately rely on domestic legislation or on passive
personality as a basis for jurisdiction. In some states judges continue
to rely upon ordinary domestic criminal legislation to pursue the
accused. Where they seek extraterritorial jurisdiction, they prefer to
rely on traditional territorial connections to establish it, such as is
provided when the accused allegedly committed a crime against a
national in a foreign state. In the absence of legislation broadening
extraterritorial jurisdiction over those accused of committing serious
international crimes, judges are often reluctant to exercise universal
jurisdiction.
While others have raised concerns elsewhere with regard to the
use of external judicial processes, the exercise of universal
jurisdiction may be of greater concern than the application of
international criminal law through institutions such as the ad hoc
criminal tribunals or the recently established ICC.2 9 Two reasons
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10
(manuscript at 67, 67-76) (comparing domestic legislati6n before the pre and post
ICC, and considering more restrictive legislation).
29. But see Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and
Non-Party States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 13-67 (2001) [hereinafter High
Crimes] (raising concerns about the International Criminal Court ("ICC") and
arguing that the states that are most likely to be "implicated in serious international
crimes are the least likely to grant jurisdiction over their nationals to an
international court"). However, Madeline Morris raises concerns about the impact
of the ICC on non-party states in this issue. See Madeline Morris, The Disturbing
Democratic Defect of the International Criminal Court, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L.
1, 109-18 (2001) [hereinafter Democratic Defect] (expressing concern about the
impact of the ICC on non-party states).
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exist for this: 1) the exercise of universal jurisdiction may not take
sufficient account of local needs; and 2) by taking place at a great
distance from the locus of the crimes, it may fail to serve many of the
putative purposes of prosecution.
Part III addresses the potential ramifications of using universal
jurisdiction for transitional societies, asking whether it serves the
needs of these societies, and whether there are unintended adverse
effects of its usage.30 The impact may be harmful precisely because
the purpose of universal jurisdiction is not explicitly to serve the
needs of the society affected by the crime. The needs of these
societies are varied and may militate for or against punishment. In
most instances the relevant considerations include not only the
culpability of the criminal, but also other societal needs. These
include stability, democratization and the rule of law, reconciliation,
and social learning, all of which require thorough address of local
actions.3' Doing justice elsewhere may serve retributive purposes,
may speak to the culpability of the criminal, might serve deterrent
purposes and certainly is part of a process of reinforcing and
elaborating upon global human rights norms, but it is far less clear
that it will have positive effects upon the needs of the society itself.32
30. See infra Part III (stressing the importance of identifying specific political
needs of transitional societies).
31. See Chandra Lehka Sriram, Truth Commissions and Political Theory:
Tough Moral Choices in Transitional Situations, 18 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 4, 471-92
(2000) [hereinafter Truth Commissions] (drawing on the political theories of
utilitarianism, deontoligical liberalism, and communitarism to explore whether
pursuing justice in transitional societies is favorable); CHANDRA LEHKA SRIRAM,
JUSTICE VS. PEACE OF TRANSITIONS: CONFRONTING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter JUSTICE VS. PEACE] (providing a
general account of the myriad goals, normative and political, that transitional
societies might pursue and those who seek to aid them in order to have the desired
local impact) (manuscript on file with the American University International Law
Review).
32. See Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution
and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1,
19 (2001) (examining the impact of the American and European cases on the
victims in the countries where abuses occurred); see also Roland Paris,
Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism, 22 INT'L SEC. 54, 54-89
(1997) (discussing broad skepticism about the liberal paradigm that guides external
aid to transitional processes and peace building).
[19:301
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Pursuing such "globalitarian" concerns may come at the cost of local
needs.
"Externalized justice" achieved through the exercise of universal
jurisdiction might badly serve or even undermine the needs of
transitional societies. However, there should also be cause for
concern that it may fail to serve other key demands frequently
imputed to judicial processes. It may bring perpetrators to justice,
and this goal should not be underestimated, but it may do far worse
in terms of deterrence, vindication of victims, and social learning.
C. EXTERNALIZED JUSTICE REVERSED: INTERNATIONALISED
INTERNAL PROCESSES
There is reason to believe that while some of the flaws of external
justice illustrated by universal jurisdiction may apply to other
institutions and processes, such as the international criminal tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, and in the future ICC,
there may be some remedy for external actors who still wish to help
societies that have experienced gross human rights violations and
war crimes. One might term this "externalization reversed," whereby
international actors set up quasi-international processes in the
country where the events of concern took place.33 While this may in
part remedy the concerns driven by geographical distance, some
lingering legitimacy concerns are likely to remain. Models such as
the proposal of a mixed tribunal for Cambodia, and of the Special
Court in Sierra Leone, as well as the United Nations-sponsored
international tribunal in East Timor may be effective alternatives, but
it is too soon to say definitively. In design, at least, they seek to
remedy some of the concerns this essay raises with regard to external
justice. On the other hand, the experience of the Timor body should
engender some concern about the likely efficacy of externalisation
reversed. Part IV examines the flaws of the mixed tribunal model
through the Timorese case, and speculates on the implications of this
analysis for other mixed tribunals such as those of Sierra Leone or
the one proposed for Cambodia.34
33. See Chandra Lekha Sriram & Brad R. Roth, Externalization of Justice:
What Does it Mean and What is at Stake?, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 3-6 (2001)
(addressing reverse externalization).
34. See infra Part IV (discussing mixed tribunals).
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This is not to suggest that the pursuit of international justice is not
in itself a noble goal, and one that may often be achieved. Certainly
it is not to suggest that "realism" or "pragmatism" should trump the
rule of law and justice. Rather it is to call for caution in pursuing
international justice, particularly external justice. Strategies for
accountability must consider short-term needs of societies where
crimes occurred, of victims of these crimes, and broader
ramifications for deterrence of future crimes and the legitimacy of
the principles they seek to uphold. At the same time, these strategies
must address the longer-term needs of communities and of human
rights more broadly.
I. UNEVEN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION
A. BACKGROUND: UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND RESPONSIBILITY
In recent years, growing numbers of cases have been brought
outside the territory of states where such crimes have occurred, but
they have not always met with success, partly because of the
continued ability of the accused to evade arrest and prosecution.35
While attempts by a Spanish magistrate to gain custody of former
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet Ugarte drew significant
international attention, as have cases brought against Henry
Kissinger and Ariel Sharon, the principle of universal jurisdiction is
part of customary international law.36 It applies to a variety of
35. See A. Hays Butler, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: A COMPILATION OF
DOCUMENTS (2000) (providing a survey of cases that have been brought in
European and other states not only against Pinochet, but also for crimes, inter alia,
in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia); see also Sriram, supra note 8, at 57-66
(discussing proceedings involving the exercise of universal jurisdiction, including
the proceeding in Spain against former Argentine junta members and proceedings
in Senegal against the former ruler of Chad, Hissene Habre).
36. See Ruth Wedgwood, International Criminal Law and Augusto Pinochet,
40 VA. J. INT'L L. 829, 836 n.14 (2000) ("[C]rimes prohibited by international law
attract universal jurisdiction under customary international law if two criteria are
satisfied. First, they must be contrary to a peremptory norm of international law so
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international crimes in connection with customary international
proscriptions, a variety of international legal instruments, domestic
legislation, and alternative bases for jurisdiction.37 Victims have
invoked the principle of universal jurisdiction in order to initiate
legal proceedings for crimes committed in places as varied as Chad,
Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Argentina, Chile, and
Suriname.38
Courts often simultaneously refer to alternative bases for
jurisdiction under international law, claiming competence based on
passive personality, or the nationality of the victims of crimes.39
States also utilize a web of domestic legislation in order to
incorporate international criminal law of a customary or treaty-based
nature and to fulfill their obligations under relevant treaties to enact
effective domestic legislation. Such legislation often makes reference
not only to universal jurisdiction, but also, or' rather, to passive
personality." This usage of universality as well as alternative bases
as to infringe ajus cogens. Secondly, they must be so serious and on such a scale
that they can justly be regarded as an attack on the international legal order.").
37. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899-903 (D.D.C. 1988)
(analyzing whether the passive personal principle offered a basis for the court's
jurisdiction over the hostage-taking and aircraft piracy charges against Yunis). The
court also assessed its jurisdiction under domestic law, including the Hostage
Taking Act, 18 U.S.C § 1203, as well as the Destruction of Aircraft Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 32. See id. at 904-09; see also PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 29
(stating that a judicial body of any state may exercise universal jurisdiction in
connection with serious crimes under international law such as piracy, slavery, war
crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture).
38. See Sriram, supra note 8 (providing a survey of recent cases involving the
application of universal jurisdiction to seek accountability for crimes that took
place in another jurisdiction).
39. Newer international criminal law treaties sometimes confer such
competence by consent among signatories. See Convention Against Torture, supra
note 20, art. 5(l)(c) (stating that State Parties shall take necessary measures to
establish jurisdiction offenses enumerated in article 4 in the cases "[w]hen the
victim is a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate").
40. See, e.g., Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 899-907 (asserting the court's jurisdiction
over Yunis based on the universal jurisdiction and passive person jurisdiction
principles). The court quotes the Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203, which
provides that "a defendant is properly chargeable for offenses occurring outside the
United States if... the offender or the person seized or detained is a national of
the United States." Id. at 904.
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of jurisdiction appears to be increasingly common, and is described
by some as universality plus.4
In essence, under universal jurisdiction, a state is competent to
judge an accused alleged to have committed certain international
crimes and found in its territory.42 Unlike other bases for jurisdiction,
such as passive personality, specific contacts with the state seeking
to assert jurisdiction are not required.43 The nationality of the victims
and the location were the crimes took place is not relevant; such
jurisdiction over international crimes enables states to fulfill treaty
commitments to try or extradite individuals suspected of certain
crimes. Such ample jurisdiction is generally justified on the grounds
that there are certain crimes under international law that affect the
international community or mankind generally, such as genocide,
terrorism, war crimes, and torture."a  Some claim that such
jurisdiction signals that certain crimes are so heinous that they both
threaten the international community and are forcefully condemned
by it; it is in the interests of justice everywhere that perpetrators be
brought to justice. 45 At the same time, the general principle is often
asserted that immunity of states and officials does not hold where the
crimes alleged are certain international crimes, such as genocide or
slavery. 6 This becomes important when potential defendants attempt
to claim immunity as heads, or former heads, of state. While the
decision by the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") in the Case
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
41. See Orentlicher, supra note 23 (asserting that universality plus is the
current trend among states' preferences).
42. See Final Report, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that the principle of universal
jurisdiction may entitle or even require a state to prosecute an individual for crimes
regardless of where they happened).
43. See id. at 2-3 (explaining universal jurisdiction and the rationale behind the
principle).
44. See id. at 5-9 (listing examples of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction).
45. See id. at 3 (nothing that another justification for universal jurisdiction is its
deterrent effect).
46. See Sriram, supra note 8, at 50-52 (providing a survey of cases exercising
universal jurisdiction including cases against heads or former heads of states such
as Augusto Pinochet Ugarte).
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Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)47 did affirm foreign minister
immunity, the court has not yet accepted a similar claim by DRC in
the Case Concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. France).48
As the examination of a wide array of contemporary cases here
clearly indicates, national judges find different ways to confront the
problem of addressing the serious crimes which may fall under
universal jurisdiction. For example, while the Spanish court seeking
the extradition of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte of Chile claimed that
Spain could assert universal jurisdiction, it also relied upon passive
personality jurisdiction. Domestic legislation implementing
international treaties and norms were the basis for the bulk of the
arguments. 49 By contrast, the Belgian magistrate addressing the
Pinochet case found jurisdiction based on customary international
legal obligations and universal jurisdiction in the absence of
domestic implementing legislation or passive personality.50 Clearly,
practice is developing unevenly, raising several concerns. Such
disparities and the concerns they engender make clear the need to
rationalize practice.
Concerns raised by such disparities include, but certainly will not
be limited to, questions of fairness, of legitimacy, and of competing
jurisdictions. Certainly, it will seem transparently unfair, especially
47. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the
Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) (discussing how the International Court
of Justice ruled that Belgium must cancel an international arrest warrant against the
former Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2003).
48. See Certain Legal Proceedings in France (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v.
France), 2003 I.C.J. 129 (July 11) (stating how the International Court of Justice
rejected the indication of provisional measure submitted by Republic of Congo),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icof/icofframe.htm (last visited
Oct. 15, 2003).
49. See Sriram, supra note 8, at 53 (providing that the Spanish court
determined that it had jurisdiction under the Law on Judicial Powers, "which
established Spanish competence to examine certain acts proscribed by international
conventions (including the Genocide Convention) whether committed by
Spaniards or foreigners outside national territory").
50. See id. at 56 (reporting that the Belgian court held that the acts constituted
crimes against humanity, and even without treaty-based obligations, the court, as
well as all courts, had a common responsibility to punish such acts).
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to the victims of repressive regimes, that certain individuals are more
likely to escape accountability because the courts of a country in
which they seek refuge, passage, or medical treatment hold to a
narrow basis for jurisdiction. Further, it has not escaped the notice of
many that the states seeking to apply universal jurisdiction are
largely countries of the "global north," prompting some to suggest
that these activities are illegitimate and even that they imply a degree
of neo-colonialism. Finally, as we have already seen in the Pinochet
case, numerous states might seek to assert jurisdiction over the same
individual. Reconciling these competing claims will be further
complicated by the absence of coherent principles and the presence
of multifarious grounds for jurisdiction."
While it might be the case that such practice converges over time,
an overview of the case here demonstrates that this has yet to
happen. This underscores the importance of developing consistent,
hopefully progressive, principles and practice. It is beyond the
purview of this essay to resolve competing state interests or to
identify what the principles should be. The primary purpose here is
to present the current range of practice as a foundational step to
enable further discussion and the refinement to proceed.
B. THE PINOCHET CASES:
SPAIN, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND CHILE
The procedures seeking to bring General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
to justice for killings, torture, disappearances, and genocide during
his rule have taken place in several countries in recent years.52
Because many articles address the Pinochet case in detail,53 this
51. See Orentlicher, supra note 23 (manuscript at 233-37) (assessing
competing claims to jurisdiction).
52. See generally Richard J. Wilson, Prosecuting Pinochet: International
Crimes in Spanish Domestic Law, 21 HuM. RTs. Q. 927 (1999) (providing an
overview of the Pinochet case, including his arrest and the evidence underlying the
warrant for his arrest), available at
http://muse.jhu.edu/joumals/humans-rights-quarterly/v021/ (last visited Oct. 12,
2003).
53. See Richard Falk, Assessing the Pinochet Litigation: Whither Universal
Jurisdiction?, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10
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section will only briefly summarize the proceedings against him in
Spain, the United Kingdom, and Chile.
1. Proceedings in Spain
On July 4, 1996, the Union Progresista de Fiscales ("UPF"), a
group of Spanish prosecutors, brought a complaint against Pinochet
and others in a penal chamber of the Spanish Audiencia Nacional for
crimes against humanity and genocide committed between 1973 and
1990.1' The complaint laid the groundwork for factual and legal
claims that others would use in subsequent actions against Pinochet.
The complaint addressed actions occurring between the coup that
carried Pinochet and his junta to power in Chile on September 11,
1973 through the return of the country to democratic rule in April
1990. It alleged that the Pinochet regime kidnapped, detained,
tortured, killed, or "disappeared" individuals supportive of the
deposed regime, and subsequently protected its members through the
1978 self-amnesty legislation and the institution of "Senator-For
Life" status for Pinochet 5
The complaint alleged that Spain has jurisdiction, through a
combination of domestic and international law, to address crimes of
genocide, torture, and terrorism. Under the Spanish Law on Judicial
Power, Spanish courts are competent to hear cases addressing these
crimes though they occur outside Spanish territory and regardless of
(manuscript at 97, 97-120) (assessing the short-term and long-term ramifications
of the Pinochet legal proceedings).
54. See Derechos Chile, Chronology - 1996 (noting the date on which Spanish
prosecutors brought the complaint against Pinochet), at
http://www.chipsites.com/derechos/l 996_eng.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2003).
55. See The Withdrawal of Augusto Pinochet's Parliamentary Privileges:
Another Brick in the Wall, ANDEAN NEWSLETTER (quoting from Article 58 of the
1980 Chilean Constitution), available at
http://www.cajpe.org.pe/informa/mayo2000/ElNFIO.HTM (last visited Oct. 13,
2003).
No representative or senator, beginning on the day of his election or
appointment, or on the day of his incorporation, whichever is the case, can be
tried or deprived of his liberty, except in the case of crime detected by
authority, if the court of appeals of the respective jurisdiction, as a matter of
law, does not previously authorize the charges, declaring that there is due
cause. Id.
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whether a Spanihrd or a foreigner commits them.56 Thus, the
argument under domestic law was that Spain could address these
crimes even if there was no killing of a Spanish citizen in Chile,
although, as the complaint and subsequent judicial orders emphasize,
there were in fact Spanish victims.57 It was also claimed that Spain
has a sovereign interest in the cases due to the presence of Spanish
victims; and it was further claimed that this undermined the Chilean
junta's self-amnesty, which could only have legal effect, if at all, in
Chile. Domestic legislation was not the only ground articulated for
the exercise of jurisdiction by Spain. The complaint turned to
international law as a further basis to pursue crimes through
universal and other bases for jurisdiction. 8
Crimes committed under Pinochet were also said to constitute
crimes of genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention, and of
torture.5 9 The Convention Against Torture does not allow for
defenses such as obedience to superior orders or official status, 60 and
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
56. See Fiona McKay, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: Criminal Prosecutions
in Europe Since 1990 for War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, Torture and
Genocide 37 (Redress 1999) (noting that Article 23 "confers jurisdiction on
Spanish courts over crimes committed outside Spain"), available at
http://www.redress.org/publications/UJEurope.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
57. See Falk supra note 53 (manuscript at 97-120) (dealing more extensively
with the court's bases for jurisdiction, both under domestic and international law).
58. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 38-39 (providing a summary of the bases for
jurisdiction the Audiencia Nacional considered).
59. See Sriram, supra note 8, at 5 (providing an overview of the laws addressed
in the complaint against Pinochet); see also Genocide Convention, supra note 21,
art. 1 (stating that "Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed
in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they
undertake to prevent and to punish"). Spain incorporated the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide into the Spanish Penal Code with Law
44/71 of 15 November 1971. See Sriram, supra note 8, at 68 n.15.
60. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 21, arts. 1.1, 2.3 (defining
torture and stating that "an order from a superior officer or public authority"
cannot serve as a justification for torture); see also id. arts. 4-5 (discussing the
measures that countries should take to punish torture and stating the extent of a
state's jurisdiction over such crimes).
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("ICCPR") there is no immunity for persons acting in an official
capacity. 61
The complaint requested that the ministries of justice and external
affairs provide further information on all of the cases of Spanish
citizens and others who were killed or who disappeared in Chile
during this period, as well as identify judicial processes that were, or
were not, pursued for these acts.62 It called for a rogatory request to
the United States to obtain information in government archives
regarding such crimes, for freezing the assets of the accused, and if
appropriate, for the issuance of international arrest warrants.63 The
complaint also requested extradition of those responsible to Spain
under the treaty of judicial assistance and extradition between Spain
and Chile. 64
Late in 1998, Judge Baltasar Garzon of Investigating Court
Number Five determined that Spain had jurisdiction to hear
allegations of genocide and torture that took place under Pinochet's
leadership, and in November 1998, the Criminal Division of the
Spanish National Court unanimously upheld his ruling. 65 The Chilean
61. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Oct. 5, 1977, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 art. 2.3(a) (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] (ensuring that a
person whose rights have been violated is entitled to an effective remedy
"notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity").
62. See The Criminal Procedures Against Chilean and Argentinean Repressors
in Spain: A Short Summary (Nov. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Criminal Procedures in
Spain] (reviewing the content of the 1996 complaint), at
http://www.derechos.net/marga/papers/spain.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2003).
63. Id.
64. See Treaty on Extradition and Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters, Apr.
14, 1992, Spain-Chile, art. 1, 1854 U.N.T.S. 122 (stating that the Contracting
Parties undertake the responsibility to extradite persons being sought by the other
state's judiciary).
65. See Derechos Human Rights, Spain-Chile: Writ of the Instructing Court
accepting the Jurisdiction of the Pinochet case (Sept. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Writ of
the Court] (relying on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide and the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, the Central
Investigatory Court determined that Spain had the jurisdiction to judge crimes of
genocide and torture), available . at
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/juicio/jurie.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2003);
see also Wilson, supra note 52, at 950-65 (describing the court's reasoning in
finding jurisdiction).
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government objected vehemently to this assertion, arguing that
Spanish courts were not competent to judge allegations of crimes
against humanity committed in third countries and that Pinochet had
immunity as an ex-head of state and had parliamentary immunity as
a "Senator-for-Life. 66
In October of 1998, despite Chilean objections and acting on
information regarding Pinochet's presence in the United Kingdom
for medical treatment, Judge Garzon ordered Pinochet to provisional
imprisonment, issued an extradition request, and an international
arrest warrant allowing for his extradition from the United Kingdom
to Spain for trial. 67 He also ordered the freezing of Pinochet's assets
and those of other accused criminals.
68
Building on preliminary facts alleged in the complaints, facts
provided by the Chilean National Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation, and a 1982 Spanish parliamentary investigation, the
Spanish court determined that the alleged acts could constitute
genocide, terrorism, and torture. It held that such acts are subject to
judicial action under domestic and international law and are subject
to universal jurisdiction under a number of interpretations. 69 Further,
the court claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Law on
Judicial Power, which established Spanish competence to examine
certain acts proscribed by international conventions, including the
Genocide Convention, whether committed by Spaniards or foreigners
outside national territory.70
Additionally, judicial orders provided that Spain had power to
address the crime of genocide under the Genocide Convention,
66. See Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis
and Others Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (H.L. 1999) [hereinafter Pinochet II]
(summarizing Chile's anticipated argument regarding immunity).
67. See Criminal Procedures in Spain, supra note 62 (discussing the
procedural history of actions against Pinochet in Spain).
68. See Pinochet Assets Frozen, BBC NEWS ONLINE (May 15, 2001)
(addressing the freezing of the assets of Pinochet), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/em/fre/-/1/hi/world/americas/1332560.stm (last visited
Dec. 16, 2003).
69. See Writ of the Court, supra note 65 (granting jurisdiction to hear the case,
even though the alleged crimes occurred abroad).
70. See id. (noting that the international community has the obligation to
"preserve the right to live").
322 [19:301
2003] RE VOL UTIONS IN A CCOUNTA BILITY 323
which Spain incorporated into its domestic law in 1971.71 The court
further found the proscription of genocide to be jus cogens.72 It also
found that if Spain had jurisdiction over crimes of genocide and
terrorism, which also encompasses torture, then it had jurisdiction
over crimes of torture as defined in the Convention Against
Torture.73
2. Extradition Proceedings in the United Kingdom
On October 17, 1998, British authorities arrested Pinochet based
on Judge Garzon's arrest warrant. 74 Along with his claims of
71. See id. ("The crime of genocide is defined in the Convention of the 9th of
December of 1948, and this definition has been included in our own Judicial Code,
through the law 44/1971 of 15 November, as a consequence of our adherence to
the Convention.").
72. See Criminal Procedures in Spain, supra note 62 (describing findings that
Pinochet's actions were subject to universal jurisdiction because genocide is
considered to be ajus cogens principle).
73. See Writ of Court (recognizing universal jurisdiction for torture under
article 5.1). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also prohibits
torture. See ICCPR, supra note 61, art. 7 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one
shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation."). The Convention Against Torture also provides that states will
take measures necessary to ensure jurisdiction when, for example, the victim is a
national of that state. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 21, art. 5 ("Each
State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offenses referred to in article 4 in the following cases: (a)
When the offenses are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board
a ship or aircraft registered in that State; (b) When the alleged offender is a
national of that State; (c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State
considers it appropriate.").
74. See Pinochet II supra note 66; see also Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary
Magistrate and Others Ex Parte Ugarte, [2000] 1 A.C. 61 (H.L. 1998) [hereinafter
Pinochet I] (noting that on October 16, 1998, a Metropolitan Magistrate issued a
provisional warrant for Pinochet's arrest pursuant to section 8(l)(b) of the
Extradition Act of 1989, and issued a second warrant on October 22, 1998 based
on the application of the Spanish Government, which did provide a hearing for
Pinochet), available at http://www.derechos.net/doc/hl.html (last visited Oct. 11,
2003). See generally, Bhuta, supra note 12 (providing an account of the Pinochet
proceedings in the United Kingdom, and examining the national security doctrine
and state violence in Latin America); Amnesty International, United Kingdom:
The Pinochet Case-Universal Jurisdiction and Absence of Immunity for Crimes
against Humanity (Jan. 1999) (providing an account of the Pinochet case,
including how the acts alleged in the case amount to crimes against humanity, an
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immunity, Pinochet claimed he had never been a subject of Spain,
and thus alleged that an extraditable crime was not identifiable.75 A
somewhat complex process followed in which the Chilean
government intervened in the British proceeding, arguing that it
involved an exercise of jurisdiction over Chilean subjects contrary to
international law.76 The Chilean government also argued that the
proceedings directly affected Chilean "rights," including its
transition to democracy and its relations with the United Kingdom
and Spain. It argued that the Chile was the appropriate place to judge
Pinochet, and asserted national "sovereignty" as specifically alleged
immunity for ex-heads of state.77 In support of these claims, the
government cited practice and policy related to non-interference in
the "sovereign" acts of nations. The Law Lords concluded that ex-
head of state immunity did not apply in the case of certain
international crimes such as torture, hostage taking, and other grave
crimes. Pinochet, however, brought an appeal to set aside the
decision based upon links between one of the Law Lords and
Amnesty International. A reconstituted panel held that while ex-
explanation of universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and torture, and
an overview of criminal responsibility under international law of heads of state for
crimes against humanity), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGEUR450011999 (last visited Oct. 22,
2003).
75. See Pinochet II, supra note 74 (citing decrees establishing him as president
of the junta and as head of state).
Since torture outside the United Kingdom was not a crime under U.K. law
until 29 September 1988, the principle of double criminality which requires
an Act to be a crime under both the law of Spain and of the United Kingdom
cannot be satisfied in relation to conduct before that date if the principle of
double criminality requires the conduct to be criminal under United Kingdom
law at the date it was committed. Id. at 582.
76. See Christine M. Chinkin, International Decision: United Kingdom House
of Lords: Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 573, 704 (1999) (providing an account of the legal process
against Pinochet, starting with Magistrate Baltasar Garzon's initiative to take
advantage of Pinochet's presence in the United Kingdom to seek his extradition to
Spain).
77. Id.
78. See Pinochet II, supra note 74, at 592-93, 596-97 (discussing the issue of
sovereign immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). The
interpretation of the State Immunity Act 1978 of the United Kingdom was also
relevant to the court's decision. Id. at 593, 597, 603.
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heads of state did enjoy immunity in the United Kingdom with
respect to the exercise of official functions, torture could not fall
under that rubric.79 It imposed a significant temporal limitation under
domestic law, limiting crimes to those occurring after the United
Kingdom ratified the Convention Against Torture in 1988.80 After
that date, any torture committed outside the United Kingdom is also
a crime in the United Kingdom. Conspiracy in Spain to murder
someone in Spain was also found to be an extraditable crime.8'
Home Secretary Jack Straw authorized extradition proceedings on
December 9, 1998, and although he reconsidered the matter in light
of the massive reduction of extraditable charges, he confirmed his
decision on April 15, 1999.82 He reversed this stance in March 2000,
due to Pinochet's health, specifically his mental fitness to stand
trial." Pinochet returned to Chile on March 3, 2000 amidst
significant outcry from other states and human rights organizations.84
79. See id. at 583 (reasoning that Pinochet's official duties could not
encompass acts of torture as defined under the Convention Against Torture).
80. See id. at 582, 613 (concluding that a court cannot apply the Convention
Against Torture retroactively to make torture a crime in the United Kingdom
before it was ratified in 1988).
81. See id. at 582-88 (explaining that dual criminality generally requires that an
act be a crime in the United Kingdom at the time of commission and at the time
that extradition was sought). Charges were upheld treating conspiracy in Spain to
murder someone in Spain as an extraditable crime of terrorism under the European
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism. Id. at 588.
82. See Letter from Jack Straw about the Extradition of Pinochet, Derechos
Human Rights (Apr. 15, 1999) (observing that the Secretary of State had taken
careful account of the representation presented by the legal representative of
Senator Pinochet, the Spanish Government, the Chilean Government, and legal
representatives for the "Interveners," and had issued the new Authority to
Proceed), available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/juicio/straw.html (last
visited Oct. 11, 2003). The English Court was in agreement with the decision to
allowing the proceedings against Pinochet. See Derechos Human Rights, Judgment
of the English Court Allowing the Extradition of Pinochet (Oct. 8, 1999) (allowing
the extradition of Pinochet), available at
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/juicio/extra2.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
83. See Jack Straw's Full Commons Speech, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Jan 12,
2000 (reporting on the Secretary of State's remarks that "[t]he unequivocal and
unanimous conclusion of the three medical practitioners and the consultant
neurophysiologist was that, following recent deterioration in the state of Senator
Pinochet's health, which seems to have occurred principally during September and
October 1999, he is at present unfit to stand trial, and that no change to that
2003]
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3. Proceedings in Chile
Pinochet's return to Chile did not mark the end of legal action
against him. Charges were filed in Chile for a number of killings of
political prisoners in 1973, which sought to hold Pinochet
responsible for actions of his official delegate, General Sergio
Arellano Stark." The first hurdle the prosecution faced was the
parliamentary immunity Pinochet held as "Senator-for-Life."
Proceedings would have to first strip him of that immunity. On June
5, a Santiago Court of Appeals did just that.86 The defense appeal of
this ruling reached the Chilean Supreme Court, which upheld the
stripping of Pinochet's immunity.87 In December, a judge charged
Pinochet with kidnapping and ordered his arrest, but this Supreme
Court overruled this decision, while leaving open the possibility of
recommencing action against Pinochet at a later time.88
position can be expected."), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/pinochet/Story/0,11993,194674,00.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2003).
84. See Belgium Human Rights Groups Challenge Pinochet Medical Exam,
CNN.CoM, Jan. 25, 2000 (reporting that Belgium and six human rights groups filed
petitions Tuesday with the court, seeking judicial review of the medical advice that




85. See Amnesty International, Pinochet Case: Step by Step Towards Justice,
June 6, 2000 (praising the Santiago Court of Appeals decision to lift Pinochet's
parliamentary immunity), at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR220122000?open&of=-ENG-CHL
(last visited Oct. 22, 2003); Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Questions and
Answers on the Return of Pinochet to Chile (2000) (providing an account of the
status of the cases against Pinochet in Chilean courts), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/02/pinq&a.htmi (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
86. See Chilean Court Strips Immunity from Pinochet, CNN.COM, June 5, 2000
(explaining how Pinochet was stripped of his immunity), at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/06/05/pinochet/ (last visited Dec. 18,
2003). Curiously, these proceedings were not directly based on universal
jurisdiction.
87. See Clifford Krauss, Pinochet Reportedly Stripped of Immunity in Secret
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2000, at A4 (reporting on the Chilean Supreme Court's
decision).
88. See Clifford Krauss, High Court Voids Charges for Pinochet; Sets New
Date, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at All (reporting that the Chilean Supreme
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4. Proceedings against Pinochet in Other Countries
a. Proceedings in France
Upon Pinochet's arrest in the United Kingdom pursuant to a
Spanish warrant, several French victims filed complaints in October
1998, requesting the initiation of proceedings against him in France
for crimes against humanity, kidnapping, torture, and
disappearances.89 French courts issued two international arrest
warrants concerning five cases.90 In two others the domestic statute
of limitations barred the cause of action. 9' Previous decisions had
already established that under French law, universal jurisdiction does
not exist for crimes against humanity.92 However, under international
law, France could have jurisdiction in cases involving torture where
the accused is later present in France, and its enforcement
competence would generally be based on territoriality. Nonetheless,
under the penal code passive personality jurisdiction can apply for
acts committed outside France against a French victim by a
foreigner.93 France has refused to characterize the acts committed as
Court affirmed the decision of an appeals court, stating since the investigative
judge failed to obtain a detailed deposition, the judge improperly ordered
Pinochet's house arrest).
89. See Brigitte Stem, International Decision: French Tribunal de Grande
Instance (Paris), 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 696, 696 (1999) (discussing a warrant issued
on Nov. 2, 1998, which related to the disappearance of three French citizens in
Chile under Pinochet's rule); see also MCKAY, supra note 56, at 24 (stating that
criminal jurisdiction in France is based on the territorial, active personality, and
passive personality principles).
90. See Stem, supra note 89, at 697 (noting that the first warrant related to
three victims, French citizens who were residing in Chile, and the second warrant
concerned two French citizens who disappeared in Argentina).
91. See id. (noting that Judge Roger Le Loire, juge d'instruction du Tribunal de
grande instance of Paris, decided that the relevant statute of limitations barred two
of the cases from prosecution).
92. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 24 (noting that criminal jurisdiction in
France rests on the territorial, active personality, and passive personality
principles).
93. See id. (noting that articles 113-117 of the French Penal Code state that
France retains jurisdiction in cases where a foreigner commits a crime against a
French citizen).
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genocide, thus such acts are treated under other domestic criminal
law and statutes of limitation will bar certain prosecutions.94
b. Proceedings in Belgium
Following Pinochet's arrest in the United Kingdom, Chilean exiles
filed complaints against him in Belgium. 95 The investigating
magistrate found that the prohibition of crimes against humanity was
part of customary international law andjus cogens, and thus, part of
the Belgian legal order even prior to the applicability of international
conventions.96 Referring to the customary obligation to initiate
prosecution or to extradite, the magistrate found a direct obligation
of Belgian authorities to ensure punishment of such crimes
irrespective of where the crime took place. The magistrate found that
Pinochet would ordinarily be immune from prosecution in Belgium
for actions taken in exercise of his function as a head of state, but
held that the crimes alleged, such as torture, could not be official acts
under the authority or normal functions of a head of state.97 While
Belgium only enacted implementing legislation for the Geneva
94. See id. at 697-700 (stating that the statute of limitations could bar cases
such as murder and torture, whereas the statute of limitations did not bar ongoing
crimes such as kidnapping and disappearances).
95. See Luc Reydams, International Decision: Belgian Tribunal of First
Instance of Brussels (investigating magistrate), 93 AM. J. INT'L L 700, 700 (1999)
(stating that the six Chilean exiles residing in Belgium filed a criminal complaint
alleging the Pinochet committed crimes under international law, as defined in the
Belgian statute which implemented the Geneva Convention and Protocols); see
also MCKAY, supra note 56, at 18 (providing that the 1993 legislation mandated
that certain breaches of the Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols I & II
could be tried in Belgium courts).
96. See Reydams, supra note 95, at 702 (noting that the court deternmined that
crimes against humanity have become cusotmery international law).
The concept of crime against humanity has been incorporated in several
international documents but these texts codify only a customary law crime.
This is proven by the fact that several of these documents were drafted after
the commission of the acts ... we find that, before being codified in a treaty
of statute, the prohibition on crimes against humanity was part of customary
international law and of intemational jus cogens, and this norm imposes itself
imperatively and erga omnes on our domestic legal order. Id.
97. See id. at 700 (noting that the official function of the head of state is to
protect his subjects, and thus the court could not grant immunity for crimes such as
torture, murder, and hostage taking).
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Conventions and Additional Protocols in 1993, which provided
Belgian courts with universal jurisdiction, the court held that the
legislation was retroactive because the acts defined in the legislation
were already punishable in Belgium as common crimes.98 The judge
also found that the Geneva Conventions and Protocols required the
existence of an armed conflict and, thus the 1993 legislation was not
applicable to Chilean peacetime oppression.99 However, the acts
were crimes against humanity that were so unspeakable that, even in
the absence of treaty-based obligations, punishment was a common
responsibility of all states. 100 The decision did not rely heavily upon
specific international conventions or domestic implementing
legislation, but stated that as a matter of customary international law,
or even more strongly as a matter of jus cogens, universal
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity exists, and authorizes
national judicial authorities to prosecute and punish the perpetrators
in all situations. 101 In February of 1999, the Belgian Parliament
passed legislation establishing universal jurisdiction in Belgian
courts over genocide and other crimes against humanity, which
included certain forms of systematic torture.
10 2
98. See id. at 702 (stating that "when ratifying the Genocide Convention,
Belgium did not deem it necessary to implement the Convention in its domestic
legislation because 'the principles of the Convention could already be considered
part of the Belgian legal order').
99. See id. at 701 (discussing that the magistrate considered the available
information about the situation in Chile at the time of the allege crimes, and that
there was no internal armed conflict, according to the definition provided in Article
1 of Additional Protocol II).
100. See id. (explaining that the court referred to statutes and jurisprudence of
the Nuremberg, former Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals, municipal statutes, and
judicial decisions, and found that there was a prima facie evidence that Pinochet's
acts constituted crimes against humanity).
101. See id. at 700 (stating that "[c]ustomary international law is equivalent to
conventional international law and is directly applicable in the Belgian legal
order.").
102. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 18 (explaining that the motivation behind
the new law was to implement Belgium's obligations under the Genocide
Convention and to allow Belgium to take actions against the genocide in Rwanda).
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c. Other Various Proceedings
The widow of a Swiss national also filed a complaint and a court
in Geneva sought an arrest warrant based on passive personality
jurisdiction in October 1998.103 While Switzerland did request
extradition from the United Kingdom, Pinochet's return to Chile
foreclosed further proceedings."" German citizens filed charges
against Pinochet in Germany. In November 1998, the case was
assigned to a regional court.105 However, the jurisdiction was based
on passive personality.
10 6
On November 26, 1997, human rights advocates and others filed a
complaint against Pinochet in Ecuador concerning the deaths of four
Ecuadorians during his rule in Chile. 07 The President of Ecuador's
Supreme Court was to decide, whether to open a summary
investigation. 
08
When Pinochet visited Amsterdam in May of 1994, he was spotted
and a complaint was filed against him in a Dutch court based on the
Convention Against Torture. 0 9 However, the prosecutor decided not
to prosecute, and the Amsterdam Court of Appeal subsequently
103. See id. (reporting that the widow of Alexei Jaccard, a Swiss national who
disappeared in Chile in 1977, filed a complaint in Switzerland).
104. See id. (noting that Switzerland's extradition request was based on the
principle of passive personality).
105. See id. (describing the charges brought by German citizens against General
Pinochet for alleged kidnapping and ill-treatment in Chile).
106. See id. (stating that the German courts did not base competence on
universal jurisdiction).
107. See Derechos Human Rights, Ecuador: Criminal Complaint Filed Against
Augusto Pinochet (Nov. 27, 1997) (summarizing the parties and the charges filed
against Pinochet in Ecuador), available at
http://www.derechos.org/press/chilel.html?pinochet (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
108. See id. (reporting that "Hector Romero Parducci, President of the
Ecuadorian Supreme Court of Justice, will have to rule on the opening of a
summary investigation and the criminal prosecution of Pinochet as well as other
people responsible for these crimes.").
109. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 34 (outlining the Criminal Law in Wartime
Act, enacted in the Netherlands in 1952, and its implications as well as describing
the Dutch case against Pinochet). The U.N. Committee Against Torture later
questioned the Dutch about their failure to pursue charges against Pinochet. Id. at
35.
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upheld the decision on the ground that the case would have faced too
many legal hurdles."'
C. THE ARGENTINE JUNTA
1. Proceedings in Spain
On March 28, 1996, a group of Spanish prosecutors filed a
complaint in Spain against former Argentine junta members and
others with regard to disappeared Spaniards in Argentina. I
As with charges against Pinochet, the complaint alleged that junta
leaders violently subverted the constitutional order through a coup in
1976 and did not reinstate democratic rule until 1983, carrying out a
systematic campaign of repression through kidnapping,
disappearances, torture, and murder, as well as the illegal adoption of
children. The complaint alleged that some thirty thousand persons
remain disappeared and that among the disappeared at least thirty-
five were Spanish citizens.'1
2
As with the Pinochet case, the complaints and subsequent judicial
holdings used a mixture of domestic and international, as well as a
mixture of customary and conventional law to assert jurisdiction.
Spain claimed competence to hear the crimes based upon universal
jurisdiction, but also referred to the Spanish citizenship of the
disappeared, thereby based jurisdiction on the passive personality
principle. 13 The complaint indicated that the 'acts alleged could
110. See id. (noting further that the only case to come before the Dutch courts
involved a Bosnian Serb in relation to war crimes committed during the Balkan
conflict).
111. See Richard J. Wilson, Spanish Criminal Prosecutions use International
Human Rights Law to Battle Impunity in Chile and Argentina (describing Spanish
prosecutors complaint addressing human rights violations in Argentina), available
at http://www.derechos.org/koaga/iii/5/wilson.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2003).
112. See id. ("The action, which began with less than 10 named victims, now
includes more than 300 persons of Spanish nationality or their relations lost in the
Argentine dirty war.").
113. See Writ of the Court, supra note 65 (finding that Spanish domestic law
recognized universal jurisdiction).
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constitute crimes of genocide and terrorism under domestic law." 4
As discussed above, the Law on Judicial Power recognizes universal
jurisdiction over crimes of genocide and terrorism. Furthermore,
under the Genocide Convention, genocide is a crime subject to
universal prosecution and thus can be pursued by Spain whatever the
place of commission or the nationality of the perpetrators or
victims." 5  The complaint alleged further that pursuing the
perpetrators was an exercise of Spanish "sovereignty," as some of
the disappeared were Spanish citizens." 16 It also alleged that since no
law of a foreign land can act as a limitation on the exercise of
sovereign competence, the procedural limitations and pardons
granted in Argentina could have no effect on Spanish competence.
Furthermore, the Spanish Constitution prohibits general amnesties.
The defense of due obedience to orders is generally recognized in
Spanish law, but not where orders are clearly illegal."7 Finally,
Article 2 of the Convention Against Torture states that superior
orders can not serve as a justification for torture. " 8
The case went forward under Judge Garzon, who affirmed Spanish
competence to hear the case on June 28, 1996." 9 Garzon dispatched
a rogatory commission under a bilateral treaty of judicial assistance
to obtain information from Argentina, and Argentina rejected the
request for information due to alleged formal deficiencies in the
114. See Criminal Procedures in Spain, supra note 62 (discussing the arguments
asserted in the complaint regarding universal jurisdiction under Spanish law).
115. See infra notes 130-131 (asserting that combination of articles 5 and 6
implicitly require Contracting Parties to exercise universal jurisdiction); see also
Criminal Procedures in Spain, supra note 62 (arguing in the alternative that the
Genocide Convention also provides a basis of universal jurisdiction).
116. See Criminal Procedures in Spain, supra note 62 (describing the basis for
complain by Spanish prosecutors).
117. See JUSTICE VS. PEACE, supra note 31, at 191-212 (discussing the
obedience to orders defense).
118. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 20, art 3 ("An order from a
superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of
torture.").
119. See Juicio por los desaparecidos espanoles en Argentina: Providencia del
Magistrado Juez D. Baltasar Garzon, (Jan. 23, 1997) [hereinafter Providencia de
Juez D. Baltasar Garson] (stating the response of Argentine Ministry of Foreign
Affairs as well as the judge's commentary), available at
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/espana/coop.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
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request. 20 The proceedings went forward nonetheless and in March
and October 1997, Judge Garzon issued orders of unconditional
provisional imprisonment against former junta leaders, including
Admiral Luis Massera and Leopoldo Galtieri. 12 1 One of the accused,
Adolfo Francisco Scilingo, was taken into custody and Judge Garzon
rejected a government request to release him. 122 In October 1998,
Judge Garzon issued an order freezing the accounts of the accused
and fixing the number of disappeared Spaniards at 330. The next
month, Spanish jurisdiction was reconfirmed by the Spanish National
Court despite a host of objections, 123 and the next year international
arrest warrants were sought through Interpol for forty-eight
Argentineans accused of genocide and torture. 24 However, the
Argentine government resisted requests for information and
detention in Argentina of the extraditable individuals. In September
2000, however, Garzon's attempts to bring Argentine abusers to
justice returned to the public eye with the arrest of Ricardo Miguel
Cavallo in Mexico under a warrant issued by Garzon for crimes
120. See id. (reporting that Judge Garzon requested the intervention of the
ministries of justice and external affairs after Argentina rejected a subsequent
request for information). See generally Treaty on extradition and judicial
assistance in criminal matters, Mar. 3, 1987, Spain-Arg., tit. 2, 1579 U.N.T.S. 162,
168-71 (creating the formal procedure for requesting judicial assistance between
Spain and Argentina).
121. See Isabel Garcia-Zarza, Spain Holds Scilingo, Orders More Arrests,




122. See id. (addressing rationale behind Judge Garzon's rejection of a
government request to release Scilingo).
123. See Criminal Procedures in Spain, supra note 62 (describing procedures
towards establishing jurisdiction over Pinochet in Spanish courts).
124. See BBC News, Argentina Officers Wanted in Spain (July 9, 2003)
(addressing issuance of arrest warrants for additional Argentineans), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3052333.stm (last visited Dec. 15, 2003)
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committed in Argentina.'25 In June 2003, the Mexican Supreme
Court issued an order for his extradition.
26
Spain was held to have competence under its Law on Judicial
Power to pursue certain crimes, whether committed by a national or a
non-national and although the crime occurred abroad. According to
the court, the acts alleged could legally constitute the crime of
genocide under the penal code. 27 The court also determined that
crimes alleged could constitute the crime of terrorism even though
the legal order that was subverted was Argentinean rather than
Spanish. 28 The acts could also constitute crimes of torture under the
penal code. 2 9
Spain also had competent jurisdiction under international law.
While the Genocide Convention does not itself explicitly assert
universal jurisdiction for genocide, it does place upon state parties
the duty to pursue all crimes of genocide.130 While article VI of the
Genocide Convention only mentions prosecutions in territory where
crimes were committed or through international tribunals, this does
125. See Tim Weiner & Ginger Thompson, Wide Net in Argentine Torture Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000, at A6 (summarizing the filings against Cavallo, the
order calling for his imprisonment to allow extradition, and the extradition request
itself).
126. See Argentina Faces "Dirty War" Trial, BBC NEWS, Jun 11, 2003
(covering the Mexican Supreme Court's issuance of an order for Cavallo's
extradition), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2980514.stm (last visited Dec.
15, 2003).
127. See Order of the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish Audiencia Nacional
Affirming Spain's Jurisdiction (Nov. 5, 1998), in THE PINOCHET PAPERS 95, 103
(Reed Brody & Michael Ratner eds., 2000) [hereinafter Nov. 5 Order] (recognizing
that acts alleged in the criminal investigation constitute genocide, and that
consequently Article 23(4) of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch applied to
the case).
128. See id. at 104-05 (discussion the applicability of Spanish law to criminalize
international terrorism).
129. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 37 (noting that Spain incorporated torture
into the penal code in 1978).
130. See Genocide Convention, supra note 21, art. 5 ("The Contracting Parties
undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary
legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in
particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of
the other acts enumerated in article II.").
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not constitute an explicit exclusion of other bases of jurisdiction. 3'
Further, according to the court, the duty to pursue criminal
responsibility for genocide also constituted a jus cogens norm and,
thus, was broader than the Genocide Convention. 32 The court
interpreted the domestic law as being consistent with the Convention,
though it articulated jurisdiction that the Genocide Convention does
not mention. 33 Further, the court interpreted Spain's right and duty
to prosecute in light of, inter alia, the ICCPR, the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY").
134
The court also found that domestic procedural bars to prosecution
violatedjus cogens and international treaties to which Argentina was
party, and would not be relevant to the assertion of extraterritorial
131. See id. art. 6 (failing to explicitly exlude other bases of jurisdiction,
including universal jurisdiction).
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article
III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which
the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have
jurisdiction with respect to those Contract Parties which shall have accepted
its jurisdiction. Id.
132. See Sriram, supra note 8, at 59 (stating that "[t]he court also found that
domestic procedural bars to prosecution violated jus cogens and international
treaties to which Argentina was party, and would not be relevant to the assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction by Spain.").
133. Id.
134. E.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick,
and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 194, 6 U.S.T.
3217,75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949; Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8
June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 25, 1993, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159.
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jurisdiction by Spain. With the order in June 2003 by the Mexican
Supreme Court to extradite accused Argentinean Ricardo Miguel
Cavallo to Spain to face charges of genocide and terrorism, at least
one significant case arising out of the "dirty war" will proceed. 1
35
2. Proceedings in Italy
In 1996, prosecuting attorney Antonio Marini and lawyers for the
families of those who disappeared requested that charges be filed
regarding 617 Italians who disappeared in Argentina. In early 1997,
Judge Claudio D'Angelo authorized the criminal investigation into
six murders and two kidnappings of Italian citizens in Argentina
imputed to former junta members. Seven people were indicted for
murder and kidnapping in May of 1999.136 In December 2000, ah
Italian judge sentenced two generals in absentia to life imprisonment
and sentenced five other officers in absentia to twenty four years in
jail.137 However, the court did not base its decision on universal
jurisdiction, but rather on the penal code, which provides for
punishment of Italian or foreign nationals who commit "political
135. See Argentine faces 'dirty war' trial, BBC NEWS, June 11, 2000
(recounting the arrest of Cavallo as well as describing the principle of universal
jurisdiction as applied in the Cavallo case), available at
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2980514.sm (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
See generally Larry Rohter, Now the Dirtiest of Wars Won't Be Forgotten, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 2003, at A4 (noting President Nestor Kircher's, the new Argentine
President, views on the 1976-1983 military dictatorship and urging the Supreme
Court to take action regarding this case).
136. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 31 (explaining the application of domestic
law and universal jurisdiction in Italy as a means to address human rights
violations). In addition, the article discusses several cases in Italy. Id. at 32-33.
137. See Amnesty International, Report: Italy (2001) (reporting that "[i]n
December, Rome Court of Assizes sentenced two Argentine generals to life
imprisonment and five other former members of the Argentine armed forces to 24
years' imprisonment, following their trial in absentia in connection with the
abduction and murder of seven Italian citizens and the kidnapping of the child of
one them during the years of military rule in Argentina (1976-1983)."), available
at
http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001 .nsf/webeurcountries/ITALY?OpenDocument
(last visited Oct. 23, 2003).
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crimes" abroad. The code limits such crimes to crimes committed
against Italian citizens or the state itself.38
D. EXAMPLES OF CRIMES COMMITTED IN ONE JURISDICTION AND
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION
1. The Alfredo Astiz case
In March of 1990, France convicted and sentenced Argentine
captain Alfredo Astiz for the torture and disappearance of two
French nuns in Argentina.'39 An international arrest warrant was
issued in 1985, but was never executed. However, the French court
based its jurisdiction upon claims of passive personality, due to the
French nationality of the victims and did not assert universal
jurisdiction. 40
2. Crimes in Honduras: Proceedings in Spain
Billy Joya, a Honduran military officer, fled legal proceedings in
his home country where he was accused of torture and illegal
detention.' 4' Upon reaching Spain, he went into hiding. When he
emerged, he requested political asylum, which Spain denied under
refugee and asylum legislation that excludes such a status where
there is a well-founded reason to believe the applicant has
committed, inter alia, crimes such as torture and disappearances.
1 42
In August 1998, a claim filed against Joya in Spain asserted universal
138. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 32 (recognizing that article 8 of Italy's penal
code, provides that an Italian or foreign national who commits certain "political
crimes" on foreign territory can be punished according to Italian law, at the request
of the Minister of Justice).
139. See id. (stating that Argentine Captain Alfredo Astiz was convicted and
sentenced in absentia).
140. See id. (describing the Judgment of the Cour D'Assises de Paris).
141. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 40 (stating that Joya was accused of
torturing students and being a member of a Honduras death squad).
142. See Nicaragua Solidarity for Greater New York, Weekly News Update on
the Americas, Aug. 9, 1998 (discussing the Spanish government's reaction to
Joya's asylum petition), at
http://www.tulane.edu/~Iibweb/RESTRICTED/WEEKLY/l998_0809.txt (last
visited Dec. 18, 2003).
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jurisdiction under the Convention Against Torture, and his capture
was requested.
1 43
3. Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia
a. Proceedings in France
On July 20, 1993, several Bosnian nationals residing in France
filed a complaint in a criminal court in Paris charging war crimes,
torture, genocide, and crimes against humanity.'" Plaintiffs alleged
that France had jurisdiction to judge the crimes alleged under
domestic and international law. They claimed that the court could
hear acts constituting genocide under the Code of Penal Procedure in
connection with the Genocide Convention.1 45 France was also said to
have competence to hear crimes under the European Convention on
Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
146
However, the court rejected claims to French enforcement
jurisdiction, citing the Code of Penal Procedure, which legislation
incorporating the U.N. Security Council Resolution creating the
ICTY (modified on January 2, 1994).147 The court stated that such
143. See Latin America Briefs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 16, 1998 (explaining
the claim that brought about Joya's capture), available at 1998 WL 23512017.
144. See McKAY, supra note 56, at 24 (revisiting the March 26, 1996 ruling of
the Cour de Cassion that French courts did not have jurisdiction based on universal
jurisdiction in this matter). See generally Brigitte Stem, Universal Jurisdiction
over Crimes Against Humanity Under French Law-Grave Breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949-Genocide-Torture-Human Rights Violations in Bosnia and
Rwanda, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1999) (providing an overview of the proceedings
In re Javor).
145. See id. at 525 (noting that the plaintiffs also invoked international
instruments such as the Convention on the Non-Applicability of the Statute of
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity of November 26, 1968).
146. See Stem, supra note 144, at 526 (discussing the rejection of the majority
of the Plaintiffs contentions regarding the rationale for France's jurisdiction in this
matter). The court found jurisdiction but under French law, stating that Article
689-1 claims passive personality jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes. Id.
Furthermore, Article 689-2 establishes jurisdiction over torture, etc., under the
Convention Against Torture, where the perpetrator is later found in France. Id.
147. See McKAY, supra note 56, at 25 (denying jurisdiction of the offenses
committed abroad). Article 689-2 was itself enacted to give domestic effect to
France's ratification of the Convention Against Torture. Id. at 24.
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jurisdiction required the material presence of the presumed
perpetrator on the territory of France at the time of enforcement.
148
The court also rejected the use of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions
to gain jurisdiction on the ground that the duties enumerated therein
were too general to directly create competence extraterritorially.1
49
b. Proceedings in the Netherlands
In November 1995, Dutch courts initiated a preliminary inquiry
into crimes allegedly committed by Darko Knesevic in the former
Yugoslavia. The application alleged that the crimes described
constituted violations of the laws and customs of war, in particular,
as referred to in the domestic Wartime Criminal Law Act ("WCLA")
and under the Geneva Conventions.150 The examining magistrate
concluded in that December that the Netherlands lacked jurisdiction.
A decision by the Court of Appeals (Military Division) only partly
supported the magistrate's conclusion and determined that the
ordinary Dutch courts, rather than the military courts, had
competence to hear the case. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands
ruled that a Dutch military court could try Knesevic for war crimes
on the basis of universal jurisdiction as reflected in the grave breach
provisions in the Geneva Conventions.'
5'
c. Proceedings in Austria
The first trial on the basis of universal jurisdiction for crimes
related to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia took place in Austria.
In July of 1994, Austrian courts charged Dusko Cvjetkovic with
genocide, murder, and arson.'52 The penal code, which provides
148. See id. (reporting that the court denied jurisdiction because the Penal Code
only grants jurisdiction where those accused of the crime were "actually present in
France").
149. See id. (explaining that France had not directly given effect to the Geneva
Conventions in codified French law).
150. See id. at 35-36 (providing a background for Dutch cases involving
universal jurisdiction).
151. See McKAY, supra note 56, at 35 (stating that the court upheld the
universal jurisdiction provisions under four Geneva Conventions).
152. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 16-17 (outlining the background of the case
against Cvjetkovic).
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Austria the power to apply Austrian criminal law for actions
committed abroad-so long as any non-Austrian offender is present
in Austria, the offender cannot be extradited to another state, and the
act is punishable in the place where it was committed. 15 3 The court
accepted this basis for jurisdiction and considered whether it could
assert jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention. The court noted
that the Genocide Convention specifies that courts of the state where
defendants allegedly committed crimes or international tribunals
should try the accused.'54 The court reasoned, however, that since
neither venue was currently possible, Austria's failure to exercise
jurisdiction would undermine the intent of the Convention.'55
Nonetheless, a jury acquitted the defendant due to insufficient
evidence.
15 6
d. Proceedings in Denmark
Despite limited provisions in the Danish law for pursuing aliens
for crimes committed abroad, Denmark successfully prosecuted a
war crimes case against a Bosnian Muslim, Refik Saric, who sought
asylum in Denmark.'57 The court based its jurisdiction upon the penal
code, which establishes jurisdiction over international crimes when
153. See id. at 16 (characterizing Austrian law as particularly wide reaching).
154. See Genocide Convention, supra note 21, art. 6 (requiring that when an
individual is charged with a specified crime in violation of article III, he or she
"shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act
was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction
with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its
jurisdiction.").
155. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 17 (noting that the provision in the Genocide
Convention "presupposed that there was a functioning criminal justice system in
the state where the crime was committed").
156. See id. (noting that the jury's determination that there was a lack of
evidence linking the accused role to the Bosnian genocide).
157. See id. at 22 (explaining that Article 8(6) of the Danish penal code limits
jurisdiction over international crimes to circumstances where another state has
requested extradition, it has been refused, and the alleged behavior is a crime under
Danish law); see also Mary Ellen O'Connell, New International Legal Process, 93
AM. J. INT'L. L. 334, 341 (1999) (stating that the Danish courts based jurisdiction
under a law that implemented the Geneva Conventions and tried Saric under
municipal criminal law); Peter Ford, Answering for Rights Crimes, CHRISTIAN SCI.




an international treaty creates an obligation for Denmark to
prosecute, and in this case the Geneva Conventions relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War Convention and relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War obligated Denmark to
prosecute the alleged crimes.'5 8
e. Proceedings in Germany
German courts have heard four cases related to the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia and transferred one at the request of the ICTY.
Three other cases have gone forward - one in the Bavarian high
court and two in the Dusseldorf high court - resulting in two
convictions with the third case still pending. 15 9 The Bavarian High
Court convicted one defendant of aiding and abetting the killing of
fourteen persons, but could not establish the requisite intent for
genocide. 6 ' The court based jurisdiction on the German penal code,
which deals with crimes for which a court may exercise universal
jurisdiction and where an international treaty establishes the
obligation to prosecute.' 6' The court found jurisdiction in relevant
treaty provisions in the Geneva Civilian Convention, and in
provisions of the penal code, which provide competence to prosecute
158. See MCKAY, supra note 56, 22-23 (explaining the justification for
prosecution as well as the subsequent conviction and sentencing of Saric); see also
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 129, 20 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (providing that the "High Contracting
Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal
sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave
breaches of the present Convention defined in the following article"); see also
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (stating that each "High
Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to
have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and
shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts").
159. See McKAY, supra note 56, at 29-30 (discussing the cases of Dusko Tadic,
who was transferred to the ICTY, Nikola Jorgic and Novislav Djajic, who were
convicted and sentenced, and a Bosnian Serb facing proceedings before the
Dusseldorf high court).
160. See id. at 29 (reporting that Serb soldiers had shot the fourteen victims on a
bridge as an act of revenge to terrorize the Muslim population).
161. See id. (stating that Article 6.9 of the German Penal Code addresses crimes
for which universal jurisdiction applies as a result of an international treaty
obligation).
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foreigners found in Germany for crimes committed abroad where
there has been no request for extradition, such a request was refused,
or is not feasible.162 Another German court convicted a defendant of
genocide, also based on the penal code. Even though the Genocide
Convention does not explicitly confirm universal jurisdiction, the
court determined that it also did not exclude such jurisdiction.
Further, the court reasoned that the establishment of the ICTY and
Germany's law of cooperation with the Tribunal supplemented
universal jurisdiction under international law. 1
63
f. Proceedings in Switzerland
In a July 1997 case, Switzerland prosecuted a defendant accused
of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. 64 The Swiss Military penal
code provided the basis for the charges, since Swiss prosecutors
alleged violations of the laws and customs of war under the Geneva
Conventions and the two Additional Protocols. 65 However, due to
debates about mistaken identity and other evidence, the court
acquitted the defendant.1 66 Prior to the verdict, the military tribunal
affirmed its competence under the Military penal code, which covers
all armed conflicts and thus allows the use of universal
jurisdiction. 167
4. Crimes Committed in Guatemala
The Spanish Supreme Court took a narrow view of the extent to
which it could exercise universal jurisdiction with regard to
massacres committed by the Guatemalan military against Mayan
162. See id. (noting that the court relied on Article 7.2 of the German Penal
Code).
163. See McKAY, supra note 56, at 30 (discussing that Germany had enacted a
Law on Cooperation in relation to the Statute of the ICTY).
164. See id. at 41-43 (providing the background for the cases tried in
Switzerland).
165. See id. 41-42 (noting that the war crimes were committed during the
summer of 1992 in Serbian detention camps in North Western Bosnia).
166. See id. at 42 (reporting that the defendant claimed he was already in Europe
at the time the alleged offense took place).
167. See McKAY, supra note 56, at 42 (explaining that the court found itself
competent to try the case under Article 109 of the Swiss Military Penal Code).
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Indians during their thirty-plus year rule. In a genocide case, the
court found, by a narrow margin, that the Spanish courts had no
competence to investigate the genocide on the grounds that the courts
could only invoke the principle of universal jurisdiction in cases
involving special Spanish interests. 168 The court found that such
specific interests did not exist, and that Spain could only pursue
actions under the Torture convention for an assault on the Spanish
embassy in 1980, involving three Spanish nationals. 169 The dissenters
responded that those who perpetrate genocide are common enemies
of mankind, and that sufficient time had passed without Guatemalan
courts addressing these crimes.
5. Crimes Committed in Rwanda
a. Proceedings in France
As with the cases in France pertaining to crimes in the former
Yugoslavia, the absence of the accused in French territory frustrated
early prosecution attempts for crimes committed during the genocide
in Rwanda.' v An investigating Judge started criminal investigations
in a case against Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, a priest accused of crimes
against Tutsi refugees, who was on French soil.'' The penal code
168. See Amnesty International, Spain/Guatemala: University Jurisdiction
Should Apply to Crimes Against Humanity (Dec. 14, 2000) (noting the decision of
the Audiencia Nacional declaring Spanish courts not competent for the time being
to hear the case filed in Spain by the Rigoberta Mench6i Foundation against former
Guatemalan officials), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engEUR410152000?open&of-eng-gtm (last
visited Dec. 18, 2003).
169. See American Society for International Law, International Law in Brief
(April 22, 2003) (summarizing the holding of the Supreme Court of Spain in the
Judgment on the Guatemalan Genocide Case), at
http://www.asil.org/ilib/ilib0607.htm#j02 (last visited Dec. 18, 2003).
170. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 24 (noting that very few provisions in the
French law provide a basis for universal jurisdiction).
171. See Stem, supra note 144, at 528 (explaining that under French law, in
order to charge a person, that person must be on French soil, charges against
Munyeshyaka could only begin once he was known to be on French soil); see also
MCKAY, supra note 56, at 26 (noting that the Munyeshyaka decision would not
help answer questions regarding French jurisdiction over accused persons with no
link to France).
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and the Code of Penal Procedure provided the foundation for charges
of genocide and other crimes against humanity."' The Tribunal de
Grande Instance initially declared jurisdiction with regard to claims
under the Convention Against Torture, but a court of appeals
reversed on the grounds that jurisdiction could be established only
for genocide, and that because French courts did not have domestic
universal jurisdictional competence for genocide, there could be no
jurisdiction for crimes committed in Rwanda.'73 However, the Court
de Cassation reversed the ruling, based on subsequent French
legislation enacted in relation to the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), and the case
is now being heard. 74 Under the later legislation, French law allows
prosecution of those who are accused of certain crimes over which
there is universal jurisdiction, i.e. violations of the laws of war and
genocide, and those who are present in France.'75
b. Proceedings in Belgium
Belgium brought cases against four Rwandans in 1995 for
violations of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions in
relation to the genocide in Rwanda.'76 The ICTR requested the
transfer of three defendants and a fourth defendant faced the charge
of genocide. The court rejected a motion to dismiss on the claim that
failure to extradite a defendant to the ICTR indicated a lack of
172. See Stem, supra note 144, at 527 (noting that the Torture Convention was
incorporated into French law through Article 689-2 of the French Code of Criminal
Procedure, and therefore, it could serve as a basis for universal jurisdiction).
173. See McKAY, supra note 56, at 21 (providing the case history for the case
against Munyeshyaka).
174. See Stem, supra note 144 (discussing the procedural history).
175. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 26 (noting that France enacted the new law
pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 955 on May 22, 1996).
176. See id. at 18 (summarizing the approach to universal jurisdiction in
Belgium); see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, art. 1,1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter




evidence to support the charges.177 Belgium also used the universality
principle while requesting extradition of a Rwandan present in
Tanzania, who was suspected of killing ten Belgian peacekeepers
and Rwanda's former Prime Minister. In May 1999, Tanzania
extradited him to Rwanda instead. 78
c. Proceedings in Switzerland
In July of 1998, Switzerland charged a Rwandan who had been
granted political asylum in Switzerland with crimes against
humanity, genocide, and war crimes.179 A military tribunal heard the
case, which based charges of genocide and crimes against humanity
on customary international law. 80 Switzerland, however, is not a
party to the Genocide Convention and charges of war crimes were
based on Swiss law. The court rejected jurisdiction over genocide
and non-treaty-based war crimes due to the absence of domestic
implementing provisions. Nonetheless, the court allowed charges of
violations of the Geneva Conventions to go forward, and in April
1999, convicted the defendant of war crimes under these treaties.
1 8 1
6. The Habre Case
Hissene Habre ruled Chad from 1982 to 1990, and, according to a
commission of inquiry set up by the current president, his
administration was responsible for about 40,000 political
assassinations and 200,000 torture cases during his reign. 8 2 In
177. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 20 (explaining that the court dismissed the
motion, found evidence that explicitly dealt with the defendant's involvement in
the genocide, and ordered the action to continue).
178. See id. (noting that Belgium requested the extradition of Bernard
Ntuyahaga in connection with killings that occurred in 1994).
179. See id. at 42 (examining the proceedings in Switzerland against a Rwandan
after an arrest in 1996).
180. See id. (explaining that Switzerland based its jurisdiction on customary
international law because it was not a party to the Genocide Convention).
181. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 43 (reporting that the court sentenced the
defendant to life imprisonment).
182. See Senegal Court Charges Ex-Chad Leader with Torture, 16 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 3, 3 (2000) (reporting that the indictment took place on
Feb. 3, 2000); see also WORLD ORGANIZATION ON TORTURE USA, Submission to
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February of 2000, the Dakar regional court in Senegal indicted Habre
on charges of torture and political killings and placed him under
house arrest. 183 Criminal complaints by individuals as well as the
Chadian Association of Victims of Political Repression accused
Habre of torture and crimes against humanity, citing Senegal's
obligations under the Convention Against Torture and its obligation
to prosecute crimes against humanity under customary international
law.184 Filings before the court detailed crimes verified by the
Chadian commission of inquiry, a French medical group, as well as
other crimes carried out largely by the Security and Documentation
Agency, Habre's internal security force.185 Habre's lawyers objected
that Senegal has no jurisdiction over crimes committed in Chad and
that the domestic statute of limitations had run.186 In July of 2000,
amid assertions of political interference by Senegal's new president,
the Supreme Court of Senegal on the Authority and Jurisdiction of Senegal to
Criminally Prosecute Hissene Habre, Former President of Chad, For Violations of
the Convention Against Torture, Jan. 31, 2001 [hereinafter WOT Submission to
Senegal Court] (providing the Supreme Court of Senegal with an analysis of legal
principles as they apply to Hissene Habre), available at
http://www.criminalaccountability.org/SampleBriefs-HabreE.htm (last visited Oct.
22, 2003). See generally Dustin N. Sharp, Prosecutions, Development, and Justice:
The Trial ofHissein Habre, 16 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 147, 147-77 (2003) (examining
the prosecution of Hissein Habre and analyzing the different roles of those
involved with the case).
183. See Senegal Court Charges Ex-Chad Leader with Torture, supra note 182
(reporting that the indictment took place on Feb. 3, 2000); see also Norimitsu
Onishi, An African Dictator Faces Trial in His Place of Refuge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
1, 2000, at A3 (noting that human rights organizations state that Mr. Habre was
involved in 97 cases of political killings, 142 cases of torture and 100 cases of
disappearance); Editorial, An African Pinochet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at A30
(comparing Habre to Pinochet); Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Ex-Chad
Dictator Indicted in Senegal (Feb. 3, 2000) (declaring the charging of Habre as a
victory for Chad and noting that this was the first time a foreign country had
charged a former African head of state with human rights violations), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/02/hab023.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
184. See WOT Submission to Senegal Court, supra note 182 (providing a
factual basis and background for the charges against Habre).
185. See id. (noting the mandate of the Security and Documentation Agency was
to gather materials concerning Chad's national security, but that the agency
coordinated the repression of targeted ethnic and regional grounds, using mass
arrests, destroying entire villages, and through summary executions).




the indicting chamber found that Senegal had no jurisdiction to
prosecute torture-a decision that is being appealed.' Since then,
victims and their families filed at least fifty lawsuits in Chad against
the ex-dictator's political police alleging crimes of torture, murder,
and disappearances.' 88  In the face of ongoing lobbying by
international non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") and the
U.N. special rapporteurs on torture and on the independence of
judges and lawyers, Senegal's President Wade asked Habre to leave
the country. 18 9 It was only with the intervention of UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan that Habre did not leave. 90 There remains some
possibility that cases filed in Belgium may yet proceed.
7. Proceedings in the Netherlands Involving Suriname's Military
Dictatorship
Suriname, a former Dutch colony, attained full independence in
1975.19 In February 1980, sixteen non-commissioned officers
overthrew what began as a constitutional democracy. 92 They
suspended the legislature, dissolved the constitution, and installed a
187. See Editorial, Justice Denied in Senegal, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2000, at A18
(reporting that the decision that Senegal did not have jurisdiction to prosecute
torture abroad was disappointing because Senegal has one of the most independent
judiciaries in Africa); see also Anthony Faiola, 'Pinochet Effect' Spreading,
WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2000, at Al (noticing the increased number of prosecutions
being filed for alleged war crimes, and reporting that the new President's
intervention in the Habre was a setback).
188. See Douglas Farah, Chad's Torture Victims Pursue Habre in Court;
Pinochet Case Leaves Ex-Dictator Vulnerable, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2000, at
A12 (noting human rights advocates' and diplomats' surprise that the cases have
not been dismissed).
189. See Sharp, supra note 215, at 171 (noting that the criticism against
President Wade was not intended to cause the President to ask Habre to depart).
190. See id. (stating that as Habre was effectively under house arrest without
pending criminal charge, Annan's request could have raised difficult questions
about Habre's rights).
191. See U.S. Department of State, Background Notes: Suriname, Dec. 2003
(reporting state background information on Suriname, including information about
its government, which is a constitutional democracy), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2003).
192. See id. (stating that the "military-dominated government then suspended
the constitution, dissolved the legislature, and formed a regime that ruled by
decree").
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nominally civilian regime that was in fact run by a member of the
military, Desi Bouterse. 193 Under domestic and international pressure
to return to civilian rule, the military arrested and killed fifteen
opposition leaders in December 1982.194 Despite international
pressure, conflict continued. While the government instituted a new
constitution and civilian government in 1987, domestic insurgents
did not broker a settlement until 1992. In 1993, Bouterse stepped
down as head of the armed forces. The party he founded, however,
has continued to succeed in national elections and many of his
supporters retain important governmental posts. 195 The government
has yet to respond to calls to address past rights abuses. Even though
Suriname took part in an independent conference on "truth and
reconciliation" in 1998, its participation did not result in substantial
action. 1
96
Two of the victims' relatives brought proceedings in the
Netherlands against Bouterse for the "December killings", resulting
in attempts to subpoena Bouterse from Suriname in December
1999.197 In a March 3, 2000 decree, the High Court of Amsterdam
declared that the relatives appropriately served Bouterse and the
prosecution went forward. The court rejected the assertion that
Bouterse could be tried as a Dutch citizen because his citizenship had
193. See id. (noting that Desi Bouterse actually ruled the country, even though a
civilian was in the post of president).
194. See id. (noting that journalists, lawyers, and trade union leaders were
among the prominent opposition leaders killed).
195. See id. (stating that Desi Bouterse founded the National Democratic Party
in the early 1990s and in May 1996, the party won more seats in the National
Assembly than any other party).
196. See U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights, and Labor (reporting that there
was one incident of extrajudicial killing, police mistreat detainees, guards abuse
prisoners, and the judiciary remains ineffective), available at
http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/humanl999/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
197. Gerechtshof Te Amsterdam, Beschikking van 3 mart 2000 van de vijfde
meervoudige kamer belast met de behandeling van burgerlijke zaken op het beklag
met de rekestnummer R 97/163/12Sv en R 97176/12Sv [hereinafter Gerechtshof




terminated in 1975.198 The plaintiffs alleged that Bouterse
participated personally in the 1982 torturing and killing of victims.
Based on the evidence presented, the court found grounds to open an
investigation into Bouterse's responsibility as a perpetrator and
turned to the question of jurisdiction. 199 The court recognized the
primary responsibility of Suriname to pursue accountability, but
pointed out that this was unlikely and that there had been historical
ties between the Netherlands and Suriname.200 Furthermore, there
was evidence that at least one of the victims was Dutch and the
plaintiffs resided in the Netherlands. The court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs, ruling that it had jurisdiction over the crime against of
humanity of torture.2°'
The court expressed doubt about the applicability of allegations of
war crimes to the murders, pointing out that there was no protracted
armed conflict. It nonetheless requested more information. The court
found that despite the relatively small number of victims, the
murders might constitute crimes against humanity because they were
part of a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population.
The court appointed an expert in customary international law to
address a series of questions posed by the decree, including the
applicability of extraterritorial jurisdiction under customary
international law over non-nationals for crimes against humanity,
with subsidiary questions regarding whether the presence of the
accused on Dutch soil (which, under customary international law
provides general enforcement jurisdiction) or the nationality of the
victims would affect the legal outcome. In November 2000, a Dutch
198. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, END OF IMPUNITY 90, 99-100 (Nov. 19,
2001) (discussing the history of the Bouterse case), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/ai.nsf/362d2dfa88d393cf8O256cbfOO4dcabe/d30bedf
44b02953580256ab90052ddbl/$FILE/ch5.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2003
199. See Gerechtshof Case, supra note 197 (noting that "Bouterse is a serious
suspect in the case and must be called before a judge").
200. See id. (asserting that Suriname, nor any other state, was likely to iniaite
proceedings in the near future, thus, due to the level of the relationship between
Surinace and the Netherlands, "[p]rosecution in Netherlands is most favorable").
201. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 198, at 100 (ruling in favor of
the plaintiffs).
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high court ordered prosecutors to open a formal investigation into
charges against Bouterse.2 °2
8. The Potential Case Against Sharon. Belgian Jurisdiction Extends
and Retracts
In 1982 a massacre took place, perpetrated by members of the
Israeli military, in Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.2 °3
The current Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, was then defense
minister with command responsibility. 2 4 The Belgian Supreme
Court, in early 2003, extended the exercise of universal jurisdiction,
and raised the possibility of a case against Sharon when he leaves
office. The Court ruled that such a case could take place even in the
absence of the accused.205 The only constraint was head of state
immunity while he remained prime minister; thereafter it appeared
that Belgium could try him. This decision also opened the way for a
possible prosecution of Habre, a prospect made more likely as the
Senegalese president offered to hand Habre to another jurisdiction
willing to prosecute the case.20 6
Political outcry from Israel and its allies, as well as vocal outrage
from the United States over cases filed against General Tommy
Franks for alleged crimes arising out of the second war in Iraq
subsequently led Belgium to revise its universal jurisdiction
202. See Marlise Simons, Dutch Court Orders an Investigation of '82 Killings,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, sec. 1, at 1 (reporting the efforts of Dutch courts to
address the prosecution of the "December murders" of 1982).
203. See Marlise Simons, Sharon Faces Belgian Trial after Term Ends, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003 (providing background to the announcement of the Belgian
Court in its decision regarding the prosecution of Sharon).
204. See id. (reporting that an Israeli commission of inquiry conducted in 1983
came to the conclusion that the defense minister, Sharon, was responsible for the
events).
205. See id. (reporting that the court overturned the lower court's decision which
held that an accused person must be present in Belgium before a trial may
proceed).
206. See Reed Brody, An Unfinished Assignment for Israelis: Sharon on 1982,
INT'L. HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 21, 2003, at 8 (explaining that Israel is angry at the
Belgian ruling, which "leaves the way open for an investigation into the alleged
role of Ariel Sharon in a 1982 massacre").
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legislation. 27 Belgian courts will no longer hear cases where the
victim's home state protects the right to a fair trial, and the Ministry
of Justice has decided to transfer the case to Israel, subject to a
finding that a fair trial would be possible.2 8 In June 2003, faced with
a threat by the United States to remove NATO headquarters from
Brussels, the Belgian government announced that it would only hear
cases involving a Belgian national or resident as victim or accused. 09
10. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium and Republic of
the Congo v. France. Challenging the Extension of Jurisdiction at
the ICJ
In April 2000, a Belgian magistrate issued an international arrest
warrant, seeking the detention for extradition of the DRC's Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Yerodia Ndombasi for alleged crimes
constituting serious violations of international law.210 The DRC filed
a case before the ICJ contesting Belgium's jurisdiction and seeking
provisional measures to discharge the warrant immediately. 2I" The
DRC contended that as there was no evidence of jurisdiction based
207. See Richard Bernstein, Belgium Rethinks Its Prosecutorial Zeal, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003, at A8 (reporting the Belgian response to International critique
of its powers of universal jurisdiction); see also Press Release, Human Rights
Watch, Belgium: Anti-Atrocity Law Limited (Apr. 5, 2003) (stating that
subsequent limitations on the universal jurisdictional powers of Belgium will not
prevent the case against Habre from continuing), available at
http://www.hrea.org/lists/hr-headlines/markup/msg00973.html (last visited Oct.
22, 2003). Advocates for the victims have raised the concern that Palestinians will
not have access to Israeli courts. See Laurie King-Irani, The Sabra and Shatila
Case in Belgium: A Guide for the Perplexed, ELECTRONIC INTIFADA, June 16,
2003 (arguing that Belgium is sending confusing messages, in part thanks to the
media, about who can and who cannot be prosecuted for war crimes), available at
http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article l568.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
208. See King-Irani, supra note 207 (characterizing the changes in the law as
highly politicized).
209. See Belgium Alters War Crimes Law, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2003, at A18
(reporting that because of the subsequent change in Belgian law, Belgium no
longer has a basis for an action against Sharon), available at 2003 WL 17426154.
210. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the
Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121, para. 3 (Feb. 14) (describing the procedural
history of the case).
211. See id. para. 1 (alleging that Belgium violated the United Nations' charter
when it issued the warrant).
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on territory, in personam jurisdiction, or harm to the security or
dignity of Belgium, grounds for arrest were lacking, and the actions
of Belgium violated, inter alia, the principle of sovereign legal
equality.212 The DRC contended that a variety of multilateral
conventions addressing specific international offenses created
universal jurisdiction, but only where the alleged perpetrator was on
the territory of the state seeking jurisdiction, and it also asserted
diplomatic immunity for the accused. 2 3 Belgium requested that the
ICJ remove the case from its list. In December 2000, the court
rejected that request but also refused to take the provisional measure
of discharging the warrant requested by the DRC.21 4
In February of 2002, the court issued its decision in the case. Most
importantly, it did not explicitly reject the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by Belgium. Instead, it found that the exercise in this
instance violated of legal obligations of Belgium towards the DRC
because it failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction
enjoyed by an incumbent minister under international law. 215 The
court did not accept claims that the acts for which the arrest warrant
was issued could not be legal acts within the performance of official
duties, but rather indicated that the warrant would have undermined
the conduct of foreign relations by the minister.2 6 The court ordered
Belgium to cancel the international arrest warrant. 21 7 The limitation
of the exercise of universal jurisdiction by diplomatic immunity has
now been clearly articulated, but gray areas remain, particularly to
212. See id. (accusing Belgium of attempting to exercise its authority on the
territory of the Congo).
213. See id. paras. 4-5 (explaining why the DRC believes that the Belgian
warrant violates international law).
214. See id. para. 18 (rejecting Belgium's removal request unanimously).
215. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the
Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121, para. 73 (Feb. 14) (noting that Congo's
submission only addressed the arrest warrant, and that on the final submission, its
request was silent as to the broader objection to universal jurisdiction).
216. See id. para. 55 (concluding that while in office, a Minister of Foreign
Affairs must enjoy immunity in an official as well as a private capacity and that "if
a Minister for Foreign Affairs is arrested in another State on a criminal charge, he
or she is clearly thereby prevented from exercising the functions of his or her
office").
217. See id. para. 78 (finding that Belgium failed to respect the immunity of
Minister Ndombasi).
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immunities of former diplomats or heads of state for acts undertaken
in office.
France initiated proceedings for torture and crimes against
humanity in the DRC's (formerly Zaire) neighbor, the Republic of
the Congo, under articles 689-1 and 689-2 of the French Code of
Criminal Procedure.218 The Republic of the Congo challenged
attempts by France to undertake investigations and prosecutions
against, inter alia, sitting President Denis Sassou Nguesso and
Minister of the Interior Pierre Oba.219 The Republic of the Congo
sought provisional measures to compel France to suspend its judicial
proceedings.22 0 The case poses a more direct challenge to universal
jurisdiction than DRC v. Belgium, in which the DRC challenged the
legality of the arrest warrant but dropped its objections regarding the
legality of an arrest warrant as part of the exercise of universal
jurisdiction. 22' The Republic of the Congo asserted that a sitting head
of state or minister of the interior is immune from any "act of
authority" by another state that would hinder them in the exercise of
their duties, and that the "unilateral" exercise of by a state of
218. See Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Rep. of the Congo v. Fr.),
2003 I.C.J. 129, Requete et Demande D'indication de Mesure Provisoire
[hereinafter Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures] (providing that on
December 5, 2001, la Federation internationale des ligues des droit de l'homme
was a party in filing a complaint), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icof/icoforder/icof iapplication_20020209.pdf (last visited
Oct. 15 2003).
219. See id. (noting that the Congo alleged that France violated its sovereign
rights under the United Nations charter); see also Pieter H.F. Bekker, Prorogated
and Universal Jurisdiction in the International Court: The Congo v. France, ASIL
INSIGHTS, Apr. 2003 (explaining that the Congo believes France violated "the rule
that a state may not, in breach of the principle of sovereign equality among all
member states of the United Nations, exercise its authority on the territory of
another state"), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh103.htm (last
visited Dec. 13, 2003).
220. See Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 218
(providing a summary of the nature of Congo's demand).
221. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the
Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) (noting that in connection with the
Belgium case, Congo limited its demand to the arrest warrant).
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universal jurisdiction was a violation of sovereign equality enshrined
in article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter.222
On June 17, 2003, the ICJ issued an order denying the request for
the indication of a provisional measure. The court rejected claims by
the Congo that immediate measures were necessary in order to
prevent irreparable prejudice to the accused or to the Congo or
damage to French-Congolese relations, largely on the grounds that
Congo had not put forth concrete evidence of such harm.223 French
law recognizes the immunities of heads of state, and so the court
reasoned, there was no urgent concern that a case would go forward
against the president, and the other individuals being investigated
had yet to be the subject of any procedural measures.224 The
provisional measures stage did not address the direct challenge to
universal jurisdiction.
Several states have taken advantage of universal jurisdictional
competence in order to pursue the perpetrators of international
crimes. Many states simultaneously assert jurisdiction based on
passive personality or based solely on universality. However, the
degree of acceptance of the theory and variance in its application
illustrates the need for clearer guidelines for judges, as well as
recognition of the politicized nature of pursuing such crimes.
Clearly, the DRC's assertion that universal jurisdiction requires
the presence of the accused on the territory of the state seeking to
222. See Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 218
(noting that in the complaint, Congo asserted that France's actions would interfere
with the public order in Congo).
223. See Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Rep. of the Congo v. Fr.),
2003 I.C.J. 129, 29 (June 17) (voting fourteen to one against the request),
available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icof/icoforder/icofiorder_20030617.pdf (last visited Oct.
15, 2003).
Whereas in any event the Court notes that it has not been informed in
what practical respect there has been any deterioration internally or in the
international stating of the Congo, or in the Franco-Congolese relations,
since the institution of the French criminal proceedings, nor has any
evidence been placed before the Court of any serious prejudice or threat
of prejudice of this nature. Id.
224. See id. 31 (noting France's contention that under Article 656 of the French
Code of Criminal Procedure, France would have to obtain the express consent of
Congo in order to approach President Sassou Nguesso to give evidence).
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assert jurisdiction differed radically from the interpretations of
Spanish or Belgian magistrates. It is worth noting that in its final
pleadings to the ICJ, the DRC did not re-state its blanket objection to
universal jurisdiction. Similarly, Spain and many other countries
choose to rely not solely upon universality, but also upon domestic
implementing legislation and passive personality jurisdiction, while
Belgium has sought jurisdiction based purely upon international
obligations and universality. Also, France has sometimes chosen, as
in the Alfredo Astiz case, to base jurisdiction upon passive
personality when universal jurisdiction could also have applied.
States have also turned to their obligations under the ICTY and ICTR
and implementing legislation to justify their proceedings. Clearly, a
whole host of factors contribute to the rather disparate array of
sources and arguments marshaled by domestic judges-confusion
with regard to the scope, content, and authority of international legal
sources, confusion about the relation of these sources to domestic
law and politics, and even broader political realities in the
international arena persists. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
examine these factors in great detail, but it is clear that there remains
a wide variance among national practices. Such variance in results
raises concerns of fairness, legitimacy, and competing jurisdictions
that need to be resolved. While the progressive development of
exercise of universal jurisdiction appears to be a promising step for
human rights, the variance in practice will need to be rationalized
over time.
II. BEYOND THE FAMOUS CASES: THE
UNEVENLY EXPANDING SCOPE OF UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION AND THE PROBLEM OF
LEGITIMACY
When Spain submitted an extradition request to the United
Kingdom for the former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
the world's attention was riveted for the first time on the principle
and practice of universal jurisdiction. Even if the principle of
universal jurisdiction underpinned the very possibility of legal
proceedings against Pinochet, it turned out not to be the central basis
3552003]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
for the House of Lords' willingness to extradite.225 We should not, in
any event, allow the most notorious cases to distract our attention
from other prosecutions in which universal jurisdiction has played a
role. States are relying on universal jurisdiction more commonly.
However the summary presented above and the analysis of recent
cases presented below shows that courts most often use universal
jurisdiction as one basis among others for initiating legal proceedings
for serious crimes, it is typically not being used as the sole basis for
asserting jurisdiction.
I identify three distinct approaches to the use or non-use of the
principle of universal jurisdiction. The practice of universal
jurisdiction is developing unevenly, with only a very few judges and
countries exercising "pure" universal jurisdiction, that is universal
jurisdiction as the sole basis for prosecution. More common is the
exercise of "universal jurisdiction plus," in which claims about the
universal nature of the crime are combined with reliance on ordinary
domestic criminal legislation or other principles of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. In a third set of cases, national courts have considered
relying on universal jurisdiction and have instead relied exclusively
on domestic criminal legislation and other theories of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
While the increased resort to universal jurisdiction is a promising
way of holding accountable those accused of serious crimes, the
project of articulating common standards for the use of universal
jurisdiction should receive greater attention. The inconsistent use of
universal jurisdiction could exacerbate conflict among states and
jurisdictions and encourage perceptions that the exercise of universal
jurisdiction is illegitimate, arbitrary, or even "imperialistic." In some
instances, there is a concern that pursuing alleged criminals via
universal jurisdiction might jeopardize democratic transitions or
upset post-conflict efforts to build peace.226 Such exercises of
universal jurisdiction may, as Pablo de Grieff observes, create
225. See supra notes 76-81 (discussing that universal jurisdiction was not the
central basis for extradition from the United Kingdom).
226. See Sriram, supra note 3, at 47-70 (examining the potential impact of the
exercise of universal jurisdiction upon states).
356 [19:301
REVOLUTIONS IN A CCOUNTABILITY
conflicts with regard to the priority of claims over defendants.1
2 7
Reconciling these competing claims will be difficult in the absence
of coherent principles and procedures to resolve such disputes. As
the exercise of universal jurisdiction becomes increasingly common,
the world community needs clearer principles to guide the use of
universal jurisdiction and to make this use more consistent.
As we observe the expanding practice of universal jurisdiction we
should be mindful of the dangers of inconsistency. International law,
already subject to serious skepticism about its status as a coherent
body of real law, may thus be subject to the further objection that
application is piecemeal or arbitrary. Differential application of
accountability for serious breaches across various jurisdictions may
lead to massive inconsistencies in the application of human rights
and humanitarian norms. Such inconsistencies may seem unfair, and
victims of repressive regimes in particular will balk at the idea that
certain perpetrators are more likely to escape accountability because
the courts to whose jurisdiction they might be subject hold to narrow
bases for such jurisdiction. It also has not escaped the notice of many
that, save for one exception, the states seeking to apply universal
jurisdiction are all countries of the "global north," while those from
whom defendants are sought are nearly all in the "global south."
There is a risk that these activities may seem like "jurisdictional
imperialism.
2 28
After articulating the three trends among states' assertions of
universal jurisdiction, this essay examines the risks that such
inconsistencies may engender: illegitimacy, consistency, unfairness,
and competing jurisdiction. This part ends by emphasizing the
importance of developing consistent principles and practice so as to
227. See Pablo de Greiff, Comment: Universal Jurisdiction and Transitions to
Democracy, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10
(manuscript at 121, 126-27) (asserting that "deomcray is a system that requires
that citizens see themselves as the authors and the executors of their own laws").
228. See Final Report, supra note 5, at 19-20 ("[T]he decision to initiate
proceedings on the basis of universal jurisdiction may be objected to."). States
exercising universal jurisdiction on this basis may be accused of jurisdictional
imperialism because universal jurisdiction is only likely to be exercised in
powerful states with regard to crimes committed in less powerful states. Id.
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avoid the strong objections that will arise if the exercise of universal
jurisdiction is understood to be inconsistent and unfair.
A. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN PRACTICE: THREE APPROACHES
1. "Pure" Universal Jurisdiction: Claiming Competence without the
Backstop of Domestic Legislation
Courts rarely exercise universal jurisdiction as the sole basis for a
criminal prosecution. Judges have so far been markedly wary of
acting without the support of additional bases of action.
Belgium, which already has one of the most expansive
approaches, further broadened its approach with its revision of
legislation to adopt the statute of the International Criminal Court,
and with the holding by the Supreme Court that it could hold trials in
absentia.2 29 Not only has a Belgium court recognized universal
jurisdiction as a matter of customary international law, orjus cogens,
but the legislation adopted in 1999 sought to specifically apply
universal jurisdiction to genocide and crimes against humanity.
23 °
Belgium again relied upon the universality principle in charges
brought against four Rwandans arrested in Brussels in 1995: three of
these were transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, while proceedings against a fourth, Vincent Ntezimana,
were initiated in Belgium.23' The DRC challenged Belgium's
expansive use of universal jurisdiction in a case before the ICJ, and
challenged the international arrest warrant issued by Belgium for the
former Minister of Foreign Affairs (now the Minister of
229. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 18 (conveying that Belgium was the first
state to comply with the statute).
230. See id. (explaining that the motivation for Belgium was to act strongly
against genocide in Rwanda); see also Luc Reydams, International Decision:
Belgian Tribunal of First Instance of Brussels, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 700 (1999)
(explaining that the court considered the application of the Belgian implementation
of legislation for the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, rejecting it on
unrelated grounds).




Education). 2 The ICJ sided with the DRC, treating foreign minister
immunity as a bar to the exercise of universal jurisdiction.233 Debate
continues in Belgium over the appropriate scope of universal
jurisdiction legislation, and- as discussed above, in April 2003,
Belgium reduced its scope.
In a rare instance of the courts of a developing country seeking to
exercise universal jurisdiction, Senegal indicted former Chadian
dictator Hissene Habre.234 In a decision tainted with accusations of
political interference, the indicting court then determined that
Senegal had no jurisdiction to prosecute torture.235
Universal jurisdiction in its "pure" form has also played a role in
Spain, though not in the famous proceedings against Augusto
Pinochet. Rather, a case involving a Honduran military officer, Billy
Joya, relied on universal jurisdiction for activities criminalized under
the Torture Convention. 36 Spanish courts refused to find competence
in a genocide case in Guatemala, absent special Spanish interests, but
have since successfully sought agreement to extradition by Mexico
of an Argentine implicated in dirty war abuses. 7
In these few cases, domestic judges have seen fit to pursue
criminals for crimes established in international conventions, or that
form part of jus cogens. These judges did not feel the need to rely
upon additional domestic legislation, although in the case of
Belgium, at least, such legislation is available. These recent instances
of "pure" universal jurisdiction are striking but still rare. It remains
232. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the
Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) (describing the procedural history of the
case).
233. See supra notes 215-217 (noting that the ICJ held that use of universal
jurisdiction violated certain legal obligation Belgium held towards the DRC).
234. See Human Rights Watch, The Case Against Hissene Habre, an "African
Pinochet'" (indicating that due to Habre's exile in Senegal, the Senegalese courts
attempted to try him), available at
http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/introweb2.htm. (last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
235. See id. (asserting that the political situation in Senegal forced the courts to
dismiss the case).
236. See McKay, supra note 56, at 40 (noting that the Spanish court relied on
universal jurisdiction).
237. See supra notes 125-126 (noting that Mexico has agreed to extradite
Ricardo Miguel Cavallo).
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to be seen whether they are anomalies or represent a trend in
practice.
2. Universal Jurisdiction Plus: Backstopping with Other Bases of
Jurisdiction
Judges in national courts have usually been more comfortable
combining what is to them a novel basis for jurisdiction with more
familiar bases, those linked to a state's territory or interests.
238
Legislation providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction over those
accused of serious crimes under international law may become more
expansive, and perhaps more consistent, as nations seek to conform
to their obligations as signatories to the ICC statute. Belgium and
Canada are among the nations that have already made such revisions.
In this category of cases, judges simultaneously acknowledge that
universal jurisdiction exists under international law, and at the same
time demonstrate nervousness about exercising it in the absence of
other more particular and familiar connections to the crimes. Judges
may seek to assert jurisdiction in accord with specific provisions of
domestic legislation that provide explicitly for extraterritorial
application of criminal legislation, or with domestic legislation
incorporating provisions of treaties that provide for such jurisdiction,
or with domestic criminal legislation. In some of these cases, judges
simultaneously maintain that jurisdiction could be based in addition
to, or solely on, universal jurisdiction.
The Finta case, for example, involved charges in Canada for war
crimes and crimes against humanity based upon sections of the
Canadian Criminal Code, which provided for extraterritorial
jurisdiction based upon the current Canadian nationality of the
accused even if the accused was not Canadian at the time of the
commission of the crimes.239 The court upheld the statute, but
238. See Benvenisti, supra note 27 (providing a comparative analysis of national
courts' enforcement of international law).
239. See Regina v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 63-65 (explaining that the
accused could be tried because he committed an act against the laws of Canada in
force at the time even though he was not a Canadian citizen.); see also Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts, in
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS
CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10 (manuscript at 168, 168-90)
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required that charges be brought for domestic crimes, such as
murder, rather than genocide.240 New Canadian legislation simplified
prosecutions by allowing the court to bring forth charges directly for
international crimes such as genocide.24'
In the Pinochet case in Spain, jurisdiction was based upon
provisions in the Spanish penal code that provide for extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The case also relied upon provisions in international
treaties, customary international law, and Spanish implementing
legislation.242 The court did not require the existence of any territorial
nexus, such as the victims' nationality. Interestingly, the court
nonetheless identified specific Spanish victims. It seems plausible
that the court sought to proceed based upon domestic legislation and
universal jurisdiction, but sought to establish passive personality
jurisdiction as a legal backstop. Courts involved in cases against the
members of the Argentine junta applied similar legal reasoning.
These cases contributed to the revival of legal proceedings in
Argentina, where a judge invalidated amnesty and other
legislation.243
A 1997 case in the Netherlands, involving crimes in the former
Yugoslavia, relied upon universal jurisdiction along with domestic
legislation implementing the Geneva Conventions.244 In another case
(addressing the proper limits of universal jurisdiction, which does not require "a
link between any part of the offence and the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction").
240. See Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 323 (reasoning that questions of
international law are best left to a judge).
241. See Butler, supra note 28 (manuscript at 70-71) (discussing Canada's new
statute concerning universal jurisdiction, which attempts to eliminate the obstacles
created by the Finta decision).
242. See Falk, supra note 53(manuscript at 115) (explaining that the court
reasoned that genocide was jus cogens, and therefore universal jurisdiction thus
existed).
243. See Argentine Decision Invalidating Amnesty Welcomed, World Report
2001: Argentina, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (stating that by declaring "Due
Obedience" and "Full Stop" laws unconstitutional, Argentina signaled the end of
impunity), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/03/ArgentinaAmnesty306.htm (last visited Dec.
13, 2003).
244. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 35 (noting that the Netherlands upheld the
universal jurisdiction provisions under the grave breaches regime of the four
Geneva Conventions).
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involving the former dictator of Suriname, a Dutch court in March
2000, exercised universal jurisdiction relying upon crimes
established in the Torture Convention, as well as the passive
personality theory. In an attempt to clarify the applicability of
different modes of extraterritorial jurisdiction, this court appointed
an expert to consider the applicability of extraterritorial jurisdiction
over non-nationals for crimes against humanity, and to consider
whether the presence of the accused in the Netherlands or the
nationality of the victims would effect the legal outcome. 45
In 1994, an Austrian court based jurisdiction to try an accused war
criminal from the former Yugoslavia on domestic legislation and
treaty provisions.46 The court found jurisdiction under the Austrian
penal code and the Genocide Convention, concluding that the intent
of the convention would be undermined if Austria did not exercise
jurisdiction. 47
In Denmark, the law does not explicitly refer to universal
jurisdiction, but it does create extraterritorial jurisdiction where there
appears to be no territorial nexus. Article 8(5) of the Danish penal
code establishes jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes and other
crimes under international law whenever Denmark is obligated to
prosecute by international treaty or convention to prosecute.248 On
this basis, Denmark brought a case against a Bosnian under the
Geneva Prisoner of War Convention and the Geneva Civilian
Convention.249
245. See Amnesty International, supra note 198, at 100 (noting that a court
appointed expert determined that the Dutch court should exercise jurisdiction).
246. See McKAY, supra note 56, at 35 (explaining the case against Dusko
Cvjetkovic).
247. See id. at 17 (noting that the provision in the Genocide Convention
presupposed "that there was a functioning criminal justice system in the state
where the crime was committed").
248. See id. at 22 (including breaches of the Geneva Convention as bases for
jurisdiction).
249. See id. at 22-23 (recounting the case of Refik Saric); see also Mary Ellen
O'Connell, New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 334, 341 (1999)
(explaining that Saric's residence in Denmark supplied the basis for Danish




The German penal code provides jurisdiction for crimes for which
an international treaty establishes universal jurisdiction and an
obligation to prosecute.2150 The Fourth Geneva Convention provides
for such jurisdiction.2 1 The Genocide Convention, however, does not
explicitly confer universal jurisdiction so German courts have not
found jurisdiction under its provisions. Nevertheless, the penal code
provides for jurisdiction over genocide.252 In a case arising out of
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, a German court found that
although the Genocide Convention does not explicitly confer
universal jurisdiction, neither does it explicitly exclude it. The court
found further that the establishment of the ICTY and German
legislation enacted to facilitate cooperation with that Tribunal, have
the effect of supplementing the universal jurisdiction that exists
under international law. The court clearly recognized the existence of
universal jurisdiction in international law, while relying upon
domestic legislation.253
A Swiss military tribunal in July 1997 exercised universal
jurisdiction in a case of alleged war crimes in the former Yugoslavia,
involving beatings of civilians and other forms of degrading
treatment.254 The tribunal proceeded pursuant to the Military penal
code, which allowed for the use of universal jurisdiction for crimes
involving violations of the Geneva Conventions and additional
protocols. The courts in Switzerland allowed other prosecutions to go
250. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 28 (noting Germany's commitment to apply
universal jurisdiction for "certain crimes committed abroad against internationally
protected legal values").
251. See id. at 29 (noting that in the case against Djajic, a Bosnian Serb, the
court based jurisdiction on the Fourth Geneva Convention Articles 146 and 147,
and Additional Protocol One).
252. See id. at 28 (noting that Germany's Penal Code provides for universal
jurisdiction for certain crimes, such as genocide).
253. See id. at 30 (noting that the court held that the accused had the relevant
intent "to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, racial, religious or ethnically
distinct group" and therefore satisfied the definition of genocide, as contained in
Article 2 of the Genocide Convention and Article 220a of the German penal code).
254. See McKAY, supra note 56, at 41 (noting that the crimes occurred in the
Serbian run detention camps of Omarska and Keraterm in North Western Bosnia in
1992).
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against a Rwandan national in 1998 based upon the Geneva
Conventions but not under customary international law.255
Courts most commonly exercise universal jurisdiction on the basis
of domestic legislation that seeks to implement a state's treaty
obligations.256 Judges often refer to the principle of universal
jurisdiction and also seek the support of domestic statutes. One
important development here is the fact that increasing numbers of
states are expanding the jurisdiction of national courts as they revise
their laws to comply with their obligations under the ICC Statute and
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia. Some national courts have, furthermore, interpreted
these revised laws expansively. These states are increasingly
exercising universal jurisdiction while also backstopping with
domestic legislation. France is an illustrative example of this
practice.
Traditionally, French courts rejected universal jurisdiction and
allowed for extraterritorial jurisdiction only based on active or
passive personality, i.e. the French nationality of the victims or the
perpetrators of crimes.257 Accordingly, in the 1990 case of Alfredo
Astiz, an Argentine captain sentenced in absentia in 1990 for the
torture and disappearance of two French nuns in Argentina, the court
based its jurisdiction on the French nationality of some victims.258
In a case brought by five Bosnian Muslims residing in France, the
court denied jurisdiction for claims relating to crimes in the former
255. See id. at 43 (explaining that due to the lack of a genocide or crimes against
humanity provision in Swiss law, the Swiss could only bring charges based on
violations of the Geneva Convention).
256. See id. at 3-5 (providing a background on the definition of universal
jurisdiction and noting that under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, states
have the obligation to prosecute or extradite suspects who have allegedly
committed grave breaches of these Conventions).
257. See id. at 24 (noting that France had very few provisions which explicitly
provided for universal jurisdiction).
258. See id. at 26 (noting that France tried the accused in absentia after Britain
refused to allow French authorities to question him and after the Argentinean
authorities refused to respond to France's request for assistance); see also Press
Release, Human Rights Watch, Extradite Astiz, Argentine Government Urged
(July 27, 2001) (noting that Human Rights Watch has called for Astiz's extradition
to Italy, and he is being held on an Argentine judge's order), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/07/astiz-0727.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2003).
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Yugoslavia because the accused was not present in France. 25 9 France
has also rejected extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Geneva
Conventions in the past, but this will be far less likely today in light
of the legislation and case law following the establishment of the
ICTR.
French practice has been shifting to allow greater scope for the
exercise of universal jurisdiction. This shift has involved both
changes in legislation and judicial interpretation. In 1994 France
amended the penal code to include genocide and other crimes against
humanity.26 ° In addition, France adopted legislation in 1996 to
implement the U.N. Security Council Resolution establishing the
Rwanda tribunal, allowing for the prosecution of perpetrators of
grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, the laws and customs of
war, genocide, and crimes against humanity, so long as the accused
is present in France.26' In 1998, in proceedings involving Wenceslas
Munyeshyaka, accused in France of crimes in Rwanda, a court
exercised universal jurisdiction for war crimes and genocide. 62
While this legislation and case law pertains to crimes in Rwanda, it
would likely be persuasive in other, analogous situations, such as that
of crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.
In cases brought in France in 1998 against Pinochet, the court
issued two international arrest warrants on the basis of domestic
criminal legislation, the Criminal Procedure Code and the penal code
amended in 1994, which include genocide and crimes against
humanity committed abroad, so long as the accused is present in
259. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 25 (noting that the French did not have
implementing legislation that would give effect to the Geneva Convention and thus
Article 689, which governed jurisdiction over offenses committed abroad, did not
apply).
260. See id. at 24 (noting that although the French Penal Code specifically
incorporated penal sanctions for certain offenses classified as international crimes,
the legislation made no reference to universal jurisdiction).
261. See id. at 26 (reporting that in the Munyeshyaka decision, the court based
its jurisdiction on the French law implementing the U.N. Security Council
resolution establishing the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda).
262. See Brigitte Stern, Universal Jurisdiction Over Crimes Against Humanity
under French Law - Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 -
Genocide-Torture-Human Rights Violations in Bosnia and Rwanda, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 525, 528 (1999) (providing a procedural history of the Munyeshyaka
case).
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France.263 For many years, French courts denied the exercise of
universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity, while indicating
that it might be exercised in cases of torture where the accused is
later present in France.264 While French legislation still does not
explicitly recognize universal jurisdiction for crimes against
humanity, the 1998 Munyeshyaka case marked a significant change
in practice. This was a significant advance from the 1990 case
brought against Alfredo Astiz, which relied upon the nationality of
the victims. The extension of universal jurisdiction in France in the
past decade is partly a consequence of new legislation, but also due
to innovative and progressive judicial interpretation.
3. Non-Application: The Refusal to Rely on Universal Jurisdiction
Some courts have considered the possibility that universal
jurisdiction might provide them with competence to enforce
international law, but then balked at that possibility and ultimately
relied on domestic legislation or on passive personality as a basis for
jurisdiction.
An Italian court heard charges against Pinochet based not on
universal jurisdiction but on a provision in the penal code providing
for punishment of crimes committed abroad against Italy or its
citizens. 65 Similarly, a case against Alfredo Astiz in Italy has been
built upon the Italian nationality of some of his victims. 2 66 The cases
brought against Pinochet in Germany and Switzerland based their
263. See McKAY, supra note 56, at 27 (noting that the French court issued arrest
warrants based on the passive personality principle).
264. See id. at 24 (noting that the application of universal jurisdiction was
uncertain in France until the Munyeshyaka case).
265. See Giancarlo Capaldo, Institute for Policy Studies, Proceedings in Italy
Against Latin American Dictators and Military Personnel (Mar. 26, 2001) (noting
that under Italian law it is possible to prosecute those responsible for committing
crimes outside of Italy only when the crime in question is political and was
committed against an Italian citizen, or when Ministry of Justice requests the
prosecution to proceed), available at
http://216.239.41.104/search?q=cache:NYPbdYkZWwMJ:www.ips-
dc.org/projects/legalscholars/capaldo.PDF+pinochet+and+italy++and+jurisdiction
+&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
266. See Press Release, supra note 258 (providing that Italy sought Asitz due to
his role in the kidnapping of Italian citizens).
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jurisdiction entirely upon the passive personality, namely, the
nationality of some of the victims.267 In some states judges, then,
continue to rely upon ordinary domestic criminal legislation to
pursue the accused. Where they seek extraterritorial jurisdiction, they
prefer to rely on traditional territorial connections to establish it, such
as is provided when crimes have been committed abroad against
nationals. In the absence of legislation broadening extraterritorial
jurisdiction over those accused of committing serious international
crimes, judges are reluctant in many places to exercise universal
jurisdiction.
These disparate practices give rise to inconsistencies, which lead
to concerns about legitimacy, consistency, fairness, and conflict
among jurisdictions. These concerns have also been raised in the
context of the proliferation of international criminal tribunals, and
they are indeed serious.
B. CONCERNS DUE TO THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
1. Legitimacy
The appearance of unfair discrepancies in the exercise of universal
jurisdiction may give rise not just to complaints about fairness, but to
more fundamental objections, such as the illegitimacy of the doctrine
of universal jurisdiction. For example, objections based upon the
perceived unfairness of differential applications globally may lead to
the implication that it is an illegitimate system of law that results in
courts from developed countries pursuing dictators and war criminals
from developing countries, but not the reverse. The Habre exception
and the pursuit of war criminals from the former Yugoslavia may
mitigate these objections somewhat, but the image of universal
jurisdiction seems likely to remain a DRC defendant in a Belgian
court. More generally, the likelihood of judges from a small number
of states exercising this power over defendants from many others
creates the potential for abuse by states acting upon a particular
conception of customary international law. The rule legitimacy of
267. See MCKAY, supra note 56, at 30 & 43 (affirming the use of the nationality
of the victims for jurisdiction in the cases against Pinochet).
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universal jurisdiction is bound up with the concerns already raised; it
is worth addressing this issue further.
Thomas Franck has argued that four indicators-pedigree,
determinacy, coherence, and adherence-provide a means to assess
the legitimacy of rules. 68 Pedigree is the depth of the rule's roots in
an historic process, in state practice, treaty, and expert writings.269
Universal jurisdiction has a long history, articulated in universalistic
expressions of jurisprudence dating back to the writings of Grotius
and firmly rooted in the punishment of piracy. Universal jurisdiction
has been further entrenched in positive international law since the
end of the Second World War, although this fact has yet to make
many domestic judges more amenable to its exercise. Determinacy,
or clarity, is the rule's ability to communicate content."' Clearly, this
aspect is not settled, as the disparate understandings of the principle
of universal jurisdiction by judges, foreign ministries, and even legal
scholars would seem to indicate.27' Coherence is the rule's internal
consistency and its connectedness to the principles underlying other
rules.272 This aspect is also not settled; as some argue that there are
two not entirely consistent justifications for the rule-the overriding
interests of the international community in protecting core values,
and the pragmatic need of the community to have an enforcement
mechanism that can transcend sovereignty. However, the principle
itself is clearly tied to and consistent with the corpus of human rights
268. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
50-194 (Oxford Univ. Press 1990) (examining the role of legitimacy in
international law). Franck sets forth a list of characteristics and components that
comprise legitimacy and explains their relationships and effects on international
law). Id.
269. See id. at 94-95 (explaining that pedigree is usually earned by longevity of
an institution or rule of law and is a particularly universal form of symbolic
validation).
270. See id. at 52 (stating that "transparency" is another term that may be
employed for determinacy and these terms - along with "clarity" - taken together
illustrate that conduct is most effectively regulated when a higher degree of
lucidity exists).
271. See id. at 52-54 (remarking that ambiguity in text can result in judicial
decisions contrary to legislative intent).
272. See id. at 153 (noting that inconsistencies must advance an intrinsic,




law. Adherence, finally, is the connection between a specific rule and
higher principles.273 Specifically, adherence is the degree to which
the rule is consistent with substantive fundamental principles of
international order. Two such fundamental principles of international
order, jus cogens and respect for sovereignty, are potentially in
tension, and the doctrine of universal jurisdiction is thus bolstered by
the former and not the latter. Here, to the degree that universal
jurisdiction applies squarely to a set of heinous crimes clearly
proscribed under international law, much of which is not mere
custom but jus cogens, it would appear to be on reasonably safe
ground. However, it may also infringe upon sovereignty, respect for
which remains central to international law and politics.
2. Consistency
Piecemeal application of accountability for grave breaches of
international law could give rise to serious inconsistencies in the
levels of protection offered to fundamental human rights across
jurisdictions. Differing interpretations of the scope of universal
jurisdiction may give rise to serious gaps in the coherence of
international law.274 Yet, as one commentator asserts, "the coherence
of international law is important to the maintenance of a peaceful and
beneficial international legal system." '275 Gaps and inconsistencies
may lead to unpredictability in legal, as well as political, relations
273. See id. at 184 (providing that essentially, "adherence... is the vertical
nexus between a primary rule of obligation.., and a hierarchy of secondary rules
identifying the sources of rules and establishing normative standards that define
how rules are to be made, interpreted, and applied").
274. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact of the International Legal System of
the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
697, 703-07 (1999) (indicating that different tribunals interpret the breadth and
depth of international law in various ways and this leads to disparate or
asymmetrical results).
275. See id. at 707 (arguing that while diversity, experimentation, and
competition are vital characteristics to a stable system of international law,
coherence of law is paramount to allowing such a system to flourish); see also
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the
International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L & POL. 791, 796 (1999) (averring that in an increasingly complex system of
international law, coherence aids in the process of accomplishing the goals of
international law).
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among nations; lawyers and others value the predictability in these
relations for their putative contribution to peace and stability.
It is worth noting that although these concerns of consistency may
be significant ones, it may also be the case that the disparities are
much smaller than initially feared and such disparities are a
necessary part of the progressive development of international law.276
It may well turn out to be the case that fears of inconsistency are
seriously exaggerated, and that practice that at first appears very
divergent does converge over time. Further, it may well be the case
that it is only through such divergent practice that change is effected,
in particular change that would achieve greater protection of
fundamental rights and freedoms. Thus, we should perhaps tolerate
some inconsistencies in order to advance the cause of human rights
and accountability; it cannot be the case that for the sake of
consistency of practice that we should abandon the pursuit of
accountability.
A final risk may exist, inconsistent standards give states the scope
to vex and harass their political opponents. Fear of such politically
motivated cases is already a primary ground offered by the United
States for remaining outside of the ICC, and has also been raised in
objection to the use of universal jurisdiction, most notably by Henry
Kissinger.277  There is certainly a risk that such vexatious
prosecutions will be initiated, but this fear remains largely
hypothetical. It is not at all clear that prosecutions that are initiated
that might appear politically vexatious would be state-driven. Thus
far most of the courts hearing cases are clearly politically
276. See Charney, supra note 359, at 699-700 (concluding that in core areas of
international law, most tribunals share a relatively coherent and similar view of
those doctrines of international law).
277. See Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN
AFF. 86, 90 (2001) (contending that if the United States were to submit to a system
of universal jurisdiction, the chance for bias-based pressure and the desire to place
responsibility may engender indictments that are unfounded). While the U.N.
Security Council retains the right to quash an indictment in the ICC, veto power
remains strong and ultimately a prosecutor needs only one country to support the
indictment in order to exercise virtually unlimited discretion. Id.
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independent. For example, the Spanish government was in fact
opposed to the attempts by Garzon to pursue Pinochet. 278
3. Fairness
Such inconsistencies in the application of jurisdiction and
accountability for grave breaches will likely seem unfair, particularly
to victims of repressive regimes. At the same time, the use of
universal jurisdiction largely has taken place and continues to take
place where northern or western courts seek defendants for crimes
committed by southern regimes, leaving the door open for
accusations of bias as well. The rare exceptions are the proceedings
initiated in Suriname against former Chadian dictator Hissene Habre,
the Argentinean request for extradition of Pinochet, and the case
brought in Ecuador against Pinochet, though the latter two cases did
not explicitly address universal jurisdiction. The case brought by the
DRC against Belgium in the ICJ disputing the issue by a Belgian
judge of an international arrest warrant against the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the DRC illustrates the vehemence with which
states may reject universal jurisdiction on the grounds of sovereignty
and opposition to what is perceived to be legal imperialism. 79
It may be worth considering the possibility that, accusations of
unfairness notwithstanding, there may be at least one plausible
argument in favor of disparate practice. This might be the same type
of argument that underpins the doctrine employed by the European
Court of Human Rights that allows for some reasonable degree of
variation in state practice to take account of political, cultural, social,
and historical specificity-the doctrine of margin of appreciation.'"
278. See Spain Blocks Challenge to Pinochet's Possible Release, CNN.coM,
Jan. 20, 2000 (noting the Spanish government's unease at Garzon's efforts to
"extend his human rights crusade beyond Spanish borders"), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/01/20/pinochet.02/ (last visited Oct.
22, 2003).
279. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the
Congo v. Belg.), 2000 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) (rejecting both the DRC's request for
provisional measures that the arrest warrant be discharged immediately, and
Belgium's request that the case be removed from the list). As noted above, the ICJ
treated foreign minister immunity as a bar to Belgian jurisdiction. Id.
280. See Eyal Benvenesti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal
Standard, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 843, 843 (1999) (defining the margin of
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The court thus allows each society some leeway in resolving the
inherent tension between the rights of the individual and of the
nation. So some variance in practice is permissible.281 However, this
analogy ought not be stretched too far, as the variance in practice
here is across jurisdictions seeking to try individuals, and not in the
practice of courts where alleged abuses occurred.
4. Competing Claims
Last, but not least, a lack of clear priority in application may give
rise to competing claims, raising difficulties with regard to
competing jurisdictions and divergent jurisprudence dealing with the
same rules or legal concepts.282 As one commentator suggests in an
analogous context: "It is evident that such situations create
dissatisfaction for the States concerned because they introduce a
measure of legal insecurity. This should be avoided as much as
possible. 283 Competing claims, like inconsistency in practice,
introduces a measure of unpredictability to international law and
relations, bringing with it risks of instability and diplomatic, if not
violence and conflict.
In regards to Pinochet, numerous courts, including those of his
own country, sought to pursue cases against him. In such instances,
who prevails? In the absence of clearer principles with regard to such
conflicts, increased confusion and serious conflicts over the
appropriate hierarchy of claims seems likely to result. While it will
of course be impossible to develop a rigid hierarchy of claims with
regard to priority, there are a host of considerations to place in the
balance in identifying the appropriate forum for a case.
Undoubtedly, there will be instances where the proliferation of
mechanisms of accountability, reconciliation, etc. may be
complementary. For example, commissions of inquiry in one locale
would not necessarily preclude prosecutions elsewhere. But the same
appreciation as it applies in a general context to the European Court of Human
Rights).
281. See id. at 843-47 (discussing the rationale for the margin of appreciation).
282. See Dupuy, supra note 275, at 797-98 (discussing this issue in the context
of the proliferation of tribunals).
283. See id. at 798.
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cannot be said of competing claims for legal accountability.
Principles of double jeopardy and non bis in idem284 dictate that
properly pursued prosecutions must foreclose future proceedings on
the same charges. This makes even more imperative that where a
case is brought, it is not a sham proceeding, and that it is brought in
an appropriate forum. Considerations for selection among competing
jurisdictions ought to include, among others, treaty obligations; the
place of the commission of the crime; the nationality connection of
the victim and the accused to the state seeking to prosecute; the
likelihood, good faith, and effectiveness of the prosecution; fairness
and impartiality; convenience to the parties and the witnesses; and
the interests of justice. States may resolve competing claims through
a balancing act that takes into consideration those same factors.
This balancing act will likely be complicated further as courts and
politicians seek to determine the weight that amnesties and
immunities ought to carry. Certainly, the place of commission of the
crime will frequently, but not always, receive priority in its claim to
adjudicate a case. However, it will often be the case that the country
where the crime occurred will not be able to pursue the case due to
the country's domestic legislation, encompassing amnesties,
procedural limitations, and immunities. There is no hard and fast rule
for the resolution of such competing claims, but rather a delicate
balance to be struck that must take into account the myriad factors
listed above.
C. THE NEED FOR A MORE COHERENT REGIME
This discussion has illustrated the fact that the practice of
universal jurisdiction, while expanding in recent years, is still quite
disjointed. This should not be surprising; while the principle of
universal jurisdiction is strongly entrenched, the practice described
here is quite nascent, though expanding. Different jurisdictions have
quite distinct practices with regard to whether they can pursue
individuals accused of certain grave breaches where the breaches did
not occur on their territory, were not perpetrated against their
nationals, and were not perpetrated by their nationals. This disparity
284. See id. (explaining that anyone tried through the exercise of universal
jurisdiction for serious crimes under international law can raise this claim against
further proceedings against him or her in national or international venues).
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in practice occurs notwithstanding the purported status of the
principle as customary international law. As a result, only a very few
courts are liable to, rely upon "pure" universal jurisdiction, while
most others will take a more mixed approach of relying upon
traditional bases in tandem with universal jurisdiction. Finally, some
courts will not rely on the doctrine, turning instead to the traditional
bases alone. This disparity ought to be of some concern, as I suggest,
for several reasons-concerns of consistency, .fairness, legitimacy,
and competing claims. While more traditional considerations used in
conflict of laws may resolve some of these concerns, these disparities
as a whole run the risk of creating greater legitimacy concerns with
regard to international law generally, as well as very real
inconsistencies and perceptions of injustices in specific cases.
Concerns about politically motivated prosecutions may also
undermine universal jurisdiction if inconsistency is significant and
appears driven by biased agendas. To avoid increasing confusion
with regard to the application of this doctrine, concerted effort to
rationalize the application of it is in order.
III. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS OF EXTERNALIZING JUSTICE
A. OVERVIEW: EXTERNALIZED JUSTICE
The cases described thus far illustrate that externalization of
justice increased over the past five or so years, and it seems likely to
continue in coming years. Such externalization, whether in the form
of ad hoc international tribunals or the exercise of universal
jurisdiction, will soon extend to the work of the ICC. The appropriate
role of international courts and tribunals, as well as other domestic
mechanisms, remains seriously disputed. This article argues for
caution, particularly with regard to the exercise of universal
jurisdiction for two reasons beyond those articulated above: it may
not take sufficient account of local needs, and by taking place at a
great distance from the locus of the crimes, it may fail to serve many
of the putative purposes of prosecution.
This section examines the potential ramifications for transitional
societies of the use of universal jurisdiction, asking whether it serves
the needs of these societies, and whether there are unintended
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adverse effects of its usage. I suggest that the impact may be harmful
precisely because the purpose of universal jurisdiction is not
explicitly to serve the needs of the society or nation affected by the
crime. The two most frequently cited justifications for the use of
universal jurisdiction point to the normative interests and supporting
pragmatic considerations of the international community. Reference
is not made to the needs of transitional societies at all. Building on
previous work that develops some implications of several strands of
political theory for normative arguments about transitional justice,
this essay will seek to articulate potentially important normative
goals that may address accountability in transition. The essay will
then turn to practical considerations of peace building and
reconciliation, which build upon these normative concerns, but may
be at odds with the rationales for the use of universal jurisdiction. It
argues that there are significant risks posed by externalization of
justice and in particular the exercise of universal jurisdiction. While
it may occasionally be of utility, international actors should not view
it as a panacea, but instead recognize that each society may need to
respond to the legacy of serious human rights violations and other
abuses.
Two key arguments are made to underpin the application of
universal jurisdiction, both of which address the needs and interests
of the international community.285 One version depends upon an
account of international morality-certain crimes are so heinous that
they affect all of mankind, and thus deserve punishment. 2 6 A related
version, in essence the practical underpinning of the first, treats
universality as a procedural convenience that addresses the practical
difficulties of addressing crimes that are seen as illegal around the
world. 87 While both of these are of valid rationales and need further
articulation in order to surmount objections based upon sovereignty,
285. See Mark A. Drumbl, Juridical and Jurisdictional Disconnects, 12 Fin.
Y.B. Int'l L. 119, 134-40 (2001) (setting forth arguments against the application of
universal jurisdiction).
286. See id. at 127-30 (citing examples of extreme violence and genocide to
support the theory that some offenses innately deserve punishment).
287. See id. at 134-36 (suggesting that while they are not without problems,
extraterritorial prosecutions can be the best alternative when there is no other
mechanism to encourage or enforce accountability).
20031
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
they do not speak to the needs and interests the state or society where
the atrocities occurred or the needs of the victims.
288
Nations in transition face numerous challenges that are normative
and practical. One can identify goals ranging from stability to
reconciliation to satisfaction of the victims to doing justice, some of
which are complementary, some which are not. Some responses,
such as truth commissions or prosecutions, satisfy some goals, but
not others. Clearly, there is no room for a one-size-fits-all
prescription; what is needed is a society-specific approach within a
defined context.
This essay does not argue that it is never appropriate to do justice
"elsewhere" or to exercise universal jurisdiction.2 9 Externalizing
prosecution may at times be the only solution where a state or society
is unwilling or unable to come to terms with the past; amnesties may
have precluded legal action domestically, or the state may lack the
technical capacity to act.290 However, there is a serious risk that
solutions that speak first to the interests of the international
community at large will fail to take account of the goals articulated
above. This may be most true in the context of universal jurisdiction,
where the prosecuting state has no territorial or other nexus to the
offense, and thus may be particularly insensitive to the needs of the
territorial state, or worse, have its own biased agenda.
288. See id. at 140-41 (discussing the broad risks of conducting trials that do not
take account of the local context).
289. See Kissinger, supra note 277, at 86-96 (objecting to the exercise of
universal jurisdiction). But see Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction,
80 FOREIGN AFF. 150-54, (Sept./Oct. 2001) (responding to Kissinger's piece and
categorizing his objections to the exercise of universal jurisdiction as misplaced
and asserting that Kissinger's alternatives have little merit).
290. See Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals
for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 302, 314-15 (1999) (arguing that such amnesties run counter to the "stated
purpose of international humanitarian law"); see also Jennifer Widner, Courts and
Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social Scientist's Perspective on the
African Case, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 64-75 (2001) (discussing the complicated
relationship between courts and post-conflict peace building, and a reflection on
the role that international tribunals can play).
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B. WHY UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION?
Two bases for universal jurisdiction have generally been offered,
which do not appear to be perfectly consistent, though the second is
frequently offered in service of the first. The first is that core values
and overriding interests of the international community exist that
may transcend sovereignty.2 91 The second is that, for pragmatic
reasons, the international community may need an enforcement
mechanism that can occasionally override sovereignty.292 It is beyond
the scope of this paper to analyze these two positions in detail; the
most important aspect of these positions is that both rationales advert
to the interests of the international community, and make no
reference to the interests of the state where crimes occurred. 293 These
bases are used to either protect a set of normative goals and interests
held by the international community, or for the sake of convenience,
to allow the international community to act in the absence of action
by relevant states. These bases do not necessarily hold the concerns
of the state or society as the uppermost consideration.
Certainly, given the narrow scope of crimes for which a court may
assert universal jurisdiction, and the heinousness of those crimes,
such international interests, normative and pragmatic, cannot be
denied. However, given that a court will use universal jurisdiction in
lieu of domestic legal proceedings, and may overcome domestic
political pacts, amnesties, or other legal considerations, it is worth
291. See Final Report, supra note 5, at 3 (stating that under one rationale,
"[d]omestic courts and prosecutors bringing the perpetrators to justice are not
acting on behalf of their own domestic legal system but on behalf of the
international legal order.").
292. See Alison M. McIntire, Be Careful What You Wish For Because You Just
Might Get It: The United States and the International Criminal Court, 25 Suffolk
Transnat'l L. Rev. 249, 261 (2001) (noting that supporters of international
tribunals seek to strengthen enforcement mechanisms, which may help ensure the
protection of human rights). McIntire also notes that one main opposition to the
strengthening the enforcement mechanisms is that doing so may change the
concept of sovereignty. Id.
293. See Bhuta, supra note 12, at 529 ("By deeming systematic human rights
violations to be crimes which threaten world order, concepts such as jus cogens
crimes and universal jurisdiction exemplify attempts to place human dignity at the
apex of the legal order's hierarchy of values .... Nevertheless, the tension
between the 'law of peoples' and the traditional rights of states remains unresolved
in practice.").
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examining the ramifications of the exercise of universal jurisdiction.
What is required, then, is a consideration of the needs of transitional
societies, and the normative underpinnings supporting prosecutions
or lesser forms of accountability.
1. Justice After Transition: What is at Stake Normatively and
Politically?
There is a vast and expanding literature addressing the normative
choices of transition, which I will not address in great detail in this
section.294 I argue elsewhere that what is needed before engaging in
debates about what modes of response to atrocities are appropriate-
amnesty, truth commission, lustration, and prosecution-is a
consideration of what is at stake normatively in choices about
transition.295 Such an examination makes clear the importance of
national decisions with regard to what is best for society. By this I do
not mean that decisions made by elite pacts, which often include
perpetrators, in which choices are made for the society take sufficient
consideration of the needs of the domestic society. Rather, the
society in question must make a serious examination of its needs to
determine regard to what is best for it. In the heat of discussions
about accountability, considerations of the needs of the domestic
society may be lost, and when decisions are made by parties too far
removed from the issues, they may be ignored altogether.296 Such
considerations lead not to simple one-size-fits all policy
prescriptions, but a more nuanced understanding of what is at stake
294. See generally Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV.
HUM. RTs. J. 69 (2003) (providing a recent overview of the issue and proposing a
relevant genealogy of transitional justice); David J. Scheffer, Gary Jonathan
Bass's Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 970 (2001) (book review) (examining whether the international
community will respond to the next atrocity more easily and effectively).
295. See Truth Commissions, supra note 31, at 471-92 (2000) (examining
whether there can be other goods besides justice yielded in a pursuit for
accountability for past human rights violations). The article stresses the importance
of understanding normative issues and addressing them in state-specific contexts.
Id.
296. See Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from
Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 370-85 (1999) (explaining that the benefit of
differing goods must be weighed against one another within a specific context).
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in these choices, and recognition of the uniqueness of each
transitional context.
a. Local Needs
The distinction between the normative and political issues of
transitional justice is of course a false one; these issues are linked
intimately. However, it is important to identify the specific political
needs of transitional societies in more detail. The needs of these
societies are complex, and may militate for or against punishment; in
most instances-and this point is central-the relevant
considerations include not only the culpability of the criminal, but
also other societal needs. These needs include stability,
democratization and the rule of law, reconciliation, and social
learning, all of which require thoroughly addressing local actions.2 97
Pursuing justice outside of the domestic society may serve retributive
purposes, may speak to the culpability of the criminal, might serve
deterrent purposes, and certainly is part of a process of reinforcing
and elaborating upon global human rights norms, but it is far less
clear that external proceedings will have positive effects upon the
needs of the society itself.2 9s Pursuing "globalisation" of justice may
come at the cost of local needs.
b. Stability, Democratization, and the Rule of Law
Transitional societies have numerous urgent needs, with key needs
being stability and the enhancement of the rule of law.2 99 What is
297. See JUSTICE VS. PEACE, supra note 31, at 1-32 (providing a more general
account of the myriad goals, normative and political, that might be pursued). These
are but some of the goals that transitional societies, and those who seek to aid
them, might pursue; the focus here is on those actions relating to accountability
that arguably need to be taken locally in order to have the desired local impact. Id.
298. See Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 32, at 19 (articulating possible impacts of
foreign proceedings on individuals and on societal/institutional practices).
299. See Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding
Postconflict Societies, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 86, 92-99 (2001) (describing the variety
of institutional structures that societies may select); see also Ruti Teitel,
Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformations, 106
YALE L.J. 2009, 2014 (1997) (explaining that in its ordinary social function, law
provides order and stability but in transitions, the law can be paradoxical). Rule of
law can maintain order while still allowing change during a period of transition. Id.
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most likely to aid in the satisfaction of these needs is frequently less
clear. Punishment in domestic institutions might prove
counterproductive if it provokes a response from elements of the old
regime that undermines the nascent democracy, weakening its
legitimacy or undermining its authority over the security forces.30
Such unrest could easily end the democratic experiment and
undermine democratic stability. Advocates of democracy view
democratic rule as morally good, and may be willing to compromise
interests of justice in order to preserve the nascent democracy. 0
Thus, democratizers frequently choose to trade away some degree of
accountability in pursuit of a future state where the rule of law reigns
and human rights abuses do not take place. Reformers will recognize
that the chances of the emergence of a democratic government are
slim where members of the current regime fear future retribution.3 2
There is a danger that the threat of prosecutions, which are intended
See generally Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial
System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L
L. 46 (2001) (examining the transitions in Kosovo and East Timor and concluding
that a temporary military-run judiciary can be more effective than attempting to
develop an independent judicial system post political collapse).
300. See Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put
Into Context: the Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2639 (1991) (explaining
how domestic measures, which may be thought of as passivity instead of
punishment by other nations, can actually be a safeguard in deterring future
violations).
301. See Jamal Benomar, Justice After Transitions, 4 J. DEMOCRACY 1, 4-5
(1993) (contending that since the end goal is to promote and protect democracy,
the best way to preserve this is for countries to adopt a more conciliatory policy of
national reconciliation and amnesty for past abuses). This viewpoint is articulated
as the "reconciliation view." Id.; see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Conclusion:
Combating Impunity, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PRACTICE 281, 296 (Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) (analyzing objections to
prosecution in light of the fundamental belief that there is a "right to democracy");
Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2545 (1991) (arguing the case
against prosecutions since fragile democracies may not be able to survive military
power or politically motivated trials during periods of transition).
302. See Jon M. Van Dyke & Gerald W. Berkley, Redressing Human Rights
Abuses, 20 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 243, 246 (1992) (emphasizing that regimes
that are likely to face punishment are less likely to voluntarily relinquish power).
Therefore, the authors illustrate that a system with certain criminal prosecutions
may not be the best way to foster effective and efficient transitions while
protecting fledgling democracies. Id.
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to strengthen the rule of law, could have the effect of strengthening
the non-democratic regime. This threat may prompt reformers to
accept amnesties and other compromises.30 3 Moreover, the large
number of potential defendants may render prosecution of all of them
unrealistic. 3" There is a risk in this situation that prosecutions carried
out abroad put these careful domestic compromises and amnesties in
peril.
Of course, it may be that prosecutions aid the reinforcement of the
rule of law, human rights, and the democratic processes. For
example, prosecution may help prevent another dirty war, not only
because members of the former junta (or potential copycats) fear
punishment, but also because the rule of law is so entrenched as to
make the return to lawlessness or abuse of law virtually impossible.
Thus, punishment may serve to restore, or install democracy, the
rule of law, and respect for human rights by making it clear that
certain actions are proscribed by law and subject to punishment.3 5
On the other hand, an amnesty might encourage future abuses by
appearing to condone them. The most important aspect of
accountability is to demonstrate that the rules of a civilized society
303. See Stanley Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge,
Accountability, and the Policing of the Past, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 7, 34-35
(1995).
304. See Van Dyke & Berkley, supra note 302, at 252 (elucidating the
implausibility of securing convictions against large numbers of military or political
dissidents due to time and cost restraints). Further, a state that lacks institutional
infrastructure and whose leaders and army are essentially destroyed may not be
able to withstand lengthy and numerous prosecutions. Id.
305. See Van Dyke & Berkley, supra note 302, at 244-45 (presenting five
arguments in favor of punishment which include reasserting law and order,
promoting democratic ideals, and serving as a deterrent); see also Raul Alfonsin,
"Never Again" in Argentina, 4 J. DEMOCRACY 15, 18-19 (1993) (expressing that
some beneficial effects of punitive measures include the deterrence of future
crimes, the clarification of the circumstances under which the crime was
committed, the condemnation of past abuses, and the increased awareness that all
individuals must obey the law); Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to
Punish: A Further Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL.
L. REv. 299, 308-14 (1990) (arguing that punishment maintains stability and
advances society by "modifying the behavior of potential lawbreakers" through
deterrence, rehabilitation of lawbreakers, and the isolation of criminals from the
rest of society).
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"cannot be flouted."3 6 Further, in addition to enshrining the rule of
law and rights in the new society, prosecution may aid social peace
by preventing a potential cycle of violence perpetrated by those
seeking vengeance for prior wrongs.30 7 Some might argue that the
very social splits that appeared in Chile during the Pinochet
proceedings in the United Kingdom illustrated the degree to which
the transitional process failed to promote social healing through
amnesty.
308
Internal trials are thus a tool of some utility for the restoration of
the rule of law and democracy, though they have mixed effects upon
stability. External trials, on the other hand, take place because the
rules of law and democracy have not been restored, or because,
although the rule of law and democracy has been established, the
state is not willing to take domestic action. Typically, external trials
do little to aid in the strengthening of nascent democracies.
Furthermore, they might well serve to contribute to weak judicial and
state capacity. To the extent that human rights cases are consistently
carried out outside of the country, they will then stand no chance of
helping to establish, train, and reform the judiciary.
306. See ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 222 (1998) (noting that criminal trials acknowledge the
hardship of the victims and reinforce the application of the law); see also Cohen,
supra note 303, at 19 (illustrating the deterrent impact of truth-telling since fear of
discovery may help deter future abusers); Diane Orentlicher, Transition to
Democracy and the Rule of Law, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 965, 1056 (1990)
(arguing that the failure to punish crimes can lead to an assumption that the
government tolerates such behavior).
307. See Amnesty International, Policy Statement on Impunity, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER
REGIMES 219, 219-221 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (arguing that "the phenomenon of
impunity is one of the main contributing factors to these continuing patters of
violations"); see also Human Rights Watch, Policy Statement on Accountability for
Past Abuses, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON
WITH FORMER REGIMES, supra, at 217, 217-18 (arguing that government has a
responsibility to seek accountability for gross human rights violations); Nigel
Rodley, Transition to Democracy and the Rule of Law, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 965, 1044 (1990) (noting that the position of Amnesty International on the
question of amnesty is more complicated, flatly opposing pre-conviction, but not
post-conviction, amnesties).
308. See Bhuta, supra note 12, at 531 (1999) (raising the possible objection to
amnesty as Pinochet's arrest and trial led to diverse reactions in Chile and
ultimately hindered the healing process).
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c. The Needs of Victims
There is another powerful reason to pursue prosecutions: concern
for the victims. This requires acknowledgment of costs that the
victims have already incurred, and the potential future costs that they
may incur if their claims are ignored.30 9 Victims of violence, in
general, tend to lose their sense of control and autonomy, and often
feel isolated. After state-sponsored human rights abuses, victims may
feel especially isolated, as others in the community will often have
distanced themselves from victims of such abuses, contending that
they must have done something to deserve this, or fearing guilt by
association.31°
The paramount concern then should be to lessen victims' suffering
in ways responsive to the harm they have suffered; the state or
relevant international actors should help them to regain a sense of
control and to re-integrate into society. It is also important that the
victims actively participate in the process, which would help them to
find meaning and a catharsis following seemingly random
309. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Punishment, Redress, and Pardon: Theoretical
and Psychological Approaches, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 301, at 13, 16-19 (arguing that
such a focus on the victim is necessary in order prevent them from becoming
isolated); see also Jaime Malamud-Goti, Punishing Human Rights Abuses in
Fledgling Democracies: The Case of Argentina, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 301, at 160 (suggesting that a
victim-centered theory of punishment responds to the victims' loss of self-worth
and purpose).
310. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 309, at 19 (noting that the larger society often
responds to the victims as a group of individuals who brought their problems on
themselves, or responds with the fear of being tainted by association with the
victims); see also Malamud-Goti, supra note 309, at 166-68 (examining the act of
blaming as a social practice as a large portion of the population often denies the
victims' allegations or accuses the victims of bringing the hardship upon
themselves); Punishment and a Rights-Based, supra note 337, at 9 (claiming that
the role of punishment provides a "political remedy" to a community's lost sense
of self-respect); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS:
FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 21 (Beacon Press 1998)
(arguing that nations recovering from atrocity must address the question of how to
help heal all members of the society, including the victims, bystanders, and even
the perpetrators); Cohen, supra note 303, at 19 (presenting the concept of a
"double problem" to victims whereby victims are first accused of not telling the
truth, and then have to address the notion that their conduct was deserved since
they were guilty of crimes themselves).
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victimization,31' and restoring their dignity by giving them "their day
in court. 312
To aid victims, any procedure should promote the perception of
procedural fairness and participation of the victims by allowing them
to tell their own stories to the greatest extent possible. However,
while a formalized adversarial setting is important, the process does
not necessarily have to lead to incarceration of perpetrators or
compensation for the victims. A significant portion of the benefit for
victims come in publicly telling the truth and having it formally
acknowledged and pronounced. The "truth" about abuses is often
known, but what is important is the official acknowledgment of their
experiences.3"3 Furthermore, public disclosure of the identities of
perpetrators is a form of punishment in itself.314
311. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 309, at 19 (suggesting that a victim-centered
approach to punishment allows the victims to reestablish their sense of control and
fosters their reintegration into the community).
312. See Van Dyke & Berkley, supra note 302, at 244 (listing arguments in
favor of prosecuting culprits who abused official positions by violating the rights
of citizens). One such argument addressed the need "to reassert the inherent
dignity of each individual by providing the victims and their families their day in
court." Id.; see also Lynn Berat & Yossi Shain, Retribution or Truth-Telling in
South Africa? Legacies of the Transitional Phase, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 163, 166
(1995) (pointing out that retribution not only exposes the truth of past atrocities,
but that it also penalizes the perpetrators); see also Juan E. M~ndez, In Defense of
Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES 1, 3-4 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997) (suggesting that "letting
bygones be bygones" is disrespectful to the victim because it does not
acknowledge the dignity of the victim).
313. See THE JUSTICE AND SOCIETY PROGRAM OF THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, STATE
CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON? 93 (1989) (highlighting Professor Thomas
Nagel's observance that acknowledgement results when knowledge is made
accessible to the public); see also Aryeh Neier, What Should be Done About the
Guilty? THE N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 1, 1990, at 34 (pointing out that
governments are accountable to the people and that accountability is more than a
"political tactic" as it encompasses recognizing moral responsibilities such as
listening to and acknowledging the pleas of the victims); Priscilla Hayner, Fifteen
Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597,
607-09 (1994) (stressing the importance of acknowledging the truth, rather than
just finding it, since acknowledgement indicates that the state admitted its crimes);
PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE ATROCITY
AND TERROR 24-27 (Routledge 2001) (arguing that the basic goal of a truth
commission is "sanctioned fact finding" and that official recognition opens a topic
for discussion and public review); MINOW, supra note 310, at 60-62 (noting that a
truth commission is distinctive from prosecution in its focus on all victims and that
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Truth commissions may be one tool to address the pain of the
victims. In South Africa many commentators have argued that
simply having an official and public commission provided some
catharsis for victims, and in El Salvador the truth commission made a
point of naming the names of certain perpetrators, while recognizing
the improbability of prosecutions.315
While punishment is useful, then, it is not the only, or even
frequently the best, solution to address the concern of the victims.
Trials may be of use, but so may truth-telling procedures such as
truth commissions. Victims may benefit by having a public platform,
by having the truth officially endorsed, and by receiving
compensation.
Of course, while this approach may have significant benefits for
those directly victimized by previous abusive regimes, it may ignore
larger societal needs, such as the re-establishment of the rule of law
and faith in the legitimacy of the regime through public
accountability (e.g., through prosecutions or open recognition of
accountability). A failure to establish the new regime's commitment
to human rights and the rule of law might inadvertently undermine
deterrence and send the wrong message to potential coup-makers.
1 6
such commissions afford individuals the opportunity to have their stories officially
acknowledged). But see Benomar, supra note 301, at 10 (1993) (discussing the
establishment of the Truth Commission in Chile, which was intended to serve as a
moral reflection on the atrocities, and acknowledging the rightist opposition's
argument that the Commission's report induced a new wave of terrorism).
314. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 309, at 19-21 (acknowledging that public
scorn, namely publication of the names of those found to have "committed
murders, inflicted torture, and caused disappearances," serves as a useful
deterrent); see also Van Dyke & Berkley, supra note 302, at 246 (suggesting that
punishment does not need to incorporate criminal prosecution and incarceration,
but that it can involve "loss of rank, job, or pension rights, and monetary fines");
see also Margaret Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as Justice: Investigatory
Commissions in Latin America, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 79, 105-07 (1995) (citing
Honduras as an example in which the findings of a commission may be used to
facilitate regular judicial proceedings).
315. See MINOW, supra note 310, at 59 (noting that the South African truth
commission was distinctive in its reconciliation and healings, and noting that
regular broadcasts of the commission's hearings placed the stories of the victim in
public view).
316. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 301, at 292 (noting that successful economic
and social systems serve as precursors to an established rule of law by providing
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Lingering resentments over the past may also resurface later, posing
problems for the new regime.3"7
If it is true that such domestic trials only address some of the
needs of victims, it may be the case that external trials address even
fewer of these needs. External trials provide for acknowledgment of
the crimes, but the acknowledgment comes from outsiders instead of
the state or parties implicated in the abuses. Further, given the
distance of proceedings, the victims may achieve little sense of
satisfaction, and they may not even be aware of the proceedings,
much less able to participate.
d. Social Pedagogical Effects of Trials
Trials may do more than deter abuses, set past harms right, or
satisfy the victims; they may strengthen a new democracy through
their educational impact.3 18 They are public spectacles that foster
discussion and force society to face its recent past. These discussions
could help prevent a reversion to the patterns of abuse that occurred
in the past. The goal of a trial need not be to construct a single
narrative of victims and victimizers, but rather to open a dialogue
that embodies and enables the liberal virtues of tolerance and
respect.3 19
However, prosecutions on this basis are still risky, and it may be
as destabilizing for a new regime to have a trial conducted for
pedagogic purposes as it would be to have a trial conducted for
deterrence or pure punishment. Instead of fostering dialogue, a trial
for pedagogic reasons may widen and reify rifts in society. Actors
the citizens with a stake in the society's future, and that the failure to establish
them could weaken the effect of the punishments).
317. See Berat & Shain, supra note 312, at 166-67 (presenting potential risks
involved with retribution as accused individuals who used to yield power may
attempt to "derail the democratic process").
318. See MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW
1-2 (1997) (declaring that a primary role of criminal trials in democratic transitions
is to promote public discussion and to provide the public with the opportunity to
examine how such events could have happened and how to prevent future
occurrences).
319. See id. at 2 (putting aside the traditional objectives of criminal law in order




that one might seek to re-educate are likely to be resistant to
assertions that their actions were morally wrong.
Internal trials, then, may have mixed effects as pedagogical tools.
If they spark backlash, then they may provide the wrong lesson.
Trials conducted externally may have an even more limited effect as
social instruction, where much of the citizenry may be unaware of
the trials, or where past abusers can contend that the proceedings are
attacks on the nation by interfering outsiders.
e. National Reconciliation
Post-conflict or transitional societies face difficulties in
reconciliation, as victims and perpetrators may live in close
proximity.3 20 Amnesty for the purpose of "national reconciliation" is
often suspect, because it may be based on cynical self-serving
arguments made by officials of abusive regimes.3 2' Locating the
normative core of the "national reconciliation" defence of amnesty is
difficult. Meanwhile, many so-called "Laws of National
Reconciliation" are frequently nothing more than final-hour self-
amnesties by outgoing regimes, padded with rhetoric about a societal
need to forgive, if not forget.
However, one might argue that forgiveness is a part of social
healing. In countries where massive abuses have occurred, mistrust
of fellow citizens and the justice system is widespread, possibly
320. See Chaim Kaufnann, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil
Wars, 20 INT'L SECURITY 136, 137 (1996) (suggesting that ethnic civil wars are
best resolved when the opposing groups are physically separated into defensible
territories). Other responses such as peace enforcement or suppression only
temporarily quiet the conflict until future aggregation. Id. But see Nicholas
Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the
Theoretical Literature, 52 WORLD POL. 437, 479-82 (2000) (disputing Kaufmann
and presenting a hypothesis that the combination of several ethnic groups in one
state will reduce the likelihood of new wars). Although partition could feasibly
reduce the frequency of internal wars, it would likely increase the frequency of
international wars; resources should consequently be focused on "enhancing ethnic
diversity while strengthening political institutions." Id. at 479-80.
321. See Cohen, supra note 303, at 36 (highlighting the somewhat ironic
concept of "national reconciliation" since the same individuals who are responsible
for the destruction then turn around and support reconciliation as a healing
process).
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rendering prosecutions counterproductive or ineffective.322 It might
be preferable to pass an amnesty law and attempt to begin social
healing by focusing on the future rather than the past. In some
instances it might be healthier for all concerned to forgive, if not
forget, and move forward.323 It might be the case that reconciliation
is not a moral "second-best" because there is no practical preferable
option. There may still be some moral virtue in the process of
reconciling narratives, and attempting to reconcile groups and
persons.324
322. See Peter Uvin, Difficult Choices in the New Post-conflict Agenda: the
International Community in Rwanda after the Genocide, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 177,
181 (2001) (acknowledging the insurmountable task of establishing justice after
the genocide on account of the damage suffered by the justice system, the scope of
the crimes, and the extensive number of people involved); see also Peter Uvin &
Charles Mironko, Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda, 9 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 219, 220-22 (2003) (noting that the Rwandan government and a
portion of the population negatively perceive the Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda, as
they view the Tribunal as relatively ineffective and its punishments as too lax);
Michael P. Scharf, Responding to Rwanda: Accountability Mechanisms in the
Aftermath of Genocide, 52 J. INT'L AFF. 621, 628 (1999) (reviewing Amnesty
International's criticisms of the Rwandan domestic trials that the trials were too
short, the defendants lacked adequate representation, and the overall environment
lacked courtroom etiquette necessary for fair adjudication); Mark A. Drumbl,
Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civics in Rwanda, 75
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1221, 1254-56 (2000) (suggesting that criminal trial may not
appropriately respond to the dilemma since perpetrators tend to take a defensive
posture, leading them to deny involvement and refute accusations); Frank M.
Afflitto, Victimization, Survival, and the Impunity of Forced Exile: A Case Study
from the Rwandan Genocide, 34 CRIME, L., & SOC. CHANGE 77, 90-93 (2000)
(illustrating that victimization continues due to continued impunity through the
story of a Tutsi survivor of the genocide who cannot return to Rwanda for fear of
being killed by the same man who killed her family).
323. See Van Dyke & Berkley, supra note 302, at 246 (presenting arguments
against prosecution that trials further hatred and division between the people, thus
preventing forgiveness and reconciliation); see also Cohen, supra note 303, at 41-
42 (arguing that it is only through acknowledgement of the past that victims can
truly forgive since they must "know what it is they are forgiving"). This
acknowledgement and forgiveness allows the nation to look to the future after it
has properly acknowledged its past. Id. at 42; see also DONALD W. SHRIVER, JR.,
AN ETHIC FOR ENEMIES: FORGIVENESS IN POLITICS 42-44 (1995) (relying upon
Christian teachings to emphasize that forgiveness leads to the "renewal of a social
relationship" and that this power to forgive lies with the people).
324. See generally Susan Dwyer, Reconciliation for Realists, 13 ETHICS & INT'L
AFF. 81 (1999) (discussing moral implications of reconciliation methods).
[19:301
REVOLUTIONS iNA CCOUNTABILITY
While social reconciliation may necessitate amnesty, it does not
preclude other forms of "punishment." The revelation of the truth,
for example, may both enable the victims to heal, and also punish the
perpetrators through public shaming. It may also serve to encourage
national debate over past events that can eventually enable
reconciliation.2 5
However, amnesty on any grounds will still be highly suspect.
Amnesty may not enable stability, and a stable democracy cannot be
built on a weak foundation. A government that begins its term by
rejecting the rule of law and accountability undermines its own
claims to legitimacy. Additionally, a society may not achieve social
reconciliation by simply turning a blind eye to the past. Victims and
victimizers alike need a process to achieve reconciliation. At the very
least, a public revelation of the truth, or prosecutions, may be
necessary. Further, even if offering forgiveness and seeking to enable
social reconciliation is the "right" approach, it is for the victims,
rather than the government or any external actors, to make the
decision.
Frequently, new democracies choose to compromise by instituting
a truth commission. National reconciliation, or at the very least
stability, is sought by offering elements of the old regime amnesty,
while at the same time providing various benefits to victims and
society as a whole through revelation of the truth. These benefits are
sought through a formalized mechanism of truth-telling. There were
at least fifteen truth commissions, some government sponsored, some
not, between 1974 and 1994, and more have been developed since,
most notably in Guatemala and South Africa.326 This particular
compromise has been especially common following transitions in
Latin America, where old authoritarian and military rulers retained
325. See Cohen, supra note 303, at 36-37 (noting that public knowledge enables
a nation to debate openly and honestly the causes of the conflict and future
prevention measures).
326. See Hayner, supra note 313, at 607 (recognizing that the importance of
truth commissions lies in their ability to conduct "sanctioned fact finding" and to
create an accurate account of the events).
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significant control over the process of transition, limiting the political
feasibility of accountability efforts beyond truth-telling.3"7
These efforts sought to reap the putative benefits of truth-telling:
vindication of the victims, official acknowledgment of the truth, and,
in some cases, identification of the perpetrators.32 s  While
acknowledging these efforts are compromises made because of
political obstacles, advocates Of truth commissions say they aid
reconciliation and stability.329 They may do so further where the
mandate of the commission empowers its members to recommend
specific measures of judicial, military, police, or other institutional
reform.
If local trials have limited conciliatory effect, it seems likely that
distant trials have less to offer to reconciliation. They may either fail
to permeate. society, or be interpreted in ways that actually
undermine reconciliation.
C. DISTANT JUSTICE: WHAT DOES IT OFFER?
This section has already suggested that "externalized justice"
achieved through the exercise of universal jurisdiction, might not
serve the needs of transitional societies. 330 This claim will be further
327. See Popkin & Roht-Arriaza, supra note 314 (exploring the truth
commissions in Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, and the proposed commission in
Guatemala through a comparison of their achievements and limitations in light of
the political and institutional realities of each country).
328. See id. at 100-01 (noting that the commissions' work proved to be
successful in "fostering a sense of redress for victims" through the process of
listening to their accounts and through the presentation of an official report
acknowledging the crimes).
329. See id. at 83 (highlighting the benefits of truth commissions as they
respond to the demand for accounting and meet the international community's
insistence that governments take action against those responsible for crimes, and
that these benefits are important steps towards reconciliation).
330. One may also assess external justice might also be assessed in terms of the
quality of procedural justice, but that issue is set aside for the purposes of this
paper. See James Meernik & Kimi Lynn King, The Effectiveness of International
Law and the ICTY-Preliminary Results of an Empirical Study, 1 INT'L CRIM. L.
R. 343, 353 (2001) (examining the composition of the ICTY, a court dealing with
crimes in the former Yugoslavia but held in the Hague, and concluding that it is
ultimately responsible for the outcome of the trials as opposed to the international
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considered below. First, however, it is important to identify the
advantages of finding justice "elsewhere" when it seems unlikely to
be found at home. Where there are legitimate domestic processes in
place that will conduct genuine examinations of past atrocities, there
is no need for outsiders to intervene and establish judicial
proceedings abroad that would supersede local processes. In the
absence of such local action, what can external judicial action
offer?
33 '
1. Bringing Perpetrators to Justice
Perhaps the most obvious virtue of the exercise of universal
jurisdiction, and the one most frequently invoked, is that it leaves
perpetrators of atrocities with "no place to hide." '332 There is, at a
minimum, a certain symbolic effect: former dictators can no longer
continue to live off the benefits of despotic rule by travelling abroad
to seek expensive medical attention, or even living abroad, thereby
staying far from the complaints of their victims. Such global reach
serves at least one key normative goal by bringing perpetrators to
justice. Additionally, the global reach of universal jurisdiction serves
the political goal of acting as a deterrent to other would-be offenders.
a. Retribution
One might argue that past abusers ought to be punished for one
simple reason: their actions were reprehensible. There is no concern
here with deterrence or bolstering the rule of law, the goal is simply
community). While the Tribunal relies on other nations for funding, it is not reliant
on state compliance for its work. Id.
331. I do not, here, address other possible goals of prosecutions or other
accountability proceedings, such as rehabilitation, or, where provision is made,
reparation, as these are not primary goals of the proceedings I examine here. But
see George S. Yacoubian, Sanctioning Alternatives in International Criminal Law:
Recommendations for the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the
Former Yugoslavia, 161 WORLD AFF. 48, 52 (1998) (noting that the establishment
of the international tribunals in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda should not
only impose incarceration on the accused, but should also provide financial
restitution for the victims as its primary goals).
332. See Roth, supra note 289 (suggesting that the limit on courts permitted to
exercise universal jurisdiction is the "availability of the defendant" rather than
ideological concerns).
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to punish wrongdoing. On this account, then, selective prosecutions
and domestic amnesties are unacceptable, 33 because any wrongdoing
requires punishment.334 Some putatively retributive approaches may
demand punishment not just because of the atrocious nature of the
crime, but also because failure to punish invites repetition. This point
relates more directly to deterrence, 335 and is not a purely retributive
argument.336
333. See Nino, supra note 300, at 2619-21 (resorting to Dworkin's distinction
between "individual rights established by principles and collective goals imposed
by policies" and arguing that selective prosecutions must "be done taking into
account its use in satisfying the goals sought within the generally permissible
criteria").
334. See Rychlak, supra note 305, at 325-33 (presenting the retributive
justification of punishment as "the systematic moral response to wrongdoing" that
results from the fact that the criminal deserves punishment); see also Neier, supra
note 313, at 83-84 (offering the retributive argument that in order to restore
equilibrium to a society, punishment must be proportionate to the crime); Carlos S.
Nino, A Consensual Theory of Punishment, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 289, 297-98
(1983) (arguing that an offender assumes a sort of liability to punishment when she
performs a voluntary act knowing that loss of legal immunity is a consequence).
335. See Benomar, supra note 301, at 4 (presenting arguments that a failure to
punish perpetrators, basically condones the crime and that on the other hand,
punishment of perpetrators symbolizes a commitment to new democratic values);
see also Neier, supra note 313, at 222 (arguing the importance of trials, even a
small number of exemplary ones, as they constitute an acknowledgment of the
suffering and a demonstration that all individuals must follow the rule of law). I
would contend that these arguments that point to such effects rather than the nature
of the crime or offender ought to be separate from pure retributivist arguments. See
Alfonsin, supra note 305 (treating retribution and deterrence motivations as
opposed and arguing that the intention in Argentina centered more around
prevention than punishment); see also J. L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive
Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 4 (1982) (suggesting that individuals who
perceive certain crimes as inexcusable consequently see them requiring a penalty
because deterrence alone does not morally justify the right to inflict deprivation on
the criminal).
336. See Mackie, supra note 335, at 4-6 (arguing that attempts to rely on
retributivism as its own principle with its own moral authority fail); see also Jeffrie
Murphy, The Retributive Emotions, and Forgiveness and Resentment, in
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 1, 1-27 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988)
(contemplating the ability to both absolve someone from guilt while believing that
the person's actions were wrong and unacceptable and concluding that forgiveness
may not be appropriate). But see Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment, and
Hatred, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra, at 35, 36-40 (arguing that condoning
and forgiveness are two distinct concepts and that condoning implies an
acceptance of the moral wrongs while forgiveness does not).
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b. Deterrence
Prosecution at home might deter potential individual violators and
strengthen societal respect for the rule of law and new democratic
institutions. Failure to punish perpetrators will weaken the new state
by raising serious doubts about the legitimacy and efficacy of the
judicial system. 3 7 Successful punishment might not only enhance the
credibility of the new regime, but also aid its consolidation and
reform efforts.33 s While not every crime must be punished, at least
some exemplary punishments are necessary for deterrent purposes.339
337. See Orentlicher, supra note 301, at 2542-43 (arguing that failure to enforce
the laws dissipates the authority and effectiveness of the law and that nations can
"foster respect for democratic institutions" by proving that no sector can escape the
law); Jamie Malamud-Goti, Remarks: Transition to Democracy and the Rule of
Law, 5 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 965, 1040 (1990) [hereinafter Malamud-Goti
Remarks] (providing Argentina as an example where the nation put members of the
military on trial to enforce the concept that no institution should rise above the law
and that the rule of law must be applied equally to all members of society); see
also Jamie Malamud-Goti, Punishment and a Rights-Based Democracy, 10 CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS 3, 6 (1991) [hereinafter Punishment and a Rights-Based Democracy]
(noting that the failure to punish state criminals properly will "undermine attempts
to de-authoritarianize" society because a individuals will continue to sacrifice their
personal values and dignities).
338. See Malamud-Goti Remarks, supra note 337, at 1040-41 (using the
prosecution of the Argentinean military as an example of adapting the institution to
a new, rights-based society that can serve as an example to the rest of the nation
that democratic principles will be applied equally throughout the nation).
339. See Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former
Yugoslavia?, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 737, 745-47 (1999) (arguing that it is not necessary
to punish a large number of perpetrators to achieve deterrence because the "moral
propaganda" that results from punishing a single offender sends a message of
"social disapproval" and encourages individuals to follow the law); see also Payam
Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Tribunals Prevent
Further Atrocities, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 9-11 (2001) (suggesting that public
ostracization of criminal leaders will likely use the "power of moral example" to
prevent future atrocities); Orentlicher, supra note 301, at 2543 (showing deterrence
in transitional situations such as Argentina and Greece where a series of
prosecutions "with defined limits" is the best option that a transitional government
can take rather than prosecuting all who took part in the violations); Jaime
Malamud-Goti, Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State
Criminals? in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 189, 189-193 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995)
(discussing the prosecution of military officers in Argentina and determining that
the trials made progress towards the protection of individual rights and that the
transitional government's decision to not try all of the violators does not breach
their moral responsibilities).
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When the prosecution cannot take place where the crime occurred,
one might hope that the spectre of prosecutions taking place
anywhere in the world would serve as a powerful deterrent.
However, there is a practical problem with the hope that
prosecution will deter future abuses. Deterrence is based on the
assumption that the perpetrator believed or understood that the action
was wrong and expected that such wrongdoing would result in
negative consequences. Unfortunately, many leaders and active
participants in authoritarian and abusive regimes have not believed
themselves to be doing something wrong. If this is indeed the case,
then such abuses are un-deterrable, since potential abusers will see
such punishments as unjustifiable, or simply as punishment of
behavior not analogous to their own.340 Such deterrent effects may be
further attenuated where the punishment is carried out far from
home. It is likely that other will view punishment as illegitimate,
sporadic, and thus unlikely to recur or simply have little impact at
all.34 There is not strong evidence that international trials have a
deterrent effect, and some evidence demonstrates the reverse.342
340. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Legal Setting, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 301, at 13, 14 (stating
that deterrence is only effective when the violation is seen as such in the eyes of
the perpetrator since some perpetrators misinterpret "society's mixed messages"
and believe themselves to be acting on justifiable motives); see also Rychlak,
supra note 305, at 309-10 (arguing that deterrence is more effective with "certainty
of punishment" than with a greater "severity of punishment" since deterrence is
ineffective if the perpetrator does not think that she will be caught).
341. See Sriram, supra note 3, at 66 (asserting that while a prosecution may
serve as a deterrent, where the prosecution takes place outside of the individual's
home country the detterent effect of that prosecution decreases because it is based
on the presumption that the perpetrated expected negative consequences to ensue
from her actions).
342. See David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of
International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 473, 474-84 (1999) (arguing that the
effect of deterrence in international prosecutions is largely untested and rather
discouraging). A possible rationale for the ineffectiveness of deterrence is that the
tribunals affect too few people to have an. impact on the masses and that they lack
the frequency of and consistency amongst punishment for similar crimes. Id. at
475; see also Carrie Gustafson, International Criminal Courts: Some Dissident
Views on the Continuation of War by Penal Means, 21 Hous. J. INT'L L. 51, 60-63
(1998) (identifying the problem with deterrence as the presupposition of a rational
perpetrator when this is not always the case and that individuals are more likely to
act on their own values and beliefs than on the "threat of formal sanction by a
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There is little reason to believe that prosecutions effected through the
exercise of universal jurisdiction would have greater deterrent
effects. It is even less likely that prosecutions elsewhere will aid
domestic reform efforts.
In many instances, resort to the exercise of universal jurisdiction
might well be appropriate where local action is barred. At the
moment, the fear that there will be a vast outbreak of politically
motivated prosecutions globally appears to be mere speculation. We
have not seen frivolous or harassing prosecutions proceed far, and
the majority of jurisdictions that have heard, or are likely to hear
such cases, have sufficiently embedded standards of rule of law and
due process that it seems unlikely that they would allow such actions
to proceed. It seems more plausible that in the near term we can
expect that prosecutions will continue to be motivated by a genuine
desire to defend fundamental human rights norms.343
However, it is not clear that doing justice at a distance serves its
intended purposes. It is also unclear that well-meaning external
actors on the opposite side of the globe, or even in a neighbouring
country, will take sufficient account of the balance that may already
have been struck locally in coming to terms with the past. Taking
action after a society has implemented an agonizing set of choices
may upset nascent stability and reconciliation.344
remote institution"); Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The
Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 55 INT'L ORG. 655, 683-84 (2001) (claiming
that effective deterrence requires "commitment, capability, and credibility" and
that these elements are not met by war crimes tribunals).
343. See Ruth Wedgwood, et al., The United States and the Statute of Rome, 95
AM. J. INT'L. L. 124, 129-30 (2001) (outlining the restraints placed on prosecutors
in the treaty to ensure correct enforcement). But see Kissinger, supra note 277
(arguing that "[t]he danger lies in pushing the effort to extremes that risk
substituting the tyranny of judges for that of governments.").
344. See Drumbl, supra note 285, at 126 (arguing that "[t]rials in Rwanda
appear to hinder the emergence of a shared political compact, a departure from the
perverse politics of ethnic duality, and the development of a sense of Rwandan
commonality and citizenship that supersedes ethnic attachments to Huti and
Tutsi.").
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D. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE
1. Internal and External Proceedings for Rwanda
As it is well known, following the United Kingdom's refusal to
extradite Pinochet to Spain, he returned to Chile where domestic
legal proceedings began. Despite widespread disappointment that the
charges would not be heard in Spain, there was also significant
reason for optimism about the impact of universal jurisdiction.
Without the proceedings in Spain and the United Kingdom, it seems
unlikely that the Chilean legal proceedings would have been
advanced. Perhaps actions abroad could be expected to have
domestic political ramifications that would force the bringing of
perpetrators to justice at home. These developments may be viewed
as part of what has been referred to as the "justice cascade" in Latin
America, whereby regional norm development and foreign judicial
processes have encouraged processes at home.3 45 However, the
impact of this cascade varies in different contexts, according to, inter
alia, the degree of democratic consolidation and the degree of
publicity and support that the international proceedings have
received.346 The lessons of distant justice from Rwanda are somewhat
less heartening.
The experiences of Rwanda starkly illustrate the mixed
ramifications of extraterritorial prosecution. The Rwanda
prosecutions have gone forward at home, through the international
tribunal, and through the use of universal jurisdiction. Several claims
have been advanced for the positive impact of the ICTR for Rwanda
itself. These effects include the penetration of international legal
norms into the national legal system and the pedagogic effect of the
Tribunal proceedings.347 However, much empirical work that has
345. See Lutz & Sikkink, supra note 32, at 4 (noting the rapid development of
human rights awareness in Latin America).
346. See id. at 31-32 (articulating six factors that impact the justice cascade, two
of which are emphasized here).
347. See Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law,
and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 361,
375-76 (1999) ("Actions like the Rwanda Tribunal's genocide conviction of a
former mayor, Jean-Paul Akayesu, and the guilty plea of former Prime Minister
Jean Kambanda, feed back into society to reshape how individuals view
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been done to date casts doubt upon these effects. In particular, some
have raised serious concerns about the relationship of the Tribunal,
based in Arusha, Tanzania, and the domestic prosecutions.348
The ICTR and domestic courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
crimes relating to the genocide of 1994.149 There are several notable
distinctions between the two. The sentences they can impose are
different, as Rwandan courts can impose the death penalty while the
Tribunal does not. The Tribunal has far greater resources, and far
fewer defendants to process, but has been very slow to render
judgment.35° At its current rate, the Tribunal is certainly not capable
of handling the vast number of cases that the Rwandan courts are
seeking to address. The Rwandan courts hearing cases arising from
genocide use a specialized plea-agreement system, which helps to
expedite cases and bring out more information, though there is
reason to hold concerns about the potential for miscarriage of
justice."' The internal trials take place in the midst of the society that
underwent the genocide, while the ICTR sits outside the nation's
borders. Finally, the division of labor may be described as one of
stratified concurrent jurisdiction: the Tribunal hears the cases of
organizers and leaders, while Rwandan courts handle more ordinary
cases.
governance, the duties of states and citizens, even the meaning of statehood and
citizenship.").
348. See International Crisis Group, International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda: Justice Delayed (2001) [hereinafter Justice Delayed] (giving a detailed
discussion of the delays and other difficulties of the tribunal), available at
http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfi?id=1878&1=1 (last visited Oct. 15,
2003); see also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, General Information
About the Tribunal: Introduction (providing an overview of the Tribunal and its
base), at http://www.ictr.org/org/ENGLISH/geninfo/intro.htm (last visited Oct. 22,
2003).
349. See Bernard Muna et al., The Rwanda Tribunal and its Relationship to
National Trials in Rwanda, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1469, 1473 (1998); see also
Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda,
7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 362 (1997) (indicating that the ICTR has
concurrent jurisdiction with Rwandan courts).
350. See Justice Delayed, supra note 348 (noting that in the seven years it has
existed, the ICTR has only issued nine judgments).
351. See Morris, supra note 349, at 359-61 (providing that under the system of
plea agreements, all perpetrators, other than ones subject to the death penalty, may
receive a pre-set, fixed reduction in the penalty).
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Critics allege that the key failing of the Tribunal is its inability to
truly penetrate Rwandan society, thus limiting its capacity to enable
reconciliation, serve pedagogic purposes, or act as a deterrent.35 2 The
Tribunal has completed several significant cases and has sent a
general message against impunity. However, critics have criticized
the Tribunal for being isolated from Rwandan society; it is not only
physically separated from Rwanda, but this fact limits its capacity to
communicate with society. There are few televisions in Rwanda and
little radio coverage as well. This means that average Rwandans are
not aware of the work of the Tribunal; without such involvement,
active or passive, it is unclear that there can be much in the way of
pedagogy, reconciliation, or deterrence produced by the Tribunal's
work.353 Conversely, it may be the case that domestic cases, which
have been handled in greater volume, and which involve detailed
confessions, contribute to the development of an accurate record of
the genocide, a necessary component of reconciliation.
a. Other Risks: Competing Mechanisms and Selectivity
The tribunal and Rwandan courts have also competed for
defendants, in several instances requesting the same defendants from
governments. This generates a significant degree of incompatibility,
given the different procedures that each employ, and given the
important disparity in sentencing options. The stratified-concurrent
jurisdiction approach of the international court also means that those
who organized the genocide have a veil of protection from the death
penalty, while more "ordinary" offenders do not. 354
It seems increasingly likely that elsewhere, as in Rwanda, we will
see several overlapping proceedings, some of which I discuss in the
352. See Uvin & Mironko, supra note 322, at 226 (critiquing Tribunal's ability
to integrate into Rwandan society); see also International Crisis Group, The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Countdown-Executive Summary
and Recommendations (2002) [hereinafter ICG Countdown] (supplying a critique
of and recommendations for the Tribunal), available at
http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfin?id=1878&1=1 (last visited Nov. 19,
2003).
353. See ICG Countdown, supra note 352 (reporting that the Rwanda Tribunal
may be failing to meetings it mandate).




next section. East Timor has had a commission of inquiry,
prosecutions pursued by the Serious Crimes Unit created by the
United Nations, and discussion of a tribunal continues.355 In Sierra
Leone, a commission of inquiry has been set up and a special court
has been authorized by the United Nations.5 6 The risk remains, with
the proliferation of such instruments, that they may be contradictory
or competing rather than complementary. Furthermore, so long as
most prosecutions are carried out by Western nations against former
leaders from the global South who have fallen from favor, there is
some significant risk that prosecutions will be selective, and that they
may also be viewed as discriminatory.357
E. EXTERNALIZATION OF JUSTICE: A CALL FOR ACTION
This is not to suggest that pursuing war criminals and human
rights abusers elsewhere is never appropriate and never serves the
needs of the societies where the crimes took place. It is, rather, to
strike a note of caution. While limitations do not formally exist on
the exercise of universal jurisdiction, the use of the principle of
complementarity would be most appropriate. That principle is built
into the statute of the ICC, which can request that national courts
defer to its jurisdiction.358 There is currently nothing to prevent
355. See Amnesty International, Still Waiting for Justice in Timor-L 'Este, June-
July 2003 (reporting that the serious crimes unit has made considerable progress
since its establishment), available at
http://www.amnesty.org.au/airesources/newsletterJuneJuly03/timor-leste.asp (last
visited Dec. 18, 2003).
356. See U.N. Approves War Crimes Court for Sierra Leone, REUTERS, Jan. 3,
2002 (stating that the task of the tribunal would be the prosecution of about twenty
people accused of being involved in Sierra Leone's decade-long civil war),
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/2002/0401slI.htm (last
visited Oct. 15, 2003).
357. See Bhuta, supra note 12, at 528 (stating that "despite widespread
acceptance of the jus cogens status of crimes, the consistent enforcement of these
principles against individuals whose crimes 'shock the conscience of mankind; has
been absent").
358. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 1,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (establishing the intent to have jurisdiction
complement Rwanda's legal system); see also Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal of Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/955
(1994).
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external national courts from asserting primacy over local national
courts, with the ramifications for the home society detailed above.
Courts ought to generate formalized limitations upon the range of
assertion of universal jurisdiction.359 Otherwise, there is a risk that
resources will flow to external procedures, which do not address
some of the most salient needs of transitional societies.
IV. EXTERNALIZATION REVERSED:
MIXED TRIBUNALS
If externalization of justice carries with it the costs and risks
articulated thus far, what is to be done? Certainly, it cannot be the
case that accountability for past abuses should not be pursued,
though caution must be exercised in doing so. There might, however,
be an alternative model-internationalized tribunals where
prosecution is carried out at home. These "mixed tribunals," which
may involve domestic and external judges or a complicated mixture
of domestic and international law, have been created for East Timor
and for Sierra Leone, and protracted negotiations regarding a
Cambodian tribunal continue. However, the experience of East
Timor suggests reason for caution. Such "externalization reversed"
may not necessarily overcome the problems identified with
externalization. These include a sense that the process does not
include local citizens, including victims, that it fails to address many
crimes, and that it does little to foster national reconciliation or
capacity-building. This reason is a dominant reason that, despite the
mixed tribunal in East Timor, there continue to be domestic demands
for an international tribunal.
359. See Kevin R. Gray, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of]1 April 2000
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 561, 723-24
(2002) (discussing foreign minister immunity as a limit to the exercise of universal
jurisdiction), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Voll3/No3/srl.html (last
visited Dec. 13, 2003); see also PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at 11
(formulating principles in order to clarify and bring order to the area of
international law dealing with prosecutions based serious crimes under
international law and universal jurisdiction).
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A. FACING THE DILEMMA: EAST TIMOR
As it is well known, shortly after the referendum on independence,
resulting in the East Timorese vote for independence after more than
twenty years of Indonesian occupation, violence erupted across the
province.160 The massacres that resulted have been attributed to
militias acting with the support or at the instigation of the Indonesian
military command.36 1 The U.N. Security Council installed a U.N.
transitional authority in East Timor to quell the violence and keep the
peace, as well as to initiate institution-building.362 In the interim, the
United Nations has taken over a broad range of governance-related
roles in the province, ranging from policing to judicial action.
3 63
Thus, responsibility for the tough choices regarding whether to
prosecute a range of individuals for the violence falls to the United
Nations and Indonesia. However, within East Timor, local opinions
also matter, and in the long run, these problems will fall to the East
Timorese government to address. Not surprisingly, the United
Nations has had considerably greater success in the pursuit of
accountability than those seeking justice in Indonesia. In East Timor,
the United Nations and the Timorese transitional actors exercise
significant authority in the face of stiff, but to date manageable,
levels of political opposition and violence. 64 In Indonesia, many of
the perpetrators of rights abuses are or were members of the military
or security sector, and would pose considerable threats to stability
360. See generally Suzanne Katzenstein, Hybrid Tribunals:' Searching for
Justice in East Timor, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245 (2003) (providing a background
on the crimes of mass atrocity in East Timor).
361. See id. at 263 (providing an overview of the Indonesian occupation of East
Timor, which lasted until August 1999).
362. See id. at 248 (noting that the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1272
established the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, and directed the
United Nations to exercise executive and legislative authority in East Timor).
363. See id. (noting that that Resolution 1272 marked the first time that the
United Nations had exercised all the sovereign functions of a country).
364. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY, East Timor in
Transition: From Conflict Prevention to State-Building (2001) (supplying an
overview of the transitional administration and exploring the types of challenges
the United Nations has faced in its administration of East Timor), available at
http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Research/PublEastTimorPrint.htm
(last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
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should their punishment be sought; those individuals seeking their
punishment are comparatively small in number and weak in strength.
In fact, most of the senior level Indonesian army ("TNI") officers
who where in command in East Timor during the referendum period
were promoted upon their return to Indonesia.3 65 The focus of this
section will be only on the attempts to address past abuses through
the serious crimes panel, not also those attempted in Indonesia.
1. Background: Occupation, Referendum, Violence,
and the U.N. Mission
Following Portugal's provision for a transitional government in
East Timor in 1975 in preparation for the independence of the
province, Indonesia invaded the province, declaring it in 1976 to be
the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia.366 The United Nations
condemned this invasion with resolutions by the Security Council
and General Assembly to this effect.3 67 The Secretary General
received a mandate to address the situation by the General Assembly
and oversaw negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal beginning
365. See IAN MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY , Self-Determination in
East Timor: The United Nations, the Ballot and International Intervention(2001)
(providing an excellent overview of the history of East Timor from Portuguese rule
to Indonesian occupation to United Nations administration), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
366. See id. (describing the historical events that occurred in 1975-76); see also
Question of East Timor: Progress Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR,
54th Sess., Agenda Item 96, U.N. Doc. A/54/654 (1999) (establishing the United
Nations mission in East Timor); United Nations, The United Nations and East
Timor: A Chronology ("The Security Council reiterates its call for Indonesia's
withdrawal. The General Assembly reaffirms the right of East Timor's people to
self-determination, a principle which it re-states yearly at its annual session."),
available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/chrono/body.html (last visited Oct.
22, 2003).
367. See Martin, supra note 366, at 17 (stating that the United Nations adopted
two resolutions calling on Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor); see also Lynn
Fredriksson, East Timor, FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus, Dec. 2000 (reporting that
"[b]etween 1972 and 1982, the United Nations passed two Security Council and
eight General Assembly resolutions condemning Indonesia's invasion, calling for
its immediate withdrawal, and supporting East Timor's self-determination."),
available at http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
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in 1983.368 Significant progress would not be made, however, until
the late 1990s, as the United Nations became increasingly active on
the issue and President Suharto of Indonesia fell from power,
providing a unique opening.369 His handpicked successor, B.J.
Habibie, proposed a form of autonomy for the Timorese, who
demanded independence.370 The result was an agreement to hold a
plebiscite on the status of the territory. Indonesia and Portugal agreed
to a U.N. operation in the territory to prepare for the plebiscite, to be
held on August 30, 1999.371 The U.N. Mission in East Timor
("UNAMET") authorized the deployment of up to 280 civilian police
officers and fifty military liaison officers as advisors in preparation
for the vote. 372 However, violence continued throughout the
province, perpetrated largely by anti-independence militias supported
by the Indonesian military.373
The militia violence in the run-up to the plebiscite sparked
international concern, but significant limits were placed on the
United Nation's capacity to ensure security. Despite United Nations
requests for the disarmament of militias and other security measures,
the resulting agreement was weak, failing to seriously restrain the
368. See East Timor-U.N.TAET Background (stating that successive
Secretaries-General conducted regular talks with Indonesia in order to resolve the
status of the territory), at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2003).
369. See Martin, supra note 366, at 18-19 (stating that the fall of the president
was a political turning point).
370. See id. at 19 (stating that the "successor government of President Habibie
state that it was prepared to give East Timor a wide-ranging autonomy, with
Jakarta retaining only three areas: foreign affairs, external defense, and some
aspects of monetary and fiscal policy").
371. See U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3988th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1236 (1999)
("Welcoming the progress made at the last round of talks between the
Governments of Portugal and Indonesia, under the auspices of the Secretary
General of the United Nations, leading to the conclusion of a series of agreements
in New York of 5 May 1999."); U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4013th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1246 (1999) [hereinafter UNAMET Resolution] (providing for the creation
of U.N.AMET).
372. See UNAMET Resolution, supra note 371 (establishing UNAMET to
organize and conduct the consultation).
373. See Martin, supra note 366, at 20 (chronicling the violence in East Timor
during this time).
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presence of paramilitary forces and militias and leaving security for
the referendum in the hands of Indonesia.
374
On August 30th, nearly ninety-nine percent of eligible voters went
to the polls, and some seventy-eight percent of those voted to reject
the autonomy package and instead become independent of
Indonesia.375 When results were announced on September 4th, a
wave of violence was unleashed by the militias, resulting in vast
destruction across East Timor, countless deaths, the displacement of
hundreds of thousands of East Timorese internally and into West
Timor, and the withdrawal of most of UNAMET.376 The international
community responded with condemnation and economic reprisals, in
particular through the World Bank, and demanded that Indonesia
permit a serious international presence. That presence came first in
the form of INTERFET, a Security Council-mandated Australian-led
international force, established on September 15th to protect
UNAMET in carrying out its tasks.377 That force would turn over its
374. The responsibility is allocated in the Agreements of 5 May signed by
Indonesia, Portugal, and the Secretary-General. See Agreement Between Indonesia
and Portugal on the Question of East Timor, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., at 1 & 3,
U.N. Doe. S/1999/513 (1999) (requesting "[tihe Secretary-General to put the
attached proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for
East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia to the East Timorese people,
both inside and outside East Timor, for their consideration and acceptance or
rejection through a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and
universal ballot."); see also Martin, supra note 366, at 31 (providing background
on the tripartite negotiations).
375. See Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human
Rights Situation in East Timor, U.N. ESCOR, 4th special sess. 3, U. N. Doc.
E/CN.4/S-4/CRP. 1 (1999) (noting the in announcing the ballot, the Secretary
General "asked all parties to bring an end to the violence, which, for 24 years, had
caused untold suffering to East Timor and to begin in earnest a process of dialogue
and reconciliation through the East Timor Consultative Commission").
376. See id. 3 (regretting that after the election, different militia groups
engaged in violence, which targeting supporters of the independence of East
Timor).
377. See Martin, supra note 366, at 114 (stating that the United Nations adopted
a resolution to establish INTERFET on September 15); see also Situation of
Human Rights in East Timor, U.N. Comm. Human Rts., 4th special sess., U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/S-4/1 (1999) (condemning the role of the militias).
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functions over the next few months to UNTAET, completing the
handover on February 28, 2000.378
The U.N. Security Council established UNTAET on October 25,
1999 under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, authorizing significant
military and police components.379 The mandate of the mission was
to provide security and maintain law and order throughout East
Timor, to establish an effective administration, to assist in the
development of civil and social services, to ensure the coordination
and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and
development assistance, to support capacity-building for self-
government, and to assist in the establishment of conditions for
sustainable development.38°
In addition to the broad work of reconstructing a devastated
country, the U.N. mission was tasked to develop institutions not
previously extant, for example, U.N. CIVPOL was brought in to train
cadets for the first civilian police in East Timor.38 1 The United
Nations has recognized the need to address the violence, creating a
commission of inquiry and establishing the Serious Crimes
Investigation Unit, a mixed panel, composed of Timorese and
378. See U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-
2000 (Feb. 2001) (commenting on the passage of military and later policy
functions to the United Nations), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/eap/index.cfm?docid=688 (last visited Oct. 16,
2003).
379. See U.N. S.C. Res., U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4057th mtg. 1, U.N.
Doc.S/RES/1272 (1999) (deciding "to establish, in accordance with the report of
the Secretary-General, a united Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(U.N.TAET), which will be endowed with overall responsibility for the
administration of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and
executive authority, including the administration of justice").
380. See id. 4 (authorizing "U.N.TAET to take all necessary measures to fulfill
its mandate").
381. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (for the Period 27 July 2000 to 16 January 2001),
U.N. SCOR, at 7, U.N. Doc. S/2001/42[hereinafter Report of the Secretary-
General] (describing the institutions developed by the United Nations). The United
Nations created a new East Timor Defense Force, when Falintil, the former armed
wing of the most popular political party, was disbanded in early 2001. Id. The new
Timorese army will be mainly concerned with providing future border protection.
Id. Courts were set up in the interim to administer justice until a new Timorese
regime could establish institutions of justice. Id.
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international judges to address those accused of crimes in East
Timor. UNTAET also established new courts for the period of the
transitional administration. It has not set up a process to address
those responsible in Indonesia and has indicated that the obligation to
pursue those responsible for the violence lies with Indonesia. The
United Nations has decided to postpone a decision on setting up an
international tribunal after Indonesia reassured the international
community that it would serve justice to the perpetrators of the
violence. This seems something of a turning point, and also
somewhat precedent-setting given the level of U.N. involvement in
constructing Timorese institutions from the ground up.
East Timorese leaders are divided on the issue of appropriate
accountability mechanisms. While Xanana Gusmao, now president
of the new country Timor Leste, has stated that an international
tribunal is not what the East Timorese need at this point, Foreign
Affairs Minister Jose Ramos-Horta encourages bringing justice to
through international tribunals.38 U.N. member states have clearly
stated that they wish to give the Indonesians an opportunity to
prosecute those responsible and maintain stability in the country's
provinces.383
2. The United Nations: Investigations and
the Commission of Inquiry
The United Nations began investigations into the post-referendum
violence soon after the violence's end. The U.N. Human Rights
Commission created a commission of inquiry, and the United
Nations also sent a team of human rights investigators, comprised of
the special rapporteurs on executions, torture, and violence against
382. See East Timor: U.N., Indonesia Issue Damning Human Rights Reports,
U.N. WIRE, Feb. 1, 2000 (quoting Jose Ramos Horta as saying, "[iln this day and
age, you cannot kill hundreds of people, destroy a whole country, and then just get
fired."); available at http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20000201/6998_story.asp
(last visited Dec. 18, 2003).
383. See Joe Saunders, Wheels of Justice: Unfinished Business in Timor, Aug.
2000 (reporting that "[k]ey member states of the U.N. early on rejected the idea of
an international tribunal on both political and logistical. grounds."), available at
http://www.hrw.org/editorials/2000/etimor0830.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2003).
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women, to East Timor in November 1999.384 These investigations
examined acts of violence launched by both pro and anti-
independence forces and attributed the killings largely to militia
groups supported by TNI and police.385
The five-member International Commission of Inquiry arrived in
East Timor in November 1999.386 Indonesia promised to cooperate
with the commission, but rejected the resolution creating the
Commission, arguing that there were "procedural irregularities" and
insisting, therefore, that any findings of the Commission were not
binding on Indonesia.387 The International Commission of Inquiry
transmitted its report to the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights in January 2000. It found, not surprisingly, that there was a
pattern of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law,
linking the TNI and the militias. 388 The Indonesian government
384. See U.N. Envoys Investigating Alleged Human Rights Abuses in East
Timor, U.N. NEWS, Nov. 8 1999 (reporting that three U.N. experts had begun
human rights abuse investigations in East Timor), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/081199.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2003). The
U.N. High Commission on Human Rights requested the investigation. See
Situation of Human Rights in East Timor, U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights, 4th Special Sess., §§ 6-7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/s-4/1 (1999). The
U.N. Economic and Social Council also supported the inquiry. See Report of the
Commission on Human Rights on its Fourth Special Session, U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, 4th Special Sess., at ch. 1, U.N. Doe.
E/CN.4/1999.167/Add. 1 (1999). ECOSOC voted twenty-seven to ten, with eleven
abstentions, in support of sending human rights investigators to East Timor. U.N.
Economic and Social Council Endorses Rights Inquiry for East Timor, U.N. NEWS,
Nov. 15, 1999, available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/151199.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
385. See U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 116(c), 59-65, U.N. Doc.
A/54/660 (1999) (detailing the rapporteurs' conclusions on Indonesia's
responsibility for human rights violations in East Timor).
386. U.N. Panel Set to Visit East Timor to Probe Atrocities, U.N. NEWS, Nov.
19, 1999 (detailing U.N. investigators' plan to visit sites and interview witnesses
where people reported rights violations), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/191199.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
387. See Question of East Timor, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Annex 1, Agenda
Item 96, at 1, U.N. Doe. A/54/727 (2000) (describing Indonesia's justification for
its belief that the establishment of the International Commission did not have the
requisite support of the international community).
388. See U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Annex 2, Agenda Item 96, 135-141, U.N.
Doc. A/54/726 (2000) [hereinafter Agenda Item 96] (discussing findings of direct
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rejected what it claimed was an undue emphasis on these violations
and a failure to recognize the responsibility of pro-independence
actors for similar violations. 89 While rejecting findings that the army
and police were seriously involved, the government promised to
bring individual perpetrators to justice.3 90 Indonesia also insisted that
only Indonesian jurisdiction was appropriate. 91 The report called for
further investigation, prosecution, and reparations. It indicated that
the United Nations had a special responsibility in its trusteeship
relations with the territory, and advocated an independent
international investigative and prosecutorial body.3 92
In early 2001, a special U.N. investigator drafted another report
that the United Nations classified as an "internal working document"
to serve as a reference document for the Serious Crimes Unit.393
However, this document leaked to the public in April 2001. It clearly
implicated the TNI and several of its generals as the perpetrators of
the post-referendum violence.3 94  The Indonesian government
responded by stating that its human rights commission would
investigate all suspects who committed crimes in East Timor and
would bring the suspects before trial soon.
links between the TNI and the militia groups that were responsible for the wave of
violence and human rights abuse).
389. See Question of East Timor, supra note 387, at 2 (detailing evidence that
pro-independence militia had conducted campaigns of terror and intimidation).
390. See id. at 3 (expressing Indonesia's willingness to prosecute human rights
violators through Indonesia's judicial system).
391. See id. (arguing that since the human rights violations occurred while East
Timor was still part of Indonesia, the Indonesian judicial mechanism was the
exclusive mechanism for trying the perpetrators).
392. See Agenda Item 96, supra note 388, 145-156 (summarizing the
rapporteurs recommendations for U.N. action).
393. See Timor Report to Be Used in Trials, THE AGE, Apr. 21, 2001 (reporting
on the United Nation's plans to use U.N. special investigator James Dunn's
report), available at http://www.etan.org/et200lb/april/l 5-21/21 treport.htm (last
visited Dec. 18, 2003).
394. See James Dunn, Crimes Against Humanity in East Timor, January to
October 1999: Their Nature and Causes, 35-45, Feb. 14, 2001 (identifying key
Indonesian army generals and commanders and detailing their role in encouraging
human rights violations), available at http://www.etan.org/news/2001 a/dunn1.htm
(last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
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UNTAET established a transitional court system, setting up a
Transitional Judicial Service Commission to vet judges and
prosecutors and to create a code of ethics.395 The Commission had
the authority to interview candidates and make recommendations to
the Transitional Administrator, who determined the final decision.396
The United Nations set up a series of district courts and established
their jurisdiction. Only the Dili District court would have jurisdiction
over serious crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, murder, sexual offenses, and torture.3 97
The courts were to apply the Indonesian penal code, the law that
was applicable in East Timor prior to October 25, 1999, until
UNTAET or a subsequent legislation enacted new regulations.398
However, these laws could not conflict with internationally
recognized standards, the mandate of UNTAET, or other regulations.
Courts could not apply certain laws, such as those of anti-subversion,
national security, etc.3 99 Courts in East Timor may also apply all
395. See Regulation No. 1999/3 on the Establishment of a Transitional Judicial
Service Commission, U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, U.N. Doc.
U.N.TAET/REG/1999/3 (1999) (establishing a Transitional Judicial Service
Commission to recommend judges to the Transitional Administrator and to prepare
a code of ethics for judges and prosecutors), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/etreg3.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
396. See id. art. 11 (disclosing that the Transitional Administrator had the final
authority to appoint candidates to judicial or prosecutorial office).
397. See Regulation No. 2000/11 On the Organization of Courts in East Timor,
U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, at 4, U.N. Doc.
U.N.TAET/REG/2000/11 (2000) (detailing the District Court in Dili's exclusive
jurisdiction over certain serious criminal offenses), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Reg 11 .pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
398. See Regulation No. 1999/1 on the Authority of the Transitional
Administration in East Timor, § 3.1, U.N. TAET/REG/1999/1 (1999) (discussing
the applicable law in East Timor).
Until replaced by UNTAET regulations or subsequent legislation of
democratically established institution of East Timor, the law applied in East
Timor prior to 25 October 1999 shall apply in East Timor insofar as they do
not conflict with the standards referred to in section 2, the fulfillment of the
mandate givent to UNTAET under United Nations Security Council
resolution 1272 (1999), or the present or any other regulation and directive
issued by the transitional administer. Id.
399. See id. § 3 (determining that courts in East Timor would not apply previous
anti-subversion and national security regulations).
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international human rights treaties in relevant cases.4 °° If necessary,
the Transitional Administrator may sign an executive order in order
to amend the Indonesian penal code.4 1 Once the UNTAET mandate
expired on January 31, 2002, the Indonesian penal code, with the
amendments made by UNTAET, would remain the applicable law,
subject to changes the government of East Timor would make.40 2
3. The Serious Crimes Unit and the Special Panel for Serious Crimes
The Serious Crimes Unit40 3 began receiving information about
crimes for indictment from the Civilian Police and local prosecutors
in June 2000.404 The National Consultative Council created the
Special Panel for Serious Crimes, comprised of two international
judges and one Timorese judge, under the regulations for the general
organization of the East Timor court system. It was competent to
hear cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
murder, sexual offenses, and torture; the regulations explicitly
400. See id. § 2 (listing international documents, such as the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, that reflect internationally recognized human rights
standards).
401. See id. § 6.1 (providing the Transitional Administrator with the power to
issue administrative directives).
402. See id. § 4 (detailing that UNTAET regulations will remain in force until
superseded in the future by legislation from democratic institutions of East Timor).
403. See Regulation No. 2000/15, On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive
Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offenses, U.N. Transitional Administration in
East Timor, § 1, U.N. Doc U.N.TAET/REG/2000/15 (2000) [hereinafter
Regulation No. 2000/15] (establishing special crimes unit panels to deal with
serious crimes offenses), available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/
RegOO15E.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2003); see also Question of the Violation of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any Part of the World, U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 9, at 6, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/27(2000) (disclosing that UNTAET created a single coordinating
agency to concentrate on investigating the 1999 violence).
404. See "Serious Crime " Files Handed Over to U.N. Mission in East Timor for
Trial, U.N. NEWS, June 26, 2000 (reporting that local prosecutors and police
handed over criminal files concerning serious crimes to the U.N.TAET), available
at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/N260600.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
405. See Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 403, at 7 (explaining that the special panel would consist of
both international and East Timorese judges).
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provided for universal jurisdiction.4 °6 The court could try perpetrators
under this regulation if the act in question was a crime under
international law or the laws of East Timor. The regulations also
provide that official privileges and immunities shall not constitute a
bar to prosecution that commanders were responsible for actions
subordinates commit, and that superior orders do not constitute a bar
to punishment.4 7 UNTAET also established detailed rules of
criminal procedure for the transitional courts in September 2000.408
Indonesia and UNTAET signed a legal memorandum of
understanding ("MOU") regarding exchange of evidence and other
evidentiary and procedural matters.40 9 However, the Unit has been
unable to collect "witness" statements and other evidence from the
Indonesian government.4 10 The Office of the Prosecutor General of
the UNTAET indicted its first suspect for crimes against humanity in
406. See Regulation No. 2000/15, supra note 403, § 2 (agreeing to the existence
of universal jurisdiction under customary international law). However, universal
jurisdiction under customary international laws has only recently risen in profile
and usage in international law. See Chandra Lekha Sriram, Exercising Universal
Jurisdiction: Contemporary Disparate Practice, 6 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 49, 49-76
(2002).
407. See Regulation No. 2000/15, supra note 403, §§ 12, 14-16, 21 (detailing
when the special panel may hold a person responsible for serious crimes).
408. See Regulation No. 2000/30, On Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure,
U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, U.N. Doc.
U.N.TAET/REG/2000/30 (2000) [hereinafter Regulation No. 2000/30] (creating
rules of procedure for due process, jurisdiction, investigations, arrest and detention,
indictment, and trial); see also Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual Criminal
Responsibility and National Reconciliation: The U.N. Truth Commission for East
Timor, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 952, 952-66 (2001) (discussing the U.N. Truth
Commission in East Timor and its creation by the legal act of United Nations
rather than on the basis of parliamentary law).
409. See Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 403, at 7 (noting the signing of documents between
Indonesia and UNTAET to enable the exchange of documents and eventually the
extraditing of suspects).
410. Interview by Karen Resnick with Barry Gibson, Deputy Chief of
Investigations, Serious Crimes Investigations Unit (Nov. 8, 2000) (noting that Mr.
Gibson informed Ms. Resnick that the Indonesian government was very slow in
providing very little information about the suspects, which they termed as
"witnesses") (interview notes on file with American University International Law
Review).
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East Timor in December 2000." ' The first hearing took place in
January 2001. The Unit began investigating crimes under the
Indonesian penal code as well as for crimes against humanity.41 2 The
Special Panel for Serious Crimes handed down its first sentence in
late January. 3 It handed down additional sentences, the maximum
available, in December 2001.414
Problems related to understaffing and limited resources have
plagued the Unit's ability to carry out its investigative tasks.41 5 Some
411. See U.N. Prosecutor in East Timor Files First Indictment for Crimes
Against Humanity, U.N. NEWS, Dec. 11, 2000 (reporting that the indictment
accused eleven people, including the first Indonesian Officer Lt. Sayful Anwar, of
committing crimes against humanity), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/N1 1 1200.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
412. See East Timor: First Hearings Held On Serious Crimes Committed
During 1999 Violence, U.N. NEWS, Jan. 10, 2001 (observing that the preliminary
hearing consisted of two separate hearings), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/OljanI0.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2003); see
also Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 381, at 4-5 (noting that
prosecutors had issued the first indictments for crimes against humanity).
413. See East Timor Court Hands Down First Sentence for Post-referendum
Violence, U.N. NEWS, Jan. 25, 2001 (revealing that the court sentenced a former
militia member to twelve years imprisonment), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/01jan25.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2003); see
also East Timor: U.N. Mission Files Second War Crimes Indictment for 1999
Violence, U.N. NEWS, Feb. 6, 2001 (noting that the Prosecutor filed the second
indictment in February), available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news (last
visited Oct. 9, 2003). See generally U.N. Transitional Administration in East
Timor, East Timor Update March 2000, at 7 (providing an overview of the rule of
law), available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetPU/ETupdateME.pdf (last
visited Oct. 22, 2003); U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, East Timor
Update April 2000, at 7 (containing further updates on the activities of the Special
Panel), available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetPU/ETupdateAE.pdf
(last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
414. See East Timor: Dili Tribunal Gives Maximum Sentences in First
Convictions, U.N. WIRE, Dec. 11, 2001 (reporting that three suspects received the
maximum sentence of thirty-three years and four months), available at
http://www.unfoundation.org/unwire/20011211/22511_story.asp (last visited Oct.
9, 2003).
415. See Mark Dodd, Call to Support or Scrap Crimes Unit, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, May 25, 2001 (observing that non-governmental organizations in East
Timor asked that the United Nations to either increase its support for the serious
crimes unit or abandon it and form an international war crimes tribunal), available




of the investigators have caseloads of more than 300 murders.
Additionally, there was no available forensic pathologist for months,
even though thirty sets of human remains were gathered for
examination." 6
Because of limited resources and poor management for two years,
the Unit was not viewed as successful, and predictions of its demise
were frequent. The Unit competed for resources with the ordinary
court system, which also had to be built from the ground up. There
was a lack of continuity in investigation, which was compounded by
a lack of resources. Additionally, there was further concern that there
was a failure to properly reach out to the Timorese, and to involve
the population and Timorese legal experts specifically, in the
process.4"7 Similarly, where local capacity-building efforts have
begun, there is a sense that foreign experts simply direct rather than
mentor and engage.41 8 Victims' groups, in particular, became very
critical of the Unit and have made strong calls for a truly
international process.
The image of the Unit improved somewhat after it indicted a
significant number of suspects, some highly placed, in early 2003.
The Unit indicted forty-eight individuals, including Indonesian
General Wiranto, the former Timorese police chief Timbul Silaen,
and Eurico Guterres. Surprisingly, President Gusmao issued a
statement indicating he considered the indictment of Wiranto to be a
mistake, and called on the international community to take over full
responsibility for the prosecutions of the crimes of 1999. He added,
"I consider it to not be in the national interest to realize a judicial
process of this nature in East Timor."4"9
416. See Mark Dodd, Massacres Go Unpunished as U.N. Crimes Unit Heads
For Collapse, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 1, 2001 (discussing concerns that
chronic lack of resources would force the serious crimes unit to collapse),
available at http://old.smh.com.au/news/0105/01/pageone/pageone6.html (last
visited Oct. 9, 2003).
417. See Katzenstein, supra note 360, at 256 (explaining that East Timorese
jurists were frustrated that U.N.TAET did not consult them in determining the
regulation governing the establishment of the Special Panels for Serious Crimes).
418. See id. at 265-68 (lamenting the lack of U.N. concern with capacity-
building and effective communication between mentors and mentees).
419. East Timor: Serious Crimes Unit Indicts 48 More Suspects, U.N. WIRE,
Feb. 28, 2003, available at
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4. The East Timor Commission for Truth, Reception, and
Reconciliation
Beyond the prosecutions carried out by the Serious Crimes Unit,
there were also attempts at non-judicial responses to crimes. The
East Timor Transitional Cabinet created a truth commission to focus
on repatriating refugees, documenting human rights abuses, and
creating human rights safeguards for the future.420 This commission
consists of five to seven national commissioners, appointed by the
transitional administrator. The commission is empowered to examine
violations in the context of the political strife in East Timor between
April 25, 1974 and October 25, 1999. The commission will have
powers of inquiry and search and seizure, but lacks more formal
judicial powers; it may also facilitate community reconciliation
processes. 4 ' The key to a successful reintegration process could lie
in the regional commissions, which would work closely with
traditional justice practices and would lessen the already heavy
burden of caseloads on conventional courts. Rwanda, similarly, has
http://wwwunwire.org/U.N.Wire/20030228/32304-story.asp (last visited Oct. 9,
2003).
420. See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 412, at 5 (indicating that
the Transitional Administration approved the formation of regulation for the Truth,
Reception, ad Reconciliation Commission); see also East Timor Cabinet Backs
Creation of Truth Commission to Record Rights Abuses, U.N. NEWS, Feb., 28 2001
(detailing that the East Timorese cabinet endorsed a draft regulation creating a
truth commission), available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/0 I feb28.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2003); East Timor Reconciliation Efforts Gain Momentum,
U.N. Mission Says, U.N. NEWS, Aug., 23 2001 (discussing the UNTAET's hopes
that the Truth Commission can resolve tensions between refugees and pro-
autonomy communities), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/Olaug23.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2003). But
see Paolo Gorjao, The East Timorese Commission for Reception, Truth, and
Reconciliation: Chronicle of a Foretold Failure? 4 CiV. WARS 142, 142-62 (2001)
(analyzing the likelihood of success of the East Timorese Commission for
Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation).
421. See Regulation No. 2001/10, On the Establishment of a Commission for
Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation, U.N. Transitional Administration in East
Timor, § 3, U.N. Doc. U.N.TAET/REG/2001/10 (July 2001) [hereinafter




instituted the use of gacaca, a traditional form of justice, in an





The issue of reconciliation arises in many transitional situations,
and East Timor is no exception. The United Nations addressed this
issue, in part through approaches that are not necessarily consistent
with more "traditional justice" mechanisms. Such "traditional
justice" approaches enable villagers themselves to address crimes
rather than using a formal judicial mechanism, and have led to the
return of some former militia members without the involvement of
the United Nations.423 In such approaches, militia members confess
their actions to village elders and must promise never to commit a
crime again.
424
Since traditional structures such as traditional justice are oral
rather than written, the extent to which local communities practice
and carry out such methods is not transparent to the international
community. Communities practice traditional justice widely,
however, and the type of sentencing a perpetrator may receive varies
not only from district to district, but also from village to village. The
fact that traditional justice practices can conflict with a formal justice
system is a recognized problem in the international community.
Efforts have been made by the U.N. Office of Communications
and Public Information, as well as the Civic Education Department,
422. See Rwanda to Use Traditional Justice in '94 Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2001, at Al (describing Rwanda's practice of traditional justice). But see Drumbl,
supra note 344, at 124-40 (analyzing the achievements of the criminal trials in
Rwanda and their applicability elsewhere).
423. See Interview by Karen Resnick with Judge Egonda-Ntende Frederik,
Court of Appeals, and Judicial Affairs, U.N.TAET (Nov. 7, 2000) (finding that the
precise mechanisms of "traditional justice" and the number of individuals returned
to villages as a result of traditional justice have proven rather hard to ascertain)
(interview notes on file with American University International Law Review);
supra Interview with Barry Gibson, note 410; Interview by Karen Resnick with
Oyvind Olson, Chief Investigator, Serious Crimes Unit (noting that villages do
report all issues resolved by traditional justice to the authorities).
424. Interview by Karen Resnick with Dionisio de Soares, Chairman, East
Timorese Jurist Association (Nov.. 21, 2000) (discussing the process of traditional
justice and the role of confessions and promises within the system) (interview
notes on file with American University International Law Review).
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the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNHCR to inform
the population about steps taken toward the structuring of a national
justice system. These include television and radio broadcasts,
articles, posters, and brochures containing information about
returning refugees.
UNTAET staff from the Civic Education Department, Department
of Peacekeeping Operations and local District Field Officers inform
local leaders and civic groups about policy changes through
meetings. UNTAET expects local leaders to provide this information
to their community. Unfortunately, information about local practices
from leaders and civic groups is not as forthcoming, and knowledge
about traditional justice remains limited.
There have been some changes made in the traditional structures,
as they are adapting to an evolving national judicial structure.
Customarily, traditional justice practices in villages in East Timor
have not dealt with mass murderers or militia crimes. Prior to the
referendum violence of 1999, outsiders perpetrated serious crimes.
Communities faced "ordinary crimes" such as theft, assault, and
murder. Crimes were dealt with on different levels. Whereas murder
and rape were handled at the village level, domestic violence and
theft were mostly handled between families, as would be the case in
marriages and divorce. Because the of the United Nations' judicial
reforms, murder and rape are now dealt with in the formal justice
structure, in so far as victims report these crimes.
Because East Timor is a largely poor and agricultural society,
crimes are underreported and the interagency process of investigating
and prosecuting crimes lacks cooperation. It is not in the economic
interest of communities to expel or lock up their citizens, and the
formal justice system can seem inadequate or inappropriate.
Traditional practices have been crucial to negotiating ways in which
to integrate the perpetrator back into the community, so that he or
she can once again contribute to the productivity of the village.
Village leaders raised concerns that the apprehension of a perpetrator
may not address the economic and social suffering of those
concerned. Hence, the perpetrator faces an additional punishment by
local villagers upon his or her return.
Despite some of the problems in coordinating the national and
local judicial practices, the reintegration of returnees in East Timor is
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an ongoing process. As part of the District Returns Committees,
UNTAET works in cooperation with UNHCR and District Human
Rights Officers to prepare communities for the returns. In contrast,
peacekeepers and CivPol officers assist in the safety aspect of the
returnees, in order to ensure that they are not victims of retaliatory
actions. CivPol detains a returnee when it becomes clear in any step
of the process of reintegration that the returnee has committed a
serious crime. In all other cases, the Committees determine whether
returnees will be accepted back into the communities without the
danger of violent retribution.
The United Nations has also held reconciliation meetings between
villagers and former militia leaders seeking to return. 425 The East
Timor Transitional Cabinet also created a Community Reconciliation
Process for dealing with less serious offenses that were the judicial
system does not process.426 In late May 2001, a major reconciliation
meeting between pro and anti-independence leaders took place, but
for security reasons militia leaders were excluded from the talks.427
The question of creating an international tribunal to address the
post-referendum violence has been a politically sensitive one, and
one that has been deferred repeatedly. While the Secretary-General
of Komnas HAM stated that he would support the creation of such a
tribunal, President Wahid and others do not apparently share his
preferences. Rather, this is an outcome that the Indonesian
government would prefer to avoid, and the few attempts at
prosecutions and the creation of an "ad hoc" tribunal appear to be
425. See East Timor: U.N. Holds Reconciliation Meeting Between Militia and
Villagers, U.N. NEWS, Feb. 2, 2000 (reporting the United Nations' efforts to
reconciliation gatherings), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/news/O I feb02.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
426. See East Timor Cabinet Backs Creation of Truth Commission to Record
Rights Abuses, supra note 420 (discussing the Cabinet's willingness to create a
Reconciliation Commission).
427. See Joanna Jolly, East Timorese Anti and Pro-Independence Leaders Hold
Landmark Talks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 24, 2001 (revealing reconciliation talks
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measures used to placate the international community and prevent
the setting up of such a tribunal.42 g
b. Lessons from East Timor: Problems of Mixed Tribunals
Clearly, some progress has been made in East Timor in addressing
the crimes perpetrated either during annexation or during the post-
referendum wave of violence.429 However, many issues remain.
While approximately seventy individuals are being held in East
Timor, courts there have had, and will continue to have, great
difficulty in reaching the higher levels of those responsible. In
addition, the Indonesian public and the Indonesian political and
judicial systems do not seem prepared or eager to pursue these
crimes.430 There is no perfect solution to this dilemma. It is likely that
many concerned parties will be unsatisfied with a solution limited to
East Timor.
The Special Panel has been plagued by financial and staffing
difficulties, the repercussions of which should not be minimized.43" '
However, even in the absence of these difficulties, its functioning
would still have been problematic. In Indonesia, many perpetrators
continue to remain at large, with little possibility of their future
428. See East Timor: Indonesian Parliament Endoress ad hoc Human Rights
Courts, ASIA HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS, Mar. 23, 2003 (reporting that Asmara
Nababan stated that the lower house of parliament agreed to establish two ad hoc
tribunals to hear cases on human rights violations); available at
http://www.ahrchk.net/news/mainfile.php/ahmews_200103/1742/ (last visited Dec.
18, 2003).
429. See Suzannah Linton, Rising From The Ashes: The Creation of a Viable
Criminal Justice System in East Timor, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 122, 176 (2001)
(concluding that while remarkable achievements have been made in the creation of
a viable judicial system, the management of this system still has a long way to go).
430. See Barbara Cochrane Alexander, East Timor: Will There be Justice?, 8
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 5, 6 (2000) (explaining that the primary reason that an
international tribunal is opposed within the country is that international law would
be used instead of the Indonesian Criminal Code).
431. See Katzenstein, supra note 360, 257-58 (proposing that the U.N.
administration severely underestimated the costs involved in building and
sustaining the civil and judicial institutions).
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apprehension.432 Prosecutions have been sporadic at best, and there
have been serious concerns about due process. 433 As a result, this
appears to have seriously harmed the credibility of the Special Panel
as an institution appears. Although the Timorese call for an
international tribunal, they remain skeptical of the international
community's interest in accountability.434 Some, but not all, of the
needs of the society and the victims of the crimes may be served by
formal inquires and reconciliations. 435  As one commentator
suggested, while mixed tribunals were a novel response intended to
remedy the shortcomings of domestic or international proceedings or
international, the risk remains that these institutions might
incorporate the worst aspects of domestic and international systems,
rather than the best.436 Thus, prospects for mixed tribunals in Sierra
Leone or Cambodia should be cautious at best.
B. SIERRA LEONE
As in East Timor, a complex system of a commission of inquiry
and a mixed tribunal has been created in Sierra Leone to address
432. See id. at 271 (suggesting that by June 2003 a very large number of killings
that would have fit the category of crimes against humanity will be left
unexamined).
433. See id. at 253 (stating that no defense witnesses were called for the first
fourteen cases prosecuted, accused are routinely detained beyond the seventy-two
hour limit without a preliminary hearing, some accused have been left in prisons
for months and even years while awaiting trial, cases have been delayed for lack of
translators or judges, for the past year the Special Court of Appeals has not
operated, judges neglected to apply international law or applied it incorrectly in
cases that have been prosecuted, handing down harsh sentences for low-level
perpetrators).
434. See id. at 251-52 (expressing that nearly three years after its establishment,
"many have expressed disappointment with the tribunal's shortcomings," and
"even in cases it adjudicated, the tribunal's process has been criticized").
435. See id. at 252 (quoting a public defender as saying "the fact that the
situation has improved for the prosecution is irrelevant when the other two organs
of the court - the judges and defense - are not functioning").
436. See Katzenstein, supra note 360, at 246 (asserting that to date the tribunal
has been criticized for its inefficiency, minimization of local participation, and
failure to uphold due process standards).
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accountability for past abuses.437 While both institutions are too new
to assess properly, it is worth examining their features briefly, and
considering the prospects for success. Certainly, the relevance of
proceedings in the tribunal is of concern to many in the international
community who seek to support it. This would suggest that the
international community has recognized key concerns from the
Timorese experience. Whether a mixed tribunal can surmount
problems, such as the disconnect between international and local
processes, and a lack of understanding by, or inclusion of, the local
population, remains to be seen. Sierra Leone may well prove an
interesting test case.
The United Nations created the Special Court pursuant to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1315 in August 2000."' The court's
statute, completed on January 16, 2002, gives it the power to
prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious
violations of national and international humanitarian law since
November 30, 1996.439 The crimes within the ambit of the court
include crimes against humanity, violations of common article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions and additional protocol II, other serious
violations of international humanitarian law, and crimes under
437. See Special Court Agreement, 2002, Ratification Act, 2002 Supplement to
Sierra Leone Gazette, vol. CXXX, No. II (Mar. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Ratification
Act 2002] (outlining the administration of the Special Court).
438. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1315 (2000) ("Recognizing that, in the particular circumstances of Sierra
Leone, a credible system of justice and accountability for the very serious crimes
committed there would end impunity and would contribute to the process of
national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.").
439. See Statute for the Special Court, Office of the Attorney General and
Ministry of Justice, Special Court Task Force, art. 1 (Jan. 16, 2002) [hereinafter
Special Court Statute] (stating that in "the event the sending States is unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry out an investigation or prosecution, the Court may, if
authorized by the Security Council on the proposal of any State, exercise
jurisdiction over such persons"), available at
http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/Statute.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
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national law.440 In March 2002, the agreement for the court was
formally ratified."'
Eight to eleven judges of mixed international backgrounds sit on
the court."2 Following the agreement between the United Nations
and the government of Sierra Leone, the Trial Chamber is to contain
of three judges, one appointed by the government and two by the
U.N. Secretary-General, based on nominations from member
states." 3 Any additional Trial Chambers would be similarly
composed. Five judges are to serve on the appeals chamber, of whom
two will be selected by the government, and three by the Secretary-
General .'4
1. Relation to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The establishment of the Special Court is contemporaneous with
the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission." 5 In
principle, their responsibilities do not overlap and there ought not be
440. See id. art. 2 (stating that "[t]he Special Court shall have the power to
prosecute persons who committed the following crimes as part of a widespread or
system attack against any civilian population," such as murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, and rape).
441. See Ratification Act 2002, supra note 437 (providing that the President and
Members of Parliament enacted the agreement).
442. See Special Court Statute, supra note 439, art. 12 (providing that three
judges shall service on the Trial Chamber and five judges shall serve in the
Appeals Chamber).
443. See id. (providing further that "[i]f, at the request of the President of the
Special Court, an alternate judge or judges have been appointed by the
Government of Sierra Leone or the Secretary-General, the presiding judge of a
Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber shall designate such an alternate judge to
be present at each stage of the trial and to replace a judge if that judge is unable to
continue sitting").
444. See id. (stating that "[e]ach judge shall serve only in the Chamber to which
he or she has been appointed").
445. See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and The
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, art. VI (July 7, 1999) (creating a
Commission for the Consolidation of Peace to ensure "reconciliation and the
welfare of all parties to the conflict, especially the victims of war), available at
http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
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any conflicts between the two institutions." 6 The Commission, as is
common for commissions of inquiry, is of course not to punish, but
rather to investigate the causes, nature, and extent of the violence,
and also to make recommendations regarding reparations and legal,
political, and administrative reform.447 However, concerns remain
about the handling of evidence and witnesses, in particular."48 There
is a possibility that evidence disclosed to the Commission, which has
a different remit and evidentiary requirements, could also be brought
before the court.449 Care must be taken to ensure that the introduction
of such evidence does not violate due process, and that those who
provide evidence are not at risk.
2. Relation to the Judiciary and National Legal Authorities
The Special Court is an exceptional institution, meaning that it is
not part of the regular judiciary of the country.45° Offenses
prosecuted before it are not, as the ratification act explicitly states,
prosecuted in the name of the country.41 The court can request
assistance from the Attorney-General, to identify and locate persons,
serve documents, arrest or detain, or transfer persons to the court.45 2
446. See The Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, 6 (Feb. 2000) (noting that the
"object for which the Commission is established is to create an impartial historical
record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law
related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone"), available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/trcact2000.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
447. See id. (stating further that the object of the Commissions including
addressing impunity, responding to the needs of the victims, promoting healing
and reconciliation, and preventing a repetition of the violations and abuses that
occurred).
448. See Celina Schocken, The Special Court For Sierra Leone: Overview and
Recommendations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L. L. 436, 452-53 (2002) (indicating that
some witnesses do not speak English do not have access to translators).
449. See id. at 456 (stating "there is nothing in the TRC Act preventing
testimony given at the TRC from being used in a prosecution by the SCSL or a
national court.").
450. See Ratification Act 2002, supra note 437, part III, art. 11(2) (stating that
"[t]he Special Court shall not form part of the Judiciary of Sierra Leone").
451. See id. part III, art. 13 ("Offences prosecuted before the Special Court are
not prosecuted in the name of the Republic of Sierra Leone.").
452. See id. part IV, art. 15 (stating that a "request for assistance made by the
Special Court may include, but shall not be limited to - (a) identification and
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Conversely, the Minster of Justice and the Attorney-General can
make requests to the court for assistance in transmitting statements
and other evidence, and questioning persons detained by the court.453
The court is formally separate from the judicial system of Sierra
Leone.454 This separation has created concerns among the members
of the court that they must ensure that they leave a "legacy" for the
country beyond the specific trials. External actors, such as donors
and the United Nations, are also concerned that activities of the court
serve to benefit and strengthen the domestic legal and judicial
system. This is particularly important in Sierra Leone, where the
court system lacks even the most basic elements, including law
reports from past decisions. The system is rife with funding and
morale problems, corruption, and challenges to independence.
Members of the court have attempted to engage in outreach to
domestic legal authorities, members of civil-society groups, and the
law school in Freetown. This outreach effort is intended to build
basic legal capacity, to explain role of the prosecutions, and the
procedure, and include the rationale for due process and the need for
defense attorneys. 455 The relationship of the court to national justice
mechanisms has not been consistently positive. The court has
necessarily lured many talented legal experts away from current or
potential roles in the national legal system. It has also taken land
from the Prison Service, including land intended for a new training
school.
At least superficially, actors involved in the functions of the
special courts, whether from United Nations Development
Programme, bilateral donors and the World Bank, or the judges
location of persons; (b) service of documents; (c) arrest or detention of persons;
and (d) transfer of an indictee to the Special Court").
453. See id. part IV, art. 19 ("The Attorney-General may make a request for
assistance to the Special Court for the purposes of any investigation into or trial in
respect of any act or omission that may constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Special Court.").
454. See id. part III, art. 11(2) (stating that the "Special Court shall not form part
of the Judiciary of Sierra Leone").
455. See Jess Bravin, Peace vs. Justice: A Prosecutor Vows No Deals For Thugs
In Sierra Leone War, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2003, at Al (indicating that "the
special court has trained local attorneys and sent teams to explain legal concepts to
villagers, soldiers and students").
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themselves, are far more concerned with the impact of the court on
victims, the wider community, and national legal capacity than has
been the case in other externalized, or mixed tribunal, experiences.456
This is certainly a positive development. However, there have been
negative effects on local capacity, and outreach is as yet limited.457
The court, correctly, is not designed to be a mechanism to build
national legal capacity. Concerns should remain, however, if the
court diverts attention and resources from other domestic needs as it
appears likely to do. It may be the case that the experience of the
court will be better than that in East Timor. If so, it might help guide
the practice of the proposed tribunal for Cambodia, if it ever comes
into being.
C. CAMBODIA
Responses to the genocide in Cambodia has not directly addressed
with the principle of universal jurisdiction as they did in East Timor.
Instead, much of the debate has focused on the nature of a potential
tribunal or court institution.458 Key questions in the debate include:
would there be an international tribunal like those for Rwanda and
Yugoslavia? Would there merely be domestic prosecutions? Would
there be a U.N. tribunal operating within Cambodia's borders?
459
While a few former members of the Khmer Rouge have been
arrested on charges of murder and genocide under a 1994 law that
banned the Khmer Rouge, the real dispute has been over the
composition and control of any tribunal. Not surprisingly, the
456. See Schocken, supra note 448, at 437 (stating that a goal of the Special
Court is to make it "more relevant to the lives of ordinary Sierra Leone citizens
trying to put their lives back together after the war than the ICTR and ICTY have
proven to be for victims in Rwanda and Yugoslavia").
457. See Douglas Farah, Sierra Leone Court May Offer Model for War Crimes
Cases; Hybrid Tribunal, with Limited Lifespan, Focuses on Higher-Ups, WASH.
POST, Apr. 15, 2003, at A21 (acknowledging that "horrible people will walk away"
but there is only the capacity to try those with the greatest responsibility).
458. See Daniel Kemper Donovan, Joint UN. - Cambodia Efforts To Establish
A Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 44 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 551, 551-64 (2003) (summarizing
the history of discussions over the establishment of a Khmer Rouge Tribunal).
459. See Yale University Cambodian Genocide Program, Chronology of a
Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 1994-2003 (2002) [hereinafter Chronology] (providing a
useful overview of the long road to the proposed tribunal), available at
http://www.yale.edu/cgp/chron-v3.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
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Cambodian government has sought to control any tribunal. By late
1999, Prime Minister Hun Sen proposed that Cambodian judges
outnumber U.N.-appointed judges three to two, as negotiations on
the draft tribunal law continued. 460 By late April of 2000, the
Cambodian government agreed to a proposal by Senator John Kerry
that would provide three Cambodian judges and two foreign judges;
four judges would have to agree to prevent a case from going
forward.46'
The National Assembly passed legislation for the establishment of
extraordinary chambers for prosecutions of these specific crimes on
January 2, 2001.462 These chambers would constitute a tribunal, and
would be made up of Cambodian and foreign judges.4 63 The
Cambodian government approached the United Nations for support
for the court. However, talks between the government and the United
Nations stalled over the United Nations' concerns that the
government would not ensure the independence of the tribunal.464
The United Nations demanded, specifically, that the government,
which includes officials with links to the Khmer Rouge, cede all
control over the tribunal. This demand seemed unlikely to be
effective.465 In the absence of a United Nations role, the governments
of India and South Africa offered support for the tribunal.466
460. See id. (stating that the United States set forth the proposal that Hun Sen
endorsed).
461. See Bruce Zagaris, Cambodia and U.N. Agree to Establish International
Criminal Court, 16 INT'L. ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 840, 840 (2000) (explaining that
the United Nations will create a pretrial chamber of three Cambodian and two non-
Cambodian judges to resolve disputes, and that a "supermajority" vote of four
judges would be required to block an indictment).
462. See Reach Kram, Cambodian Genocide Program (2001) (setting forth the
general provisions that provided for the establishment of extraordinary chambers in
the courts of Cambodia for the crimes committed during the period of Democratic
Kampuchea), available at http://www.yale.edu/cgp/cgpintro.html (last visited Oct.
22, 2003).
463. See id. art. 9 (outlining the composition of the extraordinary chambers).
464. See Donovan, supra note 458, at 564 (noting that "the United Nations cited
continuing concerns over the independence, impartiality, and objectivity of the
tribunal envisioned by Cambodia").
465. See id. at 569.
466. See Cambodia: Talks on Khmer Rouge Tribunal Resume After Year's
Hiatus, U.N. WIRE, Feb. 19, 2003 (reporting that human rights activists were not
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However, the impasse was resolved, and in June 2003, the United
Nations and the Cambodian government signed an agreement to set
up a mixed tribunal, a move human rights groups have criticized out
of fear that the government will have excessive control.
467
Procedures in East Timor and Sierra Leone, and perhaps
Cambodia, would not be novel in their use of foreign judges in
internal trials. A few countries regularly do so, though concerns are
raised in those contexts as well as to the sensitivity of foreign judges
to local contexts. Mixed tribunals can be designed to avoid some of
the difficulties that arise when trials take place at a distance. They
may engage to a greater degree with the local communities and
authorities. However, as the experience in East Timor suggests, they
may not do so to a sufficient degree, and may lead to
disillusionment. 468 At the same time, there remains a risk that
outsiders as judges, even when part of an institution that also
includes local judges, will be less aware of local needs and customs.
CONCLUSION
In this essay, I examined the phenomenon of globalized, or what I
have termed externalized, justice, looking largely at the exercise of
universal jurisdiction, but also at the shortcomings of the
international criminal tribunal for Rwanda. I have also looked at
externalization reversed, or the use of mixed tribunals with foreign
and national judges, as a possible solution to some of the flaws of
externalization. I find that while the move towards global justice is in
many ways heartening, we ought not to believe that it is a panacea.
Trials for mass atrocities and gross human rights violations are
increasing. Whether in the international war crimes tribunals for the
optimistic about the prospects for the speedy establishment of the tribunal),
available at http://www.unwire.org[U.N.Wire/20030219/32105_story.asp (last
visited Oct. 22, 2003).
467. See G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/57/228B (2003) (noting "[t]he purpose of the present Agreement is to
regulate the cooperation between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia in bringing to trial senior leaders of the Democratic Kampuchea.").
468. See Katzenstein, supra note 360, at 246 (noting that "many criticized the
tribunal for its inefficiency, for minimizing local participation, and for failing to
uphold due process standards").
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former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in regional human rights courts, or
through the exercise of universal jurisdiction in domestic courts, ex-
dictators, and others who imposed terror upon civilians, are being
held accountable. There is good reason for human rights advocates,
and indeed the international community, to celebrate. There is,
however, reason for caution, particularly with respect to the exercise
of universal jurisdiction.
While the Belgian government has scaled back legislation,
examining its recent practice in the exercise of universal jurisdiction,
as well as that of other states, offers us an opportunity to reflect upon
the virtues, but also the vices, of pursuing criminals far from the site
of their crimes.469 Heralding the global reach of the rule of law may
obscure the flaws of external trials-specifically, that such trials may
fail to achieve many of the goods often ascribed to trials at home,
and might even provoke a backlash. To the degree that global justice
is sporadic and pursued in only a handful of cases, it is also likely to
appear to be unfair and illegitimate to many.
Prosecutions are thought to serve a myriad of goals, among them
deterrence of future abuses, contribution to stability and the rule of
law where it was previously lacking, vindication for the victims, and
social reconciliation and education. Debates are rife as to whether
these goals are served by domestic trials or trials pursued through the
exercise of universal jurisdiction. In Europe, crimes committed in
Africa and Latin America seem particularly unlikely to achieve any
of these goals.
Deterrence, always a difficult effect to demonstrate, seems
particularly unlikely where only a handful of cases are pursued very
far from home. A potential tyrant will simply estimate that there is
very little likelihood that he or she will be indicted, particularly if he
or she avoids countries with active judiciaries. Such trials are also
unlikely to serve stability and the rule of law. While the prospect for
serious upheaval in a country in reaction to its leader being brought
to book is not great, it is not out of the question. Certainly, Slobodan
469. See generally Mark A. Summers, The International Court of Justice's
Decision in Congo v. Belgium: How It Affected the Development of a Principle of
Universal Jurisdiction that Would Oblige All States to Prosecute War Criminals,
21 B.U. INT'L L. J. 63 (2003) (providing an overview of the use of universal
jurisdiction since Congo v. Belgium).
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Milosevic has not missed an opportunity to grandstand for
nationalists at home while on trial in The Hague. 47° At the same time
cases pursued abroad may deprive the country's judiciary of an
opportunity to build its own capacity; there is increasing concern that
the trend towards pursuing Turkish human rights cases at the
European Court of Human Rights is doing just that. 7'
At the same, time vindication for victims, a critical concern, may
not be achieved, or may be achieved very poorlym precisely because
of the distance from the society where the crimes occurred and from
the victims themselves. Victims are unlikely in many instances to
have the opportunity to take part in proceedings far away; they and
their communities may even be unaware that such proceedings are
taking place. In many instances limited media coverage and access
exacerbates this problem. This is a common complaint with regard to
the tribunal for Rwanda; as trials occur in neighboring Tanzania,
which is in close proximity to victims in comparison to Belgium or
Spain, many Rwandans do not have the opportunity to follow or
understand the proceedings. This not only leaves many victims
without information, but also means that such trials may not really
penetrate society and contribute to reconciliation.
We should also be concerned about the uneven fashion in which
state practice has developed in this area. The expected revisions to
the Belgian legislation would take the significant step of allowing
trials in absentia, which would allow Belgian courts to potentially
address a great many more cases. But Belgian courts alone have
limited capacity, and the courts of most states, even where they are
willing to exercise universal jurisdiction, are far more cautious. This
470. See Marc Champion, Sympathy for Milosevic Grows among the Serbs as
his Trial Continues; Even those who Opposed him Admire his Courtroom
Performance; Feeling that Serbia is in the Dock, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 10, 2003,
at Al (remarking that Milosevic uses court time to promote his politics).
471. See Paul J. Magnarella, The Legal, Political, and Cultural Structures of
Human Rights Protections and Abuses in Turkey, 3 D. C. L. J. INT'L. L. & PRAC.
439, 465 (1994) (discussing that in response to the 300 individual petitions by
Turkish citizens against Turkey before the European Human Rights Commission,
and thirty cases against Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights in July
1994, Turkey's foreign minister stated that it was a result of "the poor quality of
justice in the state of emergency region" and warned that "if the quality of justice




leaves potentially wide holes in the net of global justice. Why are the
crimes of leaders in the Democratic Republic of Congo more heinous
than those who massacred villagers in Guatemala? They are not. But
when forced to make choices about which cases to pursue, some
perpetrators will be prosecuted over others. This disparity will seem
unfair to victims and perpetrators alike.
One possible response to the flaws identified here with external
justice, and with its uneven application, is the use of reverse
externalized procedures such as mixed tribunals. These "mixed
tribunals"-which may involve domestic and external judges and/or
a complicated mixture of domestic and international law, have been
created for East Timor and for Sierra Leone, and protracted
negotiations regarding one for Cambodia continue. However, the
experience of East Timor suggests reason for caution-such
"externalization reversed" may not necessarily overcome the
problems identified with externalization, such as gaps and
inconsistency in practice that may lead to concerns about legitimacy,
deterrence, and inability to effectively "do justice." '472 There may also
be a risk that external actors, and the law from external sources, may
not be sufficiently attentive to local needs and customs.
This does not mean that use of externalized justice mechanisms is
never appropriate or effective. One fundamental goal of law, whether
international or domestic, is to ensure that individuals responsible for
serious crimes are duly punished, or at the very least constrained
from repeating them. Here progress made in the externalization of
justice has allowed a great many individuals responsible for war
crimes, torture, crimes against humanity, and genocide to be brought
to book where they otherwise might never have been. This is a
momentous development, but we should be prepared to look past
rhetoric to ask whether there are not also costs.
472. See Katzenstein, supra note 360, at 246 (noting that the initial problems
with the hybrid tribunals are that they are inefficient, minimize local participation,
and fail to uphold due process standards).
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